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Abstract 
 
Over the last hundred years, competing and incompatible positions in relation to basic 
problems of knowledge and the use of the verb ‘to know’ have multiplied; and the prospect of a 
consensus solution emerging with respect to any of the problems has not seemed particularly 
good. We have a Gordian knot. Even so, I suggest that we also have a way to cut it. This will 
involve identifying why the cognitive mechanism that produces our intuitions of knowing 
evolved and was maintained (by natural selection), i.e., identifying the ‘teleonomic function’ of 
that cognitive mechanism. Also, it will involve predicting, on the basis of this teleonomic 
function, the triggering-conditions of these natural knowledge intuitions. In this thesis, I 
develop a general theory of the origin, function and triggering-conditions of knowledge 
intuitions that will allow us to cut that knot. That theory follows basic biological theory 
(including that which pertains to natural altruism) and also signal detection theory. 
 
My theory identifies a number of different circumstances under which the triggering-conditions 
of knowledge intuitions are different. Strikingly, these different circumstances (and their 
associated triggering-conditions) map onto the different competing and incompatible 
epistemological positions to which I referred. This suggests that these positions are all correct 
within the boundaries of one of the circumstances that my theory identifies; and that the 
Gordian knot is largely the result of epistemologists claiming universal applicability of a theory 
that in fact only applies under particular circumstances. We cut the knot by specifying the 
different circumstances under which each of the different epistemological positions will hold, 
and the reason we should expect it to hold in just these circumstances, in light of the 
teleonomic function of knowledge intuitions.  
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Chapter 1 
 
1.1 Overview  
 
The epistemological enterprise seems to be in a bad state. Over the last hundred years, 
theoretical positions on basic problems of knowledge, and on the use of the verb ‘to know’ and 
its cognates, have come apart rather than coalesced. In fact, it seems that every incompatible 
position has been staked out: (1) that the meaning of ‘know’ is not revealed in ordinary or 
everyday contexts, but it is in high-standard contexts (e.g., scientific contexts), (2) that the 
meaning of ‘know’ is revealed in ordinary contexts, but not in high-standard contexts, (3) that 
the evidential standard for knowledge is influenced by the practical interests of knowledge 
attributors, but not the subjects of those attributions, (4) that the standard is influenced by the 
practical interests of the subjects of knowledge attributions, but not the attributors’, and (5) 
that the standard is not influenced by the practical interests of any particular individual at all. 
Further, Gettier-Style Cases do not seem to fit comfortably in any theory of knowledge that has 
a wide base of support; and there is no agreement on how to analyse sceptical challenges (i.e., 
cases in which doubt is produced by the introduction of an extremely unlikely alternative 
hypothesis). (Title case terms, and capitalized acronyms which I use further on, receive entries 
in Appendix 5: Defined Terms.) 
 
The prospect of a consensus solution or agreement emerging with respect to any of the basic 
problems of knowledge or the correct way to account for the use of ‘know’ has not seemed 
particularly good. We have a Gordian knot. Even so, I suggest that we also have a way to cut it. 
This will involve investigating the origin and function of knowing—or, better, the origin and 
function of the intuition of knowing.  
 
Let me be clear about the extension I have in mind when I use the expression ‘intuition of 
knowing’. When we have such an intuition, in that moment, we believe without doubt, and we 
are certain that we would do well to act or form an attitude as if that which we take ourselves 
as knowing is true. Further, it seems as if these intuitions arise very often, with quick 
succession; and, also, very often go unnoticed. For example, this morning I took myself as 
knowing that my alarm clock was working properly when it went off, took myself as knowing 
that the clothes I planned to wear would be appropriate, took myself as knowing that each of 
the reports that I got from my trusted news outlet was reasonably accurate, etc. Additionally, 
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notice that these intuitions are, in the moment that they arise, decisive and absolute. In the 
moment that I received a news report from my trusted news outlet, I had no doubt that it was 
reasonably accurate. Unlike a degree of belief, the intuition of knowing seems to follow from a 
firm and final decision—even if such a decision is not reflectively accessible and even if a 
contradictory intuition may arise a moment later. So, one either intuits that one knows or not, 
either there is a doubt in the moment or not, and there is no middle ground. Call these 
intuitions, ‘Knowledge Intuitions’.  
 
My investigation into the origin and function of Knowledge Intuitions is based on the 
assumption that, regardless of the context in which they arise, they are produced by a 
functionally discrete cognitive mechanism that evolved by natural selection. (This is an 
intentional idealization, the nature of which I discuss in §3.1.) Such a mechanism will have a 
Teleonomic Function, i.e., a function that explains why it evolved and was maintained, and what 
role it has played in our survival and reproduction. I call this cognitive device the ‘Knowledge 
Intuition Producer’ or KIP.  
 
My investigation starts by hypothesizing the Teleonomic Function of the KIP. I then develop a 
general theory of Knowledge Intuitions based on that function. Development of the theory is 
consistent with basic biological theory and it draws on Signal Detection Theory (which I discuss 
in §4.2). My theory of Knowledge Intuitions purports to explain why, given the evidence, we 
have or fail to have intuitions of knowing that particular world conditions obtain, and purports 
to identify the triggering-conditions of these natural Knowledge Intuitions. (To be clear, the 
triggering-conditions indicate the conditions under which Knowledge Intuitions are predicted to 
be produced under ordinary circumstances. The process could well be derailed by extraordinary 
events.) Furthermore, I find (in §1.2.2) that the use of ‘know’ is dependent on Knowledge 
Intuitions. So, if this last finding is correct, then my explanatory theory may serve also as a 
general explanatory theory of the use of ‘know’. 
 
A key prediction of my theory is that the triggering-conditions for Knowledge Intuitions depend 
on certain circumstances— such as whether one is focused on one’s own practical interests or 
focused on helping others, and whether one is envisaging communicating to a large audience. I 
use the predicted effects of such circumstances to understand the state of epistemology. In 
particular, I find that for any one of the incompatible positions ((1) to (5) above) it is possible to 
describe the set of circumstances under which the position works, and other circumstances in 
which it does not. So, it looks like all of those basic positions are correct within the boundaries 
of one of my sets of circumstances. The picture emerges that epistemology seems to be in a 
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bad state and that we have a Gordian knot mainly because epistemologists overgeneralize, as a 
matter of course. They claim universal applicability of a theory that in fact applies to only a 
subset (though usually an important subset) of knowledge cases. We cut the knot by specifying 
the different circumstances under which each of the different epistemological positions will 
hold, and the reason we should expect it to hold in just these circumstances, in light of the 
Teleonomic Function of Knowledge Intuitions. 
 
I note as well that the developed theory is consistent with all the knowledge cases that I tested 
it against, including Gettier-Style Cases (Chapter 8), sceptical challenges (and paradoxes) 
(§7.2.4), and even cases that feature rational acceptance (§4.3.2.4). 
 
Moreover, the picture that emerges from the theory I develop suggests a framework of sorts 
for epistemology—a framework described by the different circumstances under which 
Knowledge Intuitions have different triggering-conditions. Viewing the field of epistemology 
through the lens of this framework allows us to see and appreciate a far greater richness in the 
field than we do otherwise. If one assumes that all but one of a group of competing theories is 
incorrect, when in fact several of those theories shed light on a range of cases, one will have 
failed to appreciate the insight offered by those theories that one has dismissed, and may well 
also dismiss valuable observations and findings on which those theories are based. 
 
 
1.2 Establishing a Conception of Knowledge Intuitions 
 
The basic conception of Knowledge Intuitions that I will present in my developed model is 
consistent with a large body of prima facie evidence. On that conception, Knowledge Intuitions 
are mental states that play a critical role in determining, at once (a) the picture we have of the 
world, (b) our use of ‘know’, and (c) our actions and attitudes.1 In the following three sections, I 
present some of the prima facie evidence that supports this view. 
 
 
1.2.1 Our Ordinary Picture of the World 
                                                          
1 A Knowledge Intuition appears to be an entirely different mental state than the ‘feeling of knowing’, at 
least in the way many conceptualize the latter. It seems the standard view is that the latter feeling is a 
metamemory state. It is a feeling of having memories of a certain kind without having actually retrieved 
those memories. 
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Very many of our ordinary Knowledge Intuitions pertain to the existence of non-perceptible, 
though inferable, world conditions. I refer here specifically to ordinary world conditions that are 
relevant to our being able to navigate the world, i.e., to perform actions and form attitudes that 
would advance our interests. Our taking ourselves as knowing that these conditions hold greatly 
contributes to the ordinary picture that we have of the world. Let us look at some of these non-
perceptible world conditions to which Knowledge Intuitions often pertain. 
 
We may take ourselves as knowing that objects have simple, non-perceptible (though inferable) 
physical properties. For example, we may take ourselves as knowing that the surface and 
interior of the wood shelf is made from the same material, that the car parked outside is heavy 
(even though we have not tried to lift it), and that the glass in the doctor’s office is transparent 
and reveals an outdoor scene (even though we have not checked to see whether it is not in fact 
the front of a television showing an outdoor scene). We may take ourselves as knowing that 
objects have complex, non-perceptible (though inferable) physical properties. For example, we 
may take ourselves as knowing that the watch is working properly or that the elevator has 
design features that make it safe to ride. We may take ourselves as knowing that objects have 
non-perceptible (though inferable) abstract properties. For example, we may take ourselves as 
knowing that the man is wearing his own shirt (as opposed to someone else’s), that I am 
located in my country’s capital city, or that at least one of several nearby gas stations is open 
for business at this moment. We may take ourselves as knowing that particular people have 
non-perceptible (though inferable) attributes. For example, we may take ourselves as knowing 
that the woman has my best interests at heart, that the man is looking out for himself, that the 
accused is guilty, that the woman knows that she made a mistake, and that the politician is truly 
on my side. We may take ourselves as knowing that organizations or systems have non-
perceptible (though inferable) attributes. For example, we may take ourselves as knowing that 
the political system is rigged, or that the health care system is doing a good job. We may take 
ourselves as knowing that non-perceptible (though inferable) causal events have occurred or 
that future events will occur. For example, we may take ourselves as knowing that the steep 
rise in interest rates depressed the housing market, that the bank will be open this Saturday, or 
that the sun will rise in the East tomorrow. 
 
As I suggested above, Knowledge Intuitions seem to follow from a firm decision about the 
existence of a world condition. There is no doubt in the moment that they arise. As a result, 
Knowledge Intuitions, produced in the moment by the KIP, seem to help us get an ordinary 
picture of the world that is relatively unambiguous—one that is filled with distinct solid and 
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weighty objects, filled with people who have good or bad intentions, filled with systems and 
organizations that may work well or badly, and filled with events that are causally connected 
though those connections may be non-perceptible. 
 
 
1.2.2 The Use of ‘Know’ 
 
I suggest that the ordinary use of ‘know’, in knowledge attributions and denials, generally 
depends on Knowledge Intuitions; the use depends on these mental events. (This claim 
contrasts with claims that suggest that the use of ‘know’ reflects a particular concept, 
definition, or theory of knowledge.) However, I set aside entirely the use of ‘know’ in (a) 
knowledge attributions and denials that are either intended to mislead or to be ironic, and in 
(b) second-person and third-person knowledge attributions and denials that are made in order 
to explain successful behaviour, or unsuccessful behaviour respectively2. 
 
We have compelling prima facie evidence that the use of ‘know’ depends on the production of 
Knowledge Intuitions, i.e., it depends on not having doubt in the moment. Consider the clear 
oddity of the sentence, ‘I know the train company will put me up in a hotel if I miss the 
connection, though I do have some doubts on the matter’; or the sentence, ‘I do not know that 
the bank will be open on Saturday, though I do not have any doubt that it will’. When we have 
doubt, even the slightest doubt, I suggest we ordinarily either flat out deny knowing, or we 
hedge and avoid claiming to know. Moreover, there are many different ways in which we may 
imply the presence of a doubt: ‘I think that p’, ‘I believe that p’ (the emphasis on the word 
‘believe’ suggesting only a degree of belief), ‘It may be that p’, ‘I’m pretty sure that p’, ‘It is 
plausible that p’, ‘I rationally accept that p’, ‘Let us assume for the moment that p’, or ‘I don’t 
know that p, but do know that probably p’. Moreover, when we have, in the moment, the 
intuition of knowing that p and have no doubt whatsoever, it seems that we ordinarily either 
claim to know, or avoid denying that we know. 
 
                                                          
2 I refer here to circumstances in which (a) a subject behaves as if p, (b) the behaviour proves successful, 
and (c) the success is explained by an observer using a second-person and third-person knowledge 
attribution. The observer may not intuit knowing that p, but may nonetheless attribute knowledge; and 
she does so in order to express the proposition that the success of the behaviour is a consequence of the 
subject being in possession of the truth. Consider, this example due to Peter Godfrey-Smith: ‘Jake arrived 
safely because he knew the lie of the land. He thought the quicksand was to the right, and that is where it 
was’ (1998, p.172). The observer may not have taken herself as knowing that the quicksand was to the 
right. 
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Notice too that ‘know’ has a linguistic characteristic that makes it a suitable linguistic sign for 
Knowledge Intuitions. Jason Stanley finds that the word ‘know’ does not come in ‘varying 
degrees of strength’ (2005, p.36). ‘Know’ is not gradable. This works hand-in-glove with 
Knowledge Intuitions insofar as, as I suggested earlier, the latter are decisive and absolute, and 
seem to follow from a firm and final decision that a world condition obtains. 
 
The thesis that the use of ‘know’ depends on Knowledge Intuitions provides a basis for an 
explanation of data that is at the centre of an important debate in epistemology. That data is 
the appearance that the standard of evidence reflected in the use of ‘know’ moves up and 
down, and this modulation seems to depend on the context in which knowledge attributions 
and denials are uttered. What principles are these modulations based on? What does the data 
tell us about the meaning of ‘know’? My investigation will suggest that the KIP is a cognitive 
device that has particular operating characteristics, which characteristics are consistent with its 
Teleonomic Function. So, the production of Knowledge Intuitions has these characteristics; and, 
if the use of ‘know’ depends on Knowledge Intuitions, then this use too will reflect these 
characteristics. I will show that these operating characteristics of the KIP are consistent with 
and explain the data in question.  
 
 
1.2.3 Actions and Attitudes 
 
I suggested that Knowledge Intuitions are, in the moment that they arise, decisive and absolute, 
and contrasted them with degrees of belief. We have no doubt at all in the moment when 
Knowledge Intuitions arise, whereas we have doubts that vary in intensity when we have a 
degree of belief. All other things being equal, the decisiveness of Knowledge Intuitions appears 
to allow a flexibility in our behaviour that we do not have when we have a degree of belief. In 
fact, the range of behaviours that may follow from knowing seems far greater. For example, if I 
have a degree of belief that the stock market will crash (and other conditions are met), I may 
sell my stocks. However, if I take myself as knowing that it will crash and have no doubt about it 
at all, then I might not only sell my stocks, but also see if I can bet against the stock market (or 
‘short’ the market). In fact, when one takes oneself as knowing that p, and so long as one 
continues to take oneself as knowing that p, i.e. so long as doubts don’t creep back in, it seems 
that there are no intrinsic limitations in relation to one’s behaving as if p (beside physical ones). 
If I take myself as knowing and have no doubt at all that the man will attempt to kill me, my 
behaviour may well breach ordinary boundaries. (Further on, we find that this is a reason, 
ultimately, that the elimination of all doubt, under some circumstances, requires very strong 
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evidence.) Moreover, this allowance of behavioural possibilities without intrinsic limitation 
occurs for us in the quick succession with which Knowledge Intuitions arise throughout the day. 
For example, if I take myself as knowing that the report I received from my trusted news outlet 
is accurate, then that Knowledge Intuition will allow the performance of a wide range of 
possible actions and the formation of a wide range of possible attitudes consistent with my 
taking myself as knowing that the news report is accurate. So, it seems that Knowledge 
Intuitions have some special role in controlling our actions and attitudes. (The foregoing might 
be read as suggesting that some behaviour may be controlled by degrees of belief. Moreover, it 
seems that our behaviour may also be controlled by the rational acceptance of a proposition. 
Even so, further on, in §4.3.2.4, a close examination of these cases reveal that the behaviour in 
these cases depends entirely on certain ancillary Knowledge Intuitions that generally go 
unnoticed. However, I set this aside for the moment because, as I suggested, my intention at 
this stage is merely to present some prima facie evidence that supports the conception of 
Knowledge Intuitions that emerges further on.) 
 
If my present claim that Knowledge Intuitions have a special role in controlling our actions and 
attitudes is correct, and my earlier claim that Knowledge Intuitions give voice to the ordinary 
use of ‘know’ is correct, then Knowledge Intuitions are a common cause of the performance of 
actions, the formation of attitudes and of the use of ‘know’. So, all three should be consistent. 
The ordinary utterance ‘I know that p’ should be a highly reliable indicator of the speaker acting 
or having an attitude as if p. (I note that attitudes as if p seem to very often relate to actions. 
For example, it seems typical that an attitude as if p involves being positively disposed to 
performing a particular range of possible actions in the event that a different proposition or set 
of propositions is subsequently taken as being known. If I take myself as knowing that it is a 
practical possibility that my house may one day catch fire, then I may form a positive attitude 
about buying fire insurance. If I later learn that the cost of fire insurance is low, then I will be 
prepared to buy it. I look at cases of this kind in §4.3.2.4.)  
 
The general hypothesis that there is a deep connection between the use of ‘know’ and the 
performance of actions is supported by an investigation conducted by John Hawthorne and 
Jason Stanley. (It is just this general hypothesis that is supported. There are a number of 
important differences between our accounts.) They find that ‘our ordinary folk appraisals 
[which are reflected in ordinary discourse] of the behaviour of others suggest that the concept 
of knowledge [that is reflected in ordinary discourse] is intimately intertwined with the 
rationality of action’ (2008, p.571). Further, ‘it bears emphasis that (in English at least) it is 
considerably more natural to appraise behaviour with the verb ‘know’ than the phrase “justified 
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belief”, or even “reasonable belief”’ (p.573). Hawthorne & Stanley suggest, for example, that 
the use of ’know’ in criticisms of action is a norm: ‘When someone acts on a belief that does not 
amount to knowledge, she violates the norm, and hence is subject to criticism’ (p.577). A 
mother berates her son who has just cancelled his health insurance on the basis that he does 
not know that he will not fall ill (pp.571-572).  
 
I note also that if, in fact, Knowledge Intuitions have the special role I described in controlling 
our actions and attitudes, then the operating characteristics of the KIP would have a profound 
effect on our ability to advance our interests, and on how well we do in life. Those 
characteristics would determine the circumstances under which intrinsic limitations on our 
behaviour are lifted. This situation seems to suggest that there could be practical reasons to 
modulate the standard of evidence that we set for producing Knowledge Intuitions. Compare 
the situation of (a) an agent A who will perform some everyday inconsequential action if she 
intuits knowing some ordinary proposition, and (b) an agent B who will respond accordingly if 
she intuits knowing that the man will attempt to kill her. B’s circumstances would call for a 
higher standard of evidence. In fact, the theory I will develop (particularly in §4.2, §4.3, and 
§5.2)—which, again, is based on a hypothesis about the biological function of Knowledge 
Intuitions and on Signal Detection Theory—predicts that the KIP may modulate evidential 
standards substantially, and in quick succession (discussed in §3.4). Moreover, the theory 
predicts a particular set of circumstantial factors that together determine the standard of 
evidence required to produce Knowledge Intuitions. I refer to this standard as the ‘Epistemic 
Standard’.  
 
However, if ‘know’ in fact gives voice to our Knowledge Intuitions, then the standard of 
evidence that appears to be reflected in our use of ‘know’ should be our Epistemic Standard; 
and our Epistemic Standard should determine the truth conditions of knowledge attributions 
and denials. For the sake of presentational simplicity, I will use the term ‘Epistemic Standard’ 
not only to refer to the standard that one’s evidence must meet in order to produce Knowledge 
Intuitions, but also to refer to the standard that we seem to apply when we use the word 
‘know’. (As an accommodation to presentational simplicity, this is not ideal: I am, to a large 
extent, adopting the working hypothesis that the word ‘know’ gives voice to our Knowledge 
Intuitions even before developing my theory of Knowledge Intuitions. Even so, making this 
accommodation seems worthwhile.)  
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1.3 Chapter Breakdown 
 
I suggested that theoretical positions on knowledge and the use of ‘know’ have come apart, 
rather than coalesced. In Chapter 2, I take a look at the epistemological literature over the last 
century—focusing on just this situation, and presenting the literature in a way that will facilitate 
later analysis and discussion based on my developed model. 
 
Chapters 3 and 4 focus on theory that will serve as the foundation of my model. In Chapter 3, I 
present a formal hypothesis of the Teleonomic Function of the KIP (that explains why it evolved 
and was maintained). This is based on basic biological theory. In Chapter 4, I look at what the 
operating principles of the KIP would have to be in order for it to perform the Teleonomic 
Function described in Chapter 3. This work is based on Signal Detection Theory. These operating 
principles seem to tell us a great deal about the triggering-conditions of Knowledge Intuitions. 
 
In Chapter 5, I focus on practical matters—particularly on how we may go about adjudicating 
propositions in a way that takes the KIP’s operating principles into account. I am concerned 
here that it is plausible that we are actually able to adjudicate a quick succession of 
propositions in ‘real-time’ in a way that accords with the KIP’s operating principles. Also in this 
chapter, I identify an additional contextual factor in the production of Knowledge Intuitions that 
is not predicted by Signal Detection Theory, though it follows from my hypothesis of the KIP’s 
function.  
 
In Chapter 6, I add a crucial component to my model, which is based on biological findings 
related to human altruism. The analysis that follows leads to descriptions of different sets of 
circumstances under which different basic positions in epistemology hold. 
 
I note that, over the course of Chapters 5 and 6, I test the triggering-conditions of Knowledge 
Intuitions that are predicted on the basis of my hypothesis about the KIP’s function. I do so by 
seeing whether they apply in a wide range of knowledge cases. They do; and, because it is 
unlikely that the factors would all be applicable if the hypothesis on which they were based was 
wholly false, the successful applications constitute support for my hypothesis about the KIP’s 
function.3 
                                                          
3 Broadly similar methodologies have been used by Susan Haslanger (1999), Edward Craig (1999), and 
Justin Fisher (2006). They develop a hypothesis about the function of the subject of their investigation, 
work out the implications of that hypothesis, and finally test the implications. 
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In Chapter 7, I return to the epistemological literature, and look at it from the perspective of my 
developed theory. That theory allows me to explain profound differences in the variety of 
theoretical views that are expressed. Also, (in §7.2) I examine a number of objections to the 
thesis that the Epistemic Standards we seem to set are context-dependent. I identify what 
appear to be critical weaknesses in those objections. 
 
Chapter 8 is a very short analysis of Gettier-Style Cases. In it, I show how my developed theory 
predicts our sense that the subjects in those cases do not know, even though they have justified 
true belief. 
  
In Chapter 9, I briefly look back at what I think my investigation accomplished, and say a few 
words about the effect that I hope the investigation would have on the epistemological 
enterprise.  
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Chapter 2: Two Independent Histories 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
It seems that over the last century the epistemological literature has bifurcated—creating two 
separate, distinct, individually coherent and mutually incompatible histories within 
epistemology. I call them the First History and the Second History. My developed theory of 
Knowledge Intuitions explains this occurrence. The theory predicts the emergence of two 
separate and independent research programs within epistemology that, I suggest, correspond 
with these two histories.  
 
It will be useful to separate my telling of the two histories, which I do in this chapter, from my 
explanation of the predicted emergence of two separate and independent research programs, 
which I do in Chapter 7. The former will both set up a puzzle, the apparent impasse I have just 
described, and situate my theory in the field. The latter explanation is made on the basis of the 
theory that I develop in the intervening chapters.  
 
Even so, it will be helpful to first roughly outline the principal aims of the two researcher 
programs (which are defended in Chapter 7). One of these research programs has the principal 
aim of, roughly, helping those who broadcast messages widely identify propositions that are 
unlikely to prove false. The other has the principal aim of shedding light on the circumstances 
under which we take ourselves as knowing or not knowing that particular world conditions 
obtain, and also to shed light on the ordinary use of ‘know’.  
 
In this chapter, I provide a very brief account of these two histories. To keep things focused, I 
emphasize the internal coherence and independence of each of the research programs, and 
emphasize fundamental differences in the theoretical approaches that are taken by the 
theorists that contribute to the different programs. This requires that I set aside a wide range of 
otherwise important contributions to the two histories. 
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2.2 First History 
 
It seems that First History theorists generally have the sense that a certain responsibility, 
obligation or duty attends the claim to possess knowledge. This view and the reason for having 
it is brought to life in W. K. Clifford’s extended metaphor about the voyage of ship filled with 
emigrants: 
 
A shipowner was about to send to sea an emigrant-ship. He knew that she was old, and 
not overwell built at the first; that she had seen many seas and climes, and often had 
needed repairs. Doubts had been suggested to him that possibly she was not 
seaworthy. These doubts preyed upon his mind, and made him unhappy; he thought 
that perhaps he ought to have her thoroughly overhauled and refitted, even though this 
should put him at great expense. Before the ship sailed, however, he succeeded in 
overcoming these melancholy reflections. He said to himself that she had gone safely 
through so many voyages and weathered so many storms that it was idle to suppose 
she would not come safely home from this trip also. He would put his trust in 
Providence, which could hardly fail to protect all these unhappy families that were 
leaving their fatherland to seek for better times elsewhere. He would dismiss from his 
mind all ungenerous suspicions about the honesty of builders and contractors. In such 
ways he acquired a sincere and comfortable conviction that his vessel was thoroughly 
safe and seaworthy; he watched her departure with a light heart, and benevolent 
wishes for the success of the exiles in their strange new home that was to be; and he 
got his insurance-money when she went down in mid-ocean and told no tales. 
 
What shall we say of him? Surely this, that he was verily guilty of the death of those 
men. It is admitted that he did sincerely believe in the soundness of his ship; but the 
sincerity of his conviction can in no wise help him, because he had no right to believe 
on such evidence as was before him. He had acquired his belief not by honestly earning 
it in patient investigation, but by stifling his doubts. And although in the end he may 
have felt so sure about it that he could not think otherwise, yet inasmuch as he had 
knowingly and willingly worked himself into that frame of mind, he must be held 
responsible for it. (1876, p.289) 
 
Clifford draws our attention to the multiplication of harms that may follow from broadcasting 
false messages widely. Many may be harmed in such situations by setting doubt aside. 
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Even so, doubt, and particularly Cartesian doubt, about the veracity of sense perceptions, and 
doubt even about the existence of an outside world, undermines the very possibility of 
empirical knowledge; and First History theorists generally also have the sense that it is of critical 
importance that some empirical knowledge be possible, that we can come to know that many 
different world conditions obtain.  
 
Early in the last century, a number of epistemologists concluded that Cartesian doubt may be 
set aside. Bertrand Russell, for example, explains that ‘[p]hilosophy cannot boast of having 
achieved such a degree of certainty that it can have authority to condemn the facts of 
experience . . . Universal scepticism, though logically irrefutable, is practically barren’ (1914, 
p.67). Moreover, ‘the immediate facts perceived by sight or touch or hearing do not need to be 
proved by argument, but are completely self-evident’ (p.68). 
 
Nonetheless, it seems that most of what we care to know about is subject to doubt; and this is 
because most of what we care to know about depends on more than merely accepting the 
veracity of sense perceptions. H. H. Price’s alludes to the nature of the problem in this famous 
passage: 
 
When I see a tomato there is much that I can doubt. I can doubt whether it is a tomato 
that I am seeing, and not a cleverly painted piece of wax. I can doubt whether there is 
any material thing there at all. Perhaps what I took to be a tomato was really a 
reflection . . . One thing however I cannot doubt: that there exists a red patch of a 
round and somewhat bulgy shape, standing out from a background of other colour-
patches, and having a certain visual depth, and that this whole field of colour is directly 
present to my consciousness. (1932, p.3) 
 
Seeing the red patch of a round and somewhat bulgy shape is consistent not only with a tomato 
being there, but also consistent with a wide variety of other states of affairs, including a painted 
piece of wax being there. So, empirical knowledge requires a series of correct deductive and / 
or inductive inferences (even if they are mostly made unconsciously). To know that there is a 
tomato there, Price may have to correctly infer that (a) it is possible that a real tomato could be 
there, (i.e., there are tomatoes where he lives, etc.), (b) it is not possible that a wax tomato 
could be there, or (c) it is not possible that a wax tomato could look so realistic that he could 
mistake it for a real tomato. Each such inductive inference introduces a source of possible error 
that undermines the possibility of knowing the proposition in question.  
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So, at this stage in First History theory, many epistemologists hold the view that beliefs that are 
not based on these sorts of inferences may have a firm foundation. For example, the non-
inferential belief that there is a red patch of a round and somewhat bulgy shape may have a 
firm foundation based on sense perception. However, beliefs that are based on these sorts of 
inferences may not. The ‘inferential belief’ that there is a tomato there may not. Bertrand 
Russell observes that ‘what does not go beyond our own personal sensible acquaintance must 
be for us the most certain’ (1914, p.67). 
 
C. I. Lewis (1946, p.343) identifies a general approach that we can take to brace the foundations 
of our inferential beliefs. He suggests that the ‘congruence’ or the ‘coherence’ of different 
pieces of evidence confer a much higher probability upon hypotheses than is generally 
assumed—high enough, in many instances, for knowledge. Lewis is particularly focused on 
pieces of evidence that are connected in a particular way, viz., they have all arisen as a 
consequence of a particular prior state or event:  
 
A point which particularly should draw our attention, is what can happen when various 
consequences [i.e., potential pieces of evidence] of a single hypothesis are found to be 
true. If different consequences be verified, or independently confirmed, the conjoint 
fact of these separate confirmations may increase the probability of the hypothesis in a 
degree notably greater than that which any one of them alone would give . . . (p.344) 
 
Lewis illustrates his point with an account of 
 
relatively unreliable witnesses who independently tell the same story . . . For any one of 
these reports, taken singly, the extent to which it confirms what is reported may be 
slight. And antecedently, the probability of what is reported may also be small. But 
congruence of the reports establishes a high probability of what they agree upon, by 
principles of probability determination which are familiar: On any other hypothesis than 
that of truth-telling, this agreement is highly unlikely; the story any one false witness 
might tell being one out of so very large a number of equally possible choices . . . And 
the one hypothesis which itself is congruent with this agreement becomes thereby 
commensurably well established. (p.346) 
 
22 
 
Further, Lewis suggests that this effect is multiplied when the hypothesis is consistent with 
antecedent beliefs, producing a wider coherence:4  
  
We could hardly be too impressed with the part which is played, in determining what 
we shall believe . . . by the congruence of any statement in question with our 
antecedent beliefs and with what has already some degree of confirmation. (p.349) 
 
If the probability of a hypothesis is sufficiently high, then it is rational to believe it, and to take it 
as being known. We know it is a tomato because of a congruence or coherence of our evidence. 
In denying the possession of such knowledge, ‘we would repudiate all thought and action and 
every significance of living’ (Lewis, p.362). 
 
Still, Lewis’ account does not tell us how strong the total evidence for a proposition must be in 
order to properly consider it to be known. Moreover, it seems that an answer that has a 
comfortable place within the First History will not be easily found. Even so, A. J. Ayer proposes 
an answer that has a comfortable place in the Second History. (I bring it up at this juncture 
because the subsequent reaction from First History theorists is an important part of the First 
History, and helps distinguish First History from Second History theory.) 
 
Where there are recognized criteria for deciding when one has the right to be sure, 
anyone who insists that their being satisfied is still not enough for knowledge may be 
accused . . . of misusing the verb ‘to know’. (1956, p.34) 
 
Here, Ayer suggests that the criteria that we happen to recognize as being adequate for 
knowledge, in fact constitutes an adequate standard. Ayer’s suggestion, along with those of 
other contemporaries5, is widely viewed as reducing knowledge to justified true belief.6 More 
precisely, it is widely viewed as reducing knowledge to true belief plus whatever happens to be 
ordinarily viewed as sufficient justification.  
 
This last reduction is firmly rejected by First History theorists: the coincidence of truth, belief 
and ordinary justification is not sufficient for knowledge. In fact, some eight years prior to 
Ayer’s proposal, in a 1948 publication, Bertrand Russell presents what appears to be a 
counterexample to the reduction:  
                                                          
4 Bertrand Russell (in a paper originally published 1948) traces coherence theory to Hegel (2009, p.141). 
5 For example, see Roderick Chisholm (1957, p.16). 
6 For example, see Edmund Gettier (1963, p.121).  
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There is the man who looks at a clock which is not going, though he thinks it is, and who 
happens to look at it the moment when it is right; this man acquires a true belief as to 
the time of day, but cannot be said to have knowledge. (2009, p.140) 
 
The man possesses true belief plus ordinary justification on the basis of seeing a clock clearly. 
Still, he does not have knowledge. Further, it seems that the reason that we do not intuit 
knowing in such cases is that the evidence fails to have an appropriate connection with that 
which makes the belief true. The belief is true only by accident. Look a little more closely: What 
makes the man’s belief about the time true is that it corresponds to the actual daily progress of 
the earth’s rotation. For example, if he believed it was noon and the belief was true, then the 
earth would have completed half of its daily rotation; and, at 6 p.m., it would have completed 
three-quarters of its daily rotation. However, the man’s evidence, i.e., the time indicated by the 
clock, does not have the appropriate connection with the daily progress of the earth’s rotation. 
The time indicated by the clock is not a consequence of the clock accurately tracking the 
progress of the earth’s rotation.  
 
Edmund Gettier (1963) echoes Russell’s point and provides a number of additional and much 
discussed examples. Cases of this kind are now standardly referred to as Gettier cases. I refer to 
them as Gettier-Style Cases.7  
 
D.M. Armstrong acknowledges that Gettier-Style Cases serve as counterexamples to the 
hypothesis that knowledge is true belief plus ordinary justification. However, as a First History 
theorist, he is puzzled that epistemologists would be excited by disproving the hypothesis. 
Gettier-Style Cases feature merely ‘justifiably believed grounds, in the “ordinary language” 
sense of “justifiably believed”’ (1973, p.152). He adds, 
 
                                                          
7 Cases in which the subject has met a very high evidential standard, such as the standard used in 
scientific contexts, are not standardly offered as examples of Gettier-Style Cases. This seems to follow 
from the fact that, in these cases, the probability of the questioned proposition being accidentally true is 
extremely low, and sometimes approaching nil. So, such cases just seem too hypothetical in the contexts 
in which Gettier-Style Cases come up. Consider, for example, how low the probability might be of (a) a 
man finding on a day like any other that four different clocks (which are all powered in different ways) 
agree on the time, (b) the four clocks were all stopped at the moment that the man looked at them, and 
(c) the four clocks all told the correct time. Or, consider how low the probability might be of the following 
proposition being true: the number of elementary particles per mole of a substance is 6.022×1023 (i.e., 
Avogadro’s number) is accidentally true. If it were only accidentally true, then the multiple experiments 
that have indicated Avogadro’s number are all faulty and indicated the correct number only by accident.  
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But because possession of such grounds could not constitute possession of knowledge I 
should have thought it obvious that they are too weak to serve as suitable grounds. It is 
not surprising, therefore, that Gettier is able to construct examples where a true belief 
is justified in an ordinary sense of ‘justified’, but the true belief is clearly not a case of 
knowledge. (pp.152-153) 
 
Further, Armstrong investigates an intuitive remedy to the evidential problem on which Gettier-
Style Cases are based. He investigates gathering additional evidence that would show that the 
initial evidence has the appropriate connection to that which makes the belief true. For 
example, the evidential remedy for the man who looks at the stopped clock would be to gather 
additional evidence that might confirm that the clock is working properly. However, as 
Armstrong point out, the remedy is attended by the same evidential problem: The possibility 
remains that the new evidence, like the initial evidence, may not have the appropriate 
connection to that which makes the belief true (e.g., the evidence that suggests that the clock is 
working could be Gettiered). Moreover, further additional evidence that supported the 
secondary evidence is also subject to the same problem. So, the situation leads to an indefinite 
‘regress of reasons’.  
 
Armstrong concludes that ultimately knowledge depends on meeting a condition that knowers 
may not know that they have met. Focusing initially on non-inferential knowledge such as that 
‘there is something red and round over there’ (1973, p.163), he writes, 
 
what makes a true non-inferential belief a case of knowledge is some natural relation 
which holds between the belief-state . . . and the situation which makes the belief true. 
It is a matter of a certain relation holding between the believer and the world. (p.157)  
 
Non-inferential knowledge depends on the existence of this relation; and knowers may well not 
know whether that relation exists. This constitutes an externalistic condition on knowledge. Let 
us look at this relation a little more carefully. 
 
The relation between the belief-state and the situation that makes the belief true is satisfied 
only if the belief-state is empirically reliable (Armstrong, 1973, p.159); and to be empirically 
reliable, there ‘must be a law-like connection’ (p.166) between the belief-state and the 
situation that makes the belief true. Non-inferential knowledge depends on beliefs that covary 
with the actual situation as ‘the temperature readings given by a thermometer’ (p.166) covaries 
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with actual temperature. So, roughly, non-inferential knowledge is true belief acquired using a 
reliable belief formation process. 
 
Armstrong expands his framework to include inferential knowledge (e.g., there is a tomato 
there). Inferential knowledge must have a law-like connection to non-inferential knowledge 
(which by definition has a law-like connection to that which makes the belief true). For instance, 
if it happened that round red objects nomically indicated tomatoes, then knowing that there is 
a round red object there allows me to know that there is a tomato there.8 So, inferential 
knowledge is roughly true belief acquired using a reliable belief formation process that involves 
both inferential and non-inferential beliefs. Barry Stroud, in a 1989 publication, observes that 
the  
 
promise of the new ‘externalist’ strategy is that it would avoid the regress [problem by 
allowing that a] person who knows something does not himself have to know that what 
he has got in his prior evidential base amounts to knowledge in the domain in question. 
(2001, p.137) 
 
Armstrong’s theory confirms the possibility of knowledge. However, it suggests that we may 
well not know that we know in particular instances. 
 
In the 1980s, First History theorists have sharply divergent views on whether there is an 
externalistic condition on knowledge, as Armstrong suggests. On one hand, many 
epistemologists write positively about the general approach and develop externalistic theories.9 
On the other, there is a torrent of First History writings that goes against externalism. (I look at 
this more carefully in §3.5 and Chapter 7.) John Pollock, for example, suggests that externalism 
misses the point because ‘the fundamental problem of epistemology [is helping us to decide] 
what to believe’ (1986, p.10). Alvin Goldman points out that externalism is ‘unsuitable for 
realizing the true and original goals of epistemology’ (1999, p.271). There is new interest in 
‘accessibilism’, a view that contradicts externalism by suggesting that knowledge depends on 
having reflective access to one’s evidence. According to William Alston, in a 1986 paper, ‘it 
                                                          
8 Armstrong suggests that there are other factors that determine whether an agent has inferential 
knowledge, which I have set aside here. 
9 Prominent among there are Nozick (1981) and Dretske (1981). Dretske’s externalism is reflected in his 
relevant alternative theory: ‘the difference between a relevant and an irrelevant alternative resides, not 
in what we happen to regard as a real possibility (whether reasonably or not), but in the kind of 
possibilities that actually exist in the objective situation’ (p.377). Thus, a subject knows if and only if all 
the alternatives that are made relevant by the objective situation have been ruled out. 
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looks as if there is a basic, irreducible, requirement of epistemic accessibility of ground for the 
belief that attaches to our concept of epistemic justification’ (2001, p.103). Trent Dougherty 
adds that the mental states to which one ‘has privileged access . . . are . . . evidential bedrock; 
they are our cognitive home: we start from there and must always come back to them if 
questioned long enough’ (2011, p.4). Earl Conee and Richard Feldman develop a theory of 
knowledge they call ‘evidentialism’; and it is based on the notion that knowledge depends on 
evidence that is accessible on reflection.10 Also, there is renewed interest in the deontological 
conception of justification, which suggests that we have a certain responsibility, obligation or 
duty to ensure that our beliefs are properly justified. This contradicts externalism which 
suggests that we will probably not be able to fulfil such an obligation. Let us look at this briefly. 
 
Recall W. K. Clifford’s extended metaphor about the ship-owner (reproduced earlier) in which 
an unseaworthy ship, filled with emigres, ‘went down in mid-ocean and told no tales’ (1876, 
p.289). Many First History theorists conclude that if we have a responsibility, obligation or duty 
in relation to what we communicate to others, then the very meaning of the term ‘epistemic 
justification’ should be rooted in this responsibility—giving rise to the ‘deontological conception 
of justification’. In fact, Alvin Plantinga suggests that this conception is a fundamental feature of 
the epistemological enterprise since Descartes. He explains, 
 
to understand the contemporary situation [in relation to present views on epistemic 
justification] we must take a careful look at its history, in particular at some of the ideas 
of Descartes, and perhaps even more importantly, Locke. And here what is of first 
importance is to see that for Descartes and Locke the notion of duty or obligation play a 
central role in the whole doxastic enterprise. (1990, p.49) 
 
Plantinga explains that ‘[o]riginally and at bottom, epistemic justification is deontological 
justification’ (1993, p.14). 
 
Additionally, it seems that many First History theorists conclude that if we have a responsibility, 
obligation or duty in relation to what we communicate to others, then our beliefs and denials 
should reflect that responsibility. William Alston explains that epistemic ‘principles will forbid 
beliefs formed in such a way as to be likely to be false and either permit or require beliefs 
formed in such a way as to be likely to be true’ (original italicization, 1988, pp.258-259).11 
                                                          
10 A collection of their essays on the subject may be found in Conee and Feldman (2004).  
11 See for example Kornblith (1983), Bonjour (1985), and Feldman (1988). 
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So, for many First History theorists, externalism fails to offer an acceptable remedy to the 
problem first recognized decades earlier: the inferences that need to made to secure inferential 
knowledge are fallible, and so the foundation for inferential knowledge is not firm. For many, 
there seems to be only one way forward; and it involves abandoning the thesis that knowledge 
depends on making infallible inferences, i.e., abandoning foundationalism. They could pick up 
where C. I. Lewis and others left off, further investigating what Lewis called ‘congruence’ or 
‘coherence’. Perhaps knowledge depends on the coherence of an entire system of belief. 
Laurence Bonjour suggests that coherentism is ‘the only remaining possibility for a nonsceptical 
account of empirical knowledge’ (1985, p.87). He continues,  
  
Epistemic reflection, according to such a theory, begins from a (perhaps tacit) 
representation of myself as having (approximately) such and such a specific system of 
beliefs: only relative to such a representation can questions of justification be 
meaningfully raised and answered. (p.104) 
 
However, the challenge—in fact, the principal challenge—for coherentist theory is to establish 
proper criteria for coherence. Such criteria would ensure that beliefs that are part of a system 
that is deemed to be coherent have a very low likelihood of proving false. Addressing that 
challenge, Bonjour suggests that it is critical that there be ‘various sorts of inferential, evidential 
and explanatory relations which obtain among the various members of a system of beliefs’ 
(1985, p.93). Further,  
 
coherence is not to be equated with mere consistency; . . . coherence . . . has to do with 
the mutual inferability of the beliefs in the system [and] relations of explanation are 
one central ingredient in coherence . . . (p.95) 
 
Coherentism seems to provide a promising approach to identifying beliefs that will not prove to 
be false. Unfortunately, producing a detailed account of coherence has proven to be a tricky 
undertaking. The challenge largely relates to identifying universal criteria for a coherent set of 
beliefs; and, given that a set of beliefs may be more coherent relative to some criteria than 
others, identifying the relative importance of these criteria, and the threshold for coherence.  
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2.3 Second History 
 
Let us now look at the Second History—which, I suggest, follows from a research programs that 
has as its principal aim shedding light on the circumstances under which we take ourselves as 
knowing or not knowing that particular world conditions obtain, and also to shed light on the 
ordinary use of ‘know’.  
 
I pointed out that early in the last century many epistemologists hold the view that non-
inferential beliefs (e.g., that there is a red patch of a round and somewhat bulgy shape) 
generally have firm foundations, whereas inferential beliefs (e.g., there is a tomato there) 
generally do not. Further, I gestured at C. I. Lewis’ (1946) response to this basic difficulty, viz., to 
try to find different pieces of evidence that are mutually congruent or coherent, and that are 
congruent or coherent with established beliefs. I start my account of the Second History with G. 
E. Moore’s radically different response to the basic difficulty, which he presents in a 1940 
paper. He suggests that the foundations of many ordinary inferential beliefs are firm—
particularly, those inferential beliefs that involve identifications of perceptible and 
unambiguous objects, states or events (e.g., there is a tomato there). He proposes that we set 
aside the suggestions made by the likes of Bertrand Russell and H. H. Price that those latter 
foundations are not firm—on the basis that their views are overly rationalistic and stringent. 
Moore explains, 
 
Russell’s view that I do not know for certain that this is a pencil . . . rests, if I am right, 
on no less than four distinct assumptions: (1) That I don’t know these things 
immediately [on the basis only of sensory perception]; (2) That they don’t follow 
logically from any thing or things that I do know immediately; (3) That, if (1) and (2) are 
true, my belief in or knowledge of them must be ‘based on an analogical or inductive 
argument’; and (4) That what is so based cannot be certain knowledge. . . I do not think 
it is rational to be as certain of any one of these four propositions, as of the proposition 
that I do know that this is a pencil. (1959, p.222) 
 
Here, Moore seems to adopt an attitude that is similar to that which Russell, Price and others 
took when they set aside the earlier Cartesian suggestion that we may doubt the veracity of 
sense perceptions and even the existence of an outside world. Where Russell suggested that 
‘[p]hilosophy cannot boast of having achieved such a degree of certainty that it can have 
authority to condemn the facts of experience’ (1914, p.67), Moore seems to suggest that 
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philosophy cannot boast of having achieved such a degree of certainty that it can have 
authority to condemn identifications of unambiguous objects. 
 
Following Moore, J. L. Austin, in a 1946 investigation, begins with the assumption that an 
ordinary person may well know a ‘particular, current, empirical fact’ (1979, p.77)—such as that 
the object in their view is a goldfinch. He then sets out to answer the question ‘what sort of 
thing does actually happen when ordinary people are asked “How do you know?”‘(p.77) Over 
the course of his rather informal and brief investigation, Austin manages to (1) outline a rough 
theory of relevant alternatives (RA Theory) which holds that ruling out the relevant alternatives 
to a questioned hypothesis is a sufficient condition for knowledge; (2) suggest a general 
approach to responding to sceptical challenges, such as whether the tomato is not actually a 
cleverly painted piece of wax; and (3) defend a fallibilist conception of knowledge which holds 
that it is possible to possess knowledge without possessing entailing evidence. 
 
Austin finds that knowing that p involves ruling out just those alternatives to p that are 
relevant, and not those that are irrelevant. For example, in relation to the proposition that the 
bird is a goldfinch, ‘enough evidence’ means,  
 
enough to show that (within reason, and for present intents and purposes) it ‘can’t’ be 
anything else, there is no room for an alternative, competing description of it. 
[However, it] does not mean, for example, enough to show it isn’t a stuffed [or fake] 
goldfinch. (1979, p.84) 
 
So, this early RA Theory postulates how it is that we ordinarily set evidential standards for using 
‘know’: the standard is set just high enough to rule out the alternatives that are relevant ‘within 
reason, and for present intents and purposes’. With this, Austin gestures toward a knowledge 
theory under which evidential standards depend on context. Moreover, his RA Theory suggests 
a response to classic sceptical challenges—such as that one may not in fact know that the 
object is a goldfinch because of the possibility that it is a fake. Such a possibility is not a cause 
for concern because ordinarily it is not relevant—within reason, and for present intents and 
purposes.  
 
Still, on Austin’s account, it is possible, though unlikely, that an irrelevant alternative to p is 
true, and so it is possible that p is false. However, we would not have been wrong to have 
asserted that p, even if it is a practical possibility that it is false:  
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If we have made sure [that the bird is] a goldfinch, and a real goldfinch [by ruling out 
the relevant alternatives], and then in the future it does something outrageous 
(explodes, quotes Mrs. Woolf, or what not), we don’t say we were wrong to say it was a 
goldfinch, we don't know what to say. Words literally fail us . . . [However, if we have 
ruled out the relevant alternatives, we cannot] be proved wrong, whatever happens . . . 
[On the other hand, what] the future can always do, is to make us revise our ideas 
about goldfinches or real goldfinches . . . (original italicization, 1979, pp.88-89)  
 
Austin’s suggestion that, when we have ruled out all of the relevant alternatives, we cannot be 
proved wrong, seems to constitute a step toward the fallibilist hypothesis that a knowledge 
attribution that follows from ruling out the relevant alternatives may be deemed to be true—
even if it is possible that it will later prove to be false.  
 
RA Theory is not limited to the Second History. It is also advanced in First History philosophy. 
However, there is a profound general difference between First History and Second History 
versions. Many alternatives that are deemed to be relevant in First History versions (and 
therefore needing to be ruled out) are not deemed to be relevant in Second History versions 
(and not needing to be ruled out). In fact, under First History RA Theory, alternatives are 
generally deemed to be relevant by default, i.e., requiring good reasons to be deemed to be 
irrelevant; whereas, under Second History RA Theory, alternatives are generally deemed to be 
irrelevant by default, i.e., requiring good reasons to be deemed relevant. Let us look at this 
more carefully. 
 
The standard First History view that alternatives are relevant unless there are good reasons to 
deem them irrelevant is suggested by Keith Lehrer: ‘no hypothesis should be rejected as 
unjustified without argument against it’ (1971, p.293). On Dretske’s account, alternatives are 
irrelevant only if they are not ‘possibilities that . . . exist in the objective situation’ (1981, p.377). 
He presents a case in which a birdwatcher spots what looks exactly like a gadwall. However, the 
bird also looks similar to a grebe. On Dretske’s account, the possibility that the bird is a grebe 
would only be irrelevant if in fact (a) grebes do not habitat in her location and (b) cannot 
migrate. 
 
In contrast, Second History RA theorists take alternatives to be irrelevant by default, i.e., good 
reasons are required to make them relevant. This view is reflected in Austin’s explanation of 
why a sceptical alternative, such as that the goldfinch is a fake, is not relevant: 
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The doubt or question ‘But is it a real one?’ has always (must have) a special basis, 
there must be some ‘reason for suggesting’ that it isn’t real, in the sense of some 
specific way, or limited number of specific ways, in which it is suggested that this 
experience or item may be phony. (1979, p.87) 
 
In a more developed Second History RA Theory, Stewart Cohen suggests that an alternative is 
relevant only if one or more of three particular conditions are met. Cohen’s first condition is 
that the objective probability of the alternative is high (1988, p.102). The second condition is 
that the subject’s internal statistical evidence indicates that the probability of an alternative is 
high (p.102). So, an alternative possibility is deemed relevant if the subject assesses the 
probability of it as being high. Cohen’s third condition for an alternative being relevant is that it 
is salient in the context of attribution (p.106). Here, Cohen echoes Alvin Goldman: ‘If the 
speaker is in a class where Descartes’s evil demon has just been discussed, or Russell’s five-
minute-old-world hypothesis, he may think of alternatives he would not otherwise think of and 
will perhaps treat them seriously’ (1976, p.776).  
 
Notice that Cohen’s third condition suggests that our standard for how probable an alternative 
must be to make it relevant depends on context. This constitutes an early contextualist 
condition on knowledge.12 He explains,  
 
In normal everyday contexts, the standards [for how probable an alternative must be to 
make it relevant] are such that skeptical alternatives are not relevant (unless, of course, 
the circumstances are such that skeptical alternatives are highly probable . . .). This 
explains our confidence in the truth of our everyday attributions of knowledge. 
However, when we are confronted with skeptical arguments, we may come to consider 
skeptical alternatives as relevant, thereby lowering our standards [for how probable an 
alternative must be to be relevant]. (p.96) 
 
Like Austin’s earlier theory, Cohen’s theory of knowledge incorporates a fallibilist thesis: ‘a 
fallibilist theory allows that S can know q on the basis of r where r only makes q probable’ 
(Cohen, 1988, p.91). We may know that q without entailing evidence.  
 
Before continuing in our look at the Second History, there is a small conceptual matter that it 
would be helpful to address. Many Second History theorists defend the thesis that whether or 
                                                          
12 G. C. Stine (1976) and Peter Unger (1986) offer two earlier contextualist accounts of knowledge. 
32 
 
not an individual knows that p can depend on certain contextual factors that are not truth-
conducive, particularly factors that relate to the practical circumstances. However, these 
theorists have different views on what the nature of the standard is that ultimately determines 
whether we know. For example, Cohen suggests that the standard is how probable an 
alternative must be to make it relevant. This probability standard may move up or down when 
the practical circumstances change. Other epistemologists suggest that the standard is how 
strong the evidence must be in order to be able to properly use the word ‘know’, which I refer 
to as the Epistemic Standard. Again, the Epistemic Standard may seem to move up or down 
when the practical circumstances change. In contrast, Keith DeRose (1992)13 suggests that the 
standard relates to the knower’s ‘epistemic position’. He explains that this is determined by a 
combination of the strength of the knower’s evidence and the range of relevant alternatives in 
the context. (I look at this more closely in a moment.) Finally, notice that Cohen’s standard is 
negatively correlated with both the Epistemic Standard and DeRose’s standard that relates to 
the knower’s epistemic position. For example, a low probability standard for the relevance of an 
alternative tends to produce more relevant alternatives that need to be ruled out; and so this 
calls for stronger evidence to rule out a greater number of alternatives, i.e., it calls for a high 
Epistemic Standard. 
 
Let us return to our look at the Second History. Keith DeRose recognizes that Cohen’s theory is 
unable to account for the use of ‘know’ in an important range of ordinary cases. He 
demonstrates this with his famous low-stakes and high-stakes bank cases. 
 
Bank Case A. My wife and I are driving home on a Friday afternoon. We plan to stop at 
the bank on the way home to deposit our paycheques. But as we drive past the bank, 
we notice that the lines inside are very long, as they often are on Friday afternoons. 
Although we generally like to deposit our paycheques as soon as possible, it is not 
especially important in this case that they be deposited right away, so I suggest that we 
drive straight home and deposit our paycheques on Saturday morning. My wife says, 
"Maybe the bank won’t be open tomorrow. Lots of banks are closed on Saturdays." I 
reply, "No, I know it’ll be open. I was just there two weeks ago on Saturday. It’s open 
until noon."  
 
                                                          
13 I focus on this older paper in order to better represent the historical progression of theory in the 
Second History.   
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Bank Case B. My wife and I drive past the bank on a Friday afternoon, as in Case A, and 
notice the long lines. I again suggest that we deposit our paycheques on Saturday 
morning, explaining that I was at the bank on Saturday morning only two weeks ago 
and discovered that it was open until noon. But in this case, we have just written a very 
large and very important check. If our paycheques are not deposited into our checking 
account before Monday morning, the important check we wrote will bounce, leaving us 
in a very bad situation. And, of course, the bank is not open on Sunday. My wife 
reminds me of these facts. She then says, "Banks do change their hours. Do you know 
the bank will be open tomorrow?" Remaining as confident as I was before that the bank 
will be open then, still, I reply, "Well, no. I’d better go in and make sure". (1992, p.913) 
 
In DeRose’s analysis, knowledge attributors set different standards for the knower’s ‘epistemic 
position’ in different contexts. These standards, in turn, track the stakes for the attributor, or 
the importance to the attributor of being right.14 DeRose attributes knowledge to himself in 
Bank Case A (taking himself as knowing that the bank will be open), but not in Bank Case B—
because the importance of being right to the attributor (to himself) is greater in the second 
case. 
 
In a number of writings that follow DeRose’s contextualist theory, it is suggested that it is not 
the attributor’s practical interests that determine standards, but, rather, the subject’s (which 
writings I discuss in a moment). However, DeRose’s bank cases feature first-person knowledge 
attributions, in which attributor and subject are one and the same. As a result, DeRose’s bank 
cases seem to support both DeRose’s thesis (which looks to the attributor’s practical interests), 
and the competing thesis (which looks to the subject’s practical interests). So, in order to draw 
a sharp contrast between DeRose’s thesis and the competing thesis it is helpful to consider 
cases that feature second-person or third-person knowledge attributions, in which the 
attributor is not the subject. Accordingly, let us look now at cases of this kind in support of 
DeRose’s contextualist thesis. The following original cases are based on a knowledge attribution 
that Jason Stanley uses as an example: ‘Herman knows at 1:30 p.m. on September 24, 2004 that 
Hillary Clinton is a Democrat’ (2005, p.86).  
 
                                                          
14 Robert Hambourger (1987) defended essentially this thesis some five years earlier in a carefully 
detailed paper. However, the thesis is presented as a part of an overall theory of knowledge that is 
otherwise considerably less developed than is DeRose’s.  
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Case 2-1: Low Stakes Contextualist Case 
Frank wants to get a sense of the American political scene just so that he can 
better understand and enjoy political newscasts. At 1:30 p.m. on September 24, 2004, 
Herman tells Frank that he has learned from a newspaper article that Clinton is the 
Democrat Senator from New York. Frank thinks ‘Herman knows at 1:30 p.m. on 
September 24, 2004 that Hillary Clinton is a Democrat’. 
 
Case 2-2: High Stakes Contextualist Case 
Frank is a Democratic Party strategist and is worried that Hillary Clinton quietly 
switched party affiliations, from the Democrats to the Republicans. If true, this would 
be very bad news. At 1:30 p.m. on September 24, 2004, Herman tells Frank that he has 
learned from a newspaper article that Clinton is the Democrat Senator from New York. 
Frank thinks ‘Herman does not know at 1:30 p.m. on September 24, 2004 that Hillary 
Clinton is a Democrat’. 
 
Frank finds that Herman knows that Clinton is a Democrat in the low stakes case, but not in the 
high stakes case. This state of affairs seems to be explained by the difference in the importance 
of being right for Frank, the attributor in the cases.  
 
DeRose explains that the importance of being right is a factor that is internal to the attributor, 
perhaps psychological in nature (1992, p.919). He suggests that it depends on matters such as 
the attributor’s interests and values and calls it an ‘attributor factor’. Further, he suggests that 
there are additional ‘external’ factors that may determine whether the attributor knows. He 
calls these ‘subject factors’. Echoing Goldman (1976, pp.772-773), DeRose explains that the 
context determines the range of relevant alternatives. Referring to his bank cases (above), he 
writes: 
 
If very many nearby banks have discontinued their Saturday hours in the last two 
weeks, then it seems that my original claim to know may well have been false, and if I 
admit that I did not know after this surprising fact about local banks is called to my 
attention, I will be taking back and contradicting my earlier claim to have known. (1992, 
p.921) 
 
If very many nearby banks have closed, then (a) the probability that DeRose’s bank will be 
closed increases, (b) the possibility that the bank will be closed becomes a relevant alternative 
that needs to be ruled out, and (c) DeRose’s epistemic position is weakened. Thus, DeRose 
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suggests that our epistemic position depends both on the strength of our evidence and on the 
range of relevant alternatives. (I say a little more about this in a moment.) 
 
According to DeRose, (internal) attributor factors (particularly the importance of being right) 
determine the epistemic position we must be in, in order to know; and so, these determine the 
meaning of ‘know’; whereas (external) subject factors determine the range of relevant 
alternatives, and so, along with the strength of our evidence, determines our epistemic 
position. DeRose explains, 
 
[a]ttributor factors set a certain standard the putative subject of knowledge must live 
up to in order to make the knowledge attribution true: They affect how good an 
epistemic position the putative knower must be in to count as knowing. They thereby 
affect the truth conditions and the content or meaning of the attribution. Subject 
factors, on the other hand, determine whether or not the putative subject lives up to 
the standards that have been set, and thereby can affect the truth value of the 
attribution without affecting its content: They affect how good an epistemic position 
the putative knower actually is in. (1992, pp.921-922) 
 
Additionally, if attributor factors in a case are such that the attributor sets a particularly high 
standard for her epistemic position (say because the importance of being right to the attributor 
is high), then the standard for the relevance of an alternative is lowered—so that, potentially, 
more alternatives may be deemed to be relevant, and need to be ruled out. For example, it may 
be that in a scientific context, a high standard in relation to the attributor’s epistemic position 
would lead to a low standard for the relevance of an alternative; and, as a result, even relatively 
unlikely alternatives may need to be ruled out. However, if subject factors are such that there 
are simply no probable alternatives suggested in the context, then the agent may be in a strong 
epistemic position even with weak evidence, and may be able to meet her high standard in 
relation to epistemic position with weak evidence. 
 
At this point, if will be useful to define the term ‘Contextualism’ in a way that facilitates later 
discussion; and to do so in a way that accommodates DeRose’s theory. Let us say that 
Contextualism is the view that the truth conditions for knowledge attributions vary across 
contexts in accordance with the attributor’s practical interests. 
 
While DeRose’s account is consistent with an important range of ordinary cases, there are 
nonetheless many other important ordinary cases that his account is not consistent with. I refer 
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particularly to cases in which (a) the knowledge attributer is not the subject of the attribution, 
(because the cases feature second-person or third-person attributions), and (b) the Epistemic 
Standard that seems to be reflected in the knowledge attribution seems to depend, not on the 
importance of being right for the attributor, but on the importance of being right for the 
subject.  
 
Jeremy Fantl and Mathew McGrath develop a theory of knowledge that seems to be able to 
account for these cases. It is based on a view that is often referred to as Subject Sensitive 
Invariantism (SSI). They suggest that the attributor is sensitive to the action that the subject S 
would perform on the basis of what she intuits she knows. Further, S ‘is justified in believing 
that p only if S is rational [i.e., seeking to advance her interests] to act as if p’ (2002, p.78).  
 
Look again at Jason Stanley’s example: ‘Herman knows at 1:30 p.m. on September 24, 2004 that 
Hillary Clinton is a Democrat’ (2005, p.86). Stanley, who defends a version of SSI, says that this 
knowledge attribution reflects an Epistemic Standard that depends on Herman’s practical 
situation; and it does not depend on the practical circumstances of the attributor. So, it 
‘expresses the same proposition relative to every context of use [i.e., from any attributor’s 
point of view]’ (p.86). However, Stanley does not provide a context for his example—which in 
my view is necessary in order to assess the example15. So, I offer both low stakes and high 
stakes cases that incorporate this knowledge attribution, in support of SSI. 
 
Case 2-3: Low Stakes SSI Case  
Frank knows that his brother Herman wants to get a sense of the American 
political scene just so that he can better understand and enjoy political newscasts. At 
1:30 p.m. on September 24, 2004, Herman tells Frank that he has learned from a 
newspaper article that Clinton is the Democrat Senator from New York. Frank thinks, 
‘Herman knows at 1:30 p.m. on September 24, 2004 that Hillary Clinton is a Democrat’. 
 
Case 2-4: High Stakes SSI Case 
Frank’s brother Herman is a Democratic Party strategist. Frank knows that Herman 
is worried that Hillary Clinton quietly switched party affiliations, from the Democratic 
Party to the Republican Party. Frank knows that this would be very bad news for 
Herman. At 1:30 p.m. on September 24, 2004, Herman tells Frank that he has learned 
from a newspaper article that Clinton is the Democrat Senator from New York. Frank 
                                                          
15 I defend this suggestion about the necessity of context in §7.2.2. 
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thinks, ‘Herman does not know at 1:30 p.m. on September 24, 2004 that Hillary Clinton 
is a Democrat’. 
 
It seems reasonable that Frank would take Herman as knowing that Clinton is a Democrat in the 
low stakes case, but not in the high stakes case; and this difference seems to be explained by 
the stakes being higher for the subject of the knowledge attribution, Herman, in the high stakes 
case. 
 
Like Contextualist theories, SSI theories are generally consistent with cases in which the 
attributor is the subject of knowledge attributions, i.e., first-person cases. In such cases, the 
attributor’s sensitivity to her own practical circumstances constitutes a sensitivity to the 
subject’s practical circumstances. Even so, SSI theories are not consistent with the cases I 
offered in support of Contextualism, Case 2-1 and Case 2-2, which feature a third-person 
attribution and a third-person denial respectively. Oppositely, Contextualist theories are not 
consistent with the cases I offered in support of SSI, Case 2-3 and Case 2-4, which also feature a 
third-person attribution and a third-person denial respectively. 
 
Subject Sensitive Invariantism suggests that the Epistemic Standard that seems to have been set 
does not depend on the attributor’s practical circumstances. Even so, that Epistemic Standard 
still varies. It varies in accordance with the subject’s practical circumstances. So, both SSI and 
Contextualism support the general thesis that knowledge depends on practical circumstances 
(the attributor’s or the subject’s). I refer to this thesis as ‘Epistemic Standard Variabilism’. This 
thesis is standardly rejected by First History theorists. They generally hold the view that the 
evidential standard for knowledge is very high and not dependent on practical circumstances at 
all. I refer to this view as ‘Classic Invariantism’. Moreover, Classic Invariantists have attacked 
Epistemic Standard Variabilism in a variety of ways (and I look at this further on, in §7.2). 
However, a recent Second History approach to knowledge theory is not at all subject to these 
attacks. The approach suggests that the evidential standard for knowledge is not dependent on 
practical circumstances at all, and suggests that that standard is low enough that we know 
much of what we think we know. The approach is referred to as Moderate Invariantism.16  
 
A basic component of Moderate Invariantist theory is an explanation of the elevated evidential 
standard that seems to be reflected in high stakes cases—such as those that are used to 
support SSI and Contextualism. The theory posits that these standards are suggested, not by the 
                                                          
16 See Kent Bach (2005), Patrick Rysiew (2005), and Jessica Brown (2006). 
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literal meaning of knowledge attributions or denials, but by propositions that the latter 
pragmatically convey. For example, as I read her, Jessica Brown suggests that very often the 
importance of being right and the evidential standard that this calls for are relevant and obvious 
in the context; and, as a result, this importance and evidential standard is reflected in the 
proposition that is pragmatically conveyed by knowledge attributions and denials. For example, 
in DeRose’s high stakes bank case (which I reproduced earlier), when,  
 
DeRose's wife points out that it's practically very important that they deposit the 
cheques before Monday (or there'll be big trouble with the bank) . . . she makes it clear 
that what's relevant to the conversation is a very strong epistemic position; in other 
words what's relevant to the conversation is whether DeRose's belief matches the facts 
not only at the actual and nearby worlds, but also at some further away worlds which 
are ordinarily too far away to undermine knowledge. Specifically, given that DeRose's 
wife mentions the possibility that the bank has changed its hours since DeRose's last 
visit, what's relevant is whether DeRose's belief matches the facts out to the possible 
world in which the bank has changed its hours since DeRose's last visit. As a result, . . . 
given the context, DeRose's assertion 'Ok, I don't know that the bank is open on 
Saturday' pragmatically conveys, though it does not literally state, that DeRose is not in 
a very strong epistemic position with respect to the relevant proposition, that his belief 
does not match the facts out to the world in which the bank has changed its hours. 
(2006, p.426) 17 
 
Thus, Moderate Invariantism can account for the use of ‘know’ in DeRose’s cases, and, in 
general, the cases that are used to support Contextualism (e.g., Case 2-1 and Case 2-2). 
Moreover, the approach seems to account for our use of ‘know’ in cases that support SSI (e.g., 
Case 2-3 and Case 2-4). Moderate Invariantism does so in these latter cases in virtue of its 
assertion that the proposition pragmatically conveyed by a knowledge attribution or denial is 
responsive to the practical circumstances that are relevant in the context, and it is the subject’s 
practical circumstances that are relevant in these cases. For example, in Case 2-4, it is the 
subject’s, Herman’s, practical circumstances that are relevant. So, the proposition that is 
conveyed by Frank’s denial, ‘Herman does not know at 1:30 p.m. on September 24, 2004 that 
Hillary Clinton is a Democrat’ is responsive to Herman’s practical circumstances; and that 
proposition being pragmatically conveyed suggests an elevated evidential standard. Thus, not 
                                                          
17 The account that is presented in this (2006) article is intended to fill out Patrick Rysiew’s (2001) 
account. 
39 
 
only is Moderate Invariantism not subject to the First History attacks on Epistemic Standard 
Variabilism to which I alluded, it accounts for the cases that are used to support Contextualism 
and the cases that are used to support SSI. 
  
I view the theory of Knowledge Intuitions that I develop in Chapters 3 through 8 as a Second 
History theory, and one that competes directly with Moderate Invariantism. In my final chapter, 
in §9.2, I briefly compare my theory with the latter and find that my theory seems to have 
greater explanatory and predictive adequacy than does the latter—which, if correct, would 
weigh in favour of my theory. 
 
* 
 
I suggest that this brief telling of the Second History generally reveals an effort to shed light on 
the circumstances under which we take ourselves as knowing or not knowing that particular 
world conditions obtain, and also to shed light on the ordinary use of ‘know’. I started the 
history with Moore’s suggestion that the epistemology of his day was overly rationalistic and 
stringent; and with Austin’s answer to the question ‘what sort of thing does actually happen 
when ordinary people are asked “How do you know?”‘ (1979, p.77). However, the trajectory of 
the Second History has been such that a three-way impasse developed—one in which 
Contextualists assert that Epistemic Standards depend on the importance of being right to the 
attributor, Subject Sensitive Invariantists assert that these standards depend on the importance 
of being right to the subject of knowledge attributions, and Moderate Invariantists assert that 
the standard is not dependent on practical circumstances at all. Further on (in §3.5), I will 
suggest that all this constitutes a first phase in the Second History, and briefly describe a 
possible second phase. 
 
 
2.4 Conclusion 
 
The three-way impasse that I described in the Second History expands into a four-way impasse 
when Classic Invariantism is brought into the picture. Like Moderate Invariantism, Classic 
Invariantism suggests that the truth of knowledge attributions does not depend on the 
importance of being right—for either the attributor or the subject. However, Classic 
Invariantists suggest that the Epistemic Standard is significantly higher than do Moderate 
Invariantists. Thus, the picture emerges that not only has the epistemological literature 
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bifurcated over the last century, but multiple impasses have developed; and, it seems, almost 
every possible incompatible position has been staked out (as suggested in §1.1 where I outline 
five such positions). Even so, the theory of Knowledge Intuitions that I will develop in Chapters 
3, 4, 5 and 6 suggests an explanation of why the literature would have bifurcated in the way 
that it has, why multiple theoretical impasses may have arisen, and it suggests a means by 
which this Gordian knot may be cut. 
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Chapter 3: The Function of the Knowledge 
Intuition Producer 
 
 
The last chapter revealed multiple theoretical impasses and the existence of two mutually 
incompatible histories in the epistemological literature. I begin now in earnest to address this 
situation. To start, recall my working hypothesis that Knowledge Intuitions, regardless of the 
context in which they arise, are produced by a functionally discrete cognitive mechanism that 
evolved by natural selection. I called the device, the Knowledge Intuition Producer, or KIP. In 
this chapter, I develop a hypothesis about the Teleonomic Function of the KIP, and consider 
some of the implications of that function. In subsequent chapters, I predict the triggering-
conditions of Knowledge Intuitions on the basis of that function. This will lead to the prediction 
that the triggering-conditions for Knowledge Intuitions depend on certain circumstances; and 
that, for many of the basic positions that epistemologists have staked out, it is possible to 
describe the set of circumstances under which the position works, and other circumstances in 
which it does not. We may cut the Gordian knot in epistemology by specifying the different 
circumstances under which each of the different epistemological positions will hold, and the 
reason we should expect it to hold in just these circumstances. 
 
Also, at the end of this chapter, I note that my hypothesized function of the KIP may serve as 
the basis for explaining the appearance of variation in Epistemic Standards; and then briefly 
discuss the place that explanatory accounts have in the Second History (outlined in §2.3).  
 
 
3.1 Idealization 
 
It seems that the only practical way to investigate the function of the KIP is to first ‘idealize’ it, 
to imagine a simplified model of it. Roman Frigg and Stephan Hartmann explain that in the 
sciences,  
 
idealization is a deliberate simplification of something complicated with the objective of 
making it more tractable. Frictionless planes, point masses, infinite velocities, isolated 
systems, omniscient agents, and markets in perfect equilibrium are but some well-
known examples. (2012, section 1.1)  
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Catherine Elgin describes the utility of the strategy:  
 
idealization [of studied phenomena] affords epistemic access to those features [that are 
believed to be worthwhile investigating], and enables us to explore them and their 
consequences by prescinding from complications that overshadow the features in real 
cases. It is valuable because it equips us to recognize these features, appreciate their 
significance, and tease out subtle consequences that might be obscured in the welter of 
confounding factors that obtain in fact . . . (2007, p.40) 
 
I idealize the KIP in two significant ways. First, I assume that it is a functionally discrete 
mechanism, and that it has the job of setting an Epistemic Standard in the circumstances and 
determining whether the evidence at hand is strong enough to meet that standard. If so, 
Knowledge Intuitions are produced. Further, it carries out its job in a way that allows it to fulfil 
its underlying biological function, which we will consider further on.  
 
A noteworthy aspect of this idealization is that the KIP is viewed as being functionally separated 
from the Cognitive mechanism that generates the propositions that the KIP evaluates in the first 
place. For example, the KIP is the mechanism that adjudicates the proposition that the bank will 
be open this Saturday; and is separate from the mechanism that generated that proposition. So, 
very roughly, whereas the KIP is concerned with evidence and analysis, the proposition 
generating mechanism is concerned with generating or identifying potentially true 
propositions.18 
 
Nonetheless, it would appear that these two mechanisms are fully interdependent. On the one 
hand, the KIP’s adjudications of propositions depend on the generation of alternative 
propositions. The process of adjudicating a proposition p often involves considering a small 
number of alternative propositions that are consistent with the evidence, but not consistent 
with p. For example, in Stanley’s High Stakes Case (which is reproduced, along with Stanley’s 
Low Stakes Case, in Appendix 2), the adjudication of the proposition that the bank will be open 
on Saturday involves generating and considering the alternative proposition that the bank 
changed its hours within the last two weeks. The notion that the KIP’s adjudications of 
propositions depend on the generation of alternative propositions is consistent with RA Theory 
                                                          
18 It may be that a more accurate conception of what I am taking to be two separate mechanisms would 
have it that a single mechanism has two separate functions. I will set aside such a possibility. 
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generally, if it is not explicitly suggested by most versions of it. On the other hand, the reverse 
situation seems also to hold: The operation of the proposition generating mechanism depends 
on the KIP; or, more precisely, a critical aspect of the operation of the proposition generating 
mechanism is controlled by the KIP. Let us look at this.  
 
Consider that the generation of alternatives seems sometimes limited to only those that are 
very likely; and, at other times (though far less frequently) hardly limited at all, e.g., when 
extremely unlikely possibilities are considered. I suggest that the KIP controls how likely the 
propositions that are generated (and considered) should be. It seems that when the KIP sets an 
Epistemic Standard, it effectively controls the generation of alternatives to p. As the Epistemic 
Standard is raised, the threshold likelihood of truth for generated alternatives is lowered, so as 
to potentially admit more, and less likely, alternatives (which according to RA Theory need to be 
ruled out if we are to know). For example, in Jason Stanley’s Low Stakes Case, it seems that 
neither Hannah nor Sarah consider any alternative possibilities; while in Stanley’s High Stakes 
Case, they consider the possibility that the bank changed its hours. Certainly the generation of 
the alternative in the High Stakes Case is not accidental: Generating that possibility in the low 
stakes case would have seemed odd and unnecessary given the practical circumstances, 
whereas generating the possibility in the high stakes case seems appropriate. Our Epistemic 
Standard seems to have been set higher in the high stakes case, and this seems to have called 
for the generation of less likely alternatives than were called for in the low stakes case. So, it 
seems that the KIP controls the production of alternative possibilities. Moreover, this control 
seems critical to the operation of the proposition generating mechanism. Without it, we would 
be inundated with alternative possibilities that are not worth considering, e.g., I should 
abandon the idea of going to the bank altogether because while I am at the bank it will be 
subject to an armed robbery during which I will be shot.  
 
So, the KIP and the proposition generating mechanism are critical to the efficient and 
efficacious operation of each other. However, I suggest that even though such a relationship 
holds between them, I may conduct my investigation into the KIP without being too concerned 
about the nature and operation of the proposition generating mechanism. 
 
My second idealization is to assume that the KIP adjudicates certain kinds of propositions but 
not others. My intention is to set aside a class of propositions in order to facilitate my 
investigation (and I do not suggest that the categorization of propositions I will propose mirrors 
different natural kinds of propositions). Even so, the distinction I will make is similar to certain 
distinctions that come up in the literature. Roughly, I set aside propositions that identify 
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perceptible objects and that are made under favourable conditions for observation (e.g., this is 
a tomato)—which propositions are viewed by Second History theorists as being knowable solely 
on the basis of sensory evidence; whereas I include in my investigation propositions that feature 
non-perceptible elements and that may well be subject to ordinary conscious assessments of 
whether the strength of the evidence meets an Epistemic Standard. From a different 
perspective, I am assuming that the KIP does not deliver adjudications of ordinary perceptions 
that are accepted by default.  
 
Let us look more closely at the kind of proposition that I assume the KIP does not adjudicate. 
These are propositions that (a) identify unambiguous and perceptible objects, states, events or 
conjunctions of states or events, (b) locate those objects or events in space and time, or that (c) 
attribute unambiguous and perceptible properties to objects, states or events. (I do not suggest 
that this is a comprehensive characterization.) I am stipulating, for example, that the following 
statements (made under good observational conditions) are not primarily adjudicated by the 
KIP: (i) the object is a bird, (ii) the cat is on the mat, (iii) the tomato is red, and (iv) the red 
billiard ball hit the black one. I call these ‘Elementary Propositions’.  
 
On the other hand, the KIP does adjudicate propositions that (a) identify ambiguous or non-
perceptible objects, states or events, (b) locate those objects, states or events in space or time, 
(c) attribute ambiguous or non-perceptible properties to objects, states or events, (d) attribute 
causes to states and events, or (e) make predictions about future states and events. (This too is 
not intended to be a comprehensive characterization.) For example, I assume that the KIP 
adjudicates the following statements: (1) the sun will rise in the East tomorrow; (2) my bank will 
be open this Saturday; (3) she is a loyal employee; (4) my car (which I cannot see at the 
moment) is parked outside on the street; (5) that car over there is heavy (even though I have 
not tried to lift it); (6) he has the public’s best interests at heart; (7) the bridge is safe; (8) the 
bird is a gadwall; (9) anthropogenic global warming is real; (10) the politician’s policies directly 
led to the problems to which you referred; (11) the accused is guilty; (12) the watch works fine; 
(13) that is Jonah’s sweater; and (14) Paris is the capital of France. I call these ‘Advanced 
Propositions’. 
 
So, the KIP flags Advanced Propositions as being safe to treat as true (even though they may 
sometimes be false). Let us appreciate how important such a task is to us. Compare, for 
example, the KIP’s importance to one of the several Cognitive devices that contribute to the 
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acuity of depth perception19, such as the Cognitive device that determines the extent to which 
the eyes converge when they focus on objects. A tendency to err in the production of that 
assessment may diminish depth perception acuity to some extent in some cases. Even so, such 
a tendency to err may go unnoticed—though it may rule out a career as a professional baseball 
player. In contrast, a tendency to err in our adjudications of Advanced Propositions would 
produce incorrect attributions of non-perceptible properties, incorrect predictions of all kinds, 
and incorrect everyday causal hypotheses. That would be profoundly debilitating. 
 
 
3.2 The Function Hypothesis 
 
In this section, I develop a hypothesis about the Teleonomic Function of the KIP. However, that 
work will require that we clearly distinguish such a function from an entirely different kind of 
function called an instrumental function. So, before starting that work in earnest, I discuss these 
function types (in §3.2.1). Further, my development of a Teleonomic Function hypothesis will be 
based on a hypothesis about the Teleonomic Function of cognition generally. However, the 
prospects of this approach working depends entirely on whether it is plausible that the KIP 
plays a key role in cognition generally. So, I will examine this matter also (in §3.2.2) before 
delving directly into the KIP’s Teleonomic Function.     
 
 
3.2.1 Teleonomic vs Instrumental Functions 
 
My suggestion that the KIP evolved by natural selection is implicit in several writings. For 
example, Alvin Goldman proposed that a  
 
fundamental facet of animate life, both human and infra-human, is telling things apart, 
distinguishing predator from prey, for example, or a protective habitat from a 
threatening one. The concept of knowledge has its roots in this kind of cognitive 
activity. (1976, p.791)  
 
And Edward Craig suggests that ‘[h]uman beings need true beliefs about their environment, 
beliefs that can serve to guide their actions to a successful outcome’ (1999, p.11). 
                                                          
19 Simon Grondin summarizes major research findings on depth perception cues (2016, pp.103-110). 
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If the KIP evolved by natural selection, it should have a Teleonomic Function20, i.e., there should 
be something it does that explains, in biological terms, why we have it. Peter Godfrey-Smith 
suggests that such an explanation may refer either to (a) the ancient origin of a trait, or (b) a 
more recent history in which the trait was maintained or persisted (1994, p.344). For example, 
it is suggested that the original selection pressure for feathers was produced in virtue of their 
insulation value. Feathers originally evolved to help regulate the temperature of Archaeopteryx 
animals. Even so, feathers were maintained in recent history by selection pressure for flight 
(Ostrom, 1979, cited in Gould and Vrba, 1982, p.7). Similarly, it is argued that original selection 
pressure for bones in fish was produced by their ability to store phosphates. Even so, bones are 
maintained in more recent history by selection pressure for the structural support it gives land-
dwelling vertebrates (Halstead, 1969, cited in Godfrey-Smith, 1994, p.358). Whether the KIP 
originally had a different function than it has had in recent history, or not, I will focus only on 
recent history.  
  
Let us be careful not to confuse the KIP’s Teleonomic Function with non-teleonomic functions 
that are generally referred to as ‘instrumental functions’. These are functions that relate strictly 
to how the trait is utilized by the organism. For example, we utilize depth perception when we 
take in a beautiful landscape. That trait helps create aesthetically pleasing views. So, depth 
perception may be said to have this instrumental function, creating beautiful scenes in our 
minds. This is contrasted with what is plausibly the primary Teleonomic Function of depth 
perception—to get some sense of the spatial relations of visible objects, which sense allowed 
our ancestors to make a variety of fitness-enhancing inferences, such as whether objects were 
moving toward or away from them. Further, some traits may have an instrumental function, but 
not a Teleonomic Function. The Cognitive mechanisms that mediate such traits are mere by-
products of mechanisms that mediate traits that have a Teleonomic Function, and that evolved 
by natural selection. Literacy and performing calculus are two examples that are often 
suggested in this context. It does not seem as if these traits could have helped our distant 
ancestors survive and reproduce. Additionally, John Dewey suggests that Cognitive traits that 
involve only the production and appreciation of aesthetic objects only have an instrumental 
function. 
 
As we exercise caution in not confusing the KIP’s Teleonomic Function with any of its 
instrumental functions, let us we bear in mind how easy it may be to make that error—as a 
                                                          
20 See C. S. Pittendrigh (1958) and G. C. Williams (1966). 
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result of our generally knowing very little about the changing conditions under which traits 
evolved.21 For example, perhaps a plausible adaptationist account could have been developed 
for literacy, positing a Teleonomic Function for that trait. However, we have avoided that error 
in virtue of happening to know that our brain has not evolved significantly since a time before 
writing was invented.  
 
With this mind, my proposed hypothesis of the Teleonomic Function of the KIP will be highly 
tentative. However, I do not simply stand on the hypothesis I develop about the function of the 
KIP. As I suggested earlier (in §1.3), my hypothesis is ultimately tested via the predictions it 
makes and whether those predictions are consistent with a wide range of knowledge cases. 
 
 
3.2.2 Cognition 
 
I suggest that we would do well to develop a hypothesis of the Teleonomic Function of the KIP 
on the basis of a hypothesis of the Teleonomic Function of Cognition generally. In principle, 
such a move may be made (a) if the function of the lesser device or process (in our case, the 
KIP) plays a key role in the operation of the greater device or process (in our case, Cognition), 
and (b) if it does not seem as if the lesser device or process has any other significant function. 
For example, the function of depth perception (a lesser process) follows from the function of 
the trait of being able to respond effectively to our physical environment (the greater process). 
Depth perception gives us a sense of the spatial relations of visible objects, and this plays a key 
role in our being able to respond effectively to our physical environment. We can duck if an 
object is flying toward us. Moreover, depth perception does not seem to have any other 
significant Teleonomic Function. So, let us look at whether it is plausible that the KIP plays a key 
role in the operation of Cognition.  
 
There is one small matter to clear up first. I use the definition of Cognition that is used in 
biology, which seems to be somewhat narrower than that which is used in everyday discourse. 
Specifically, Cognition is constituted by ‘those higher mental processes in humans and animals, 
such as the formation of associations, concept formation and insight, whose existence can only 
be inferred and not directly observed’ (Henderson’s Dictionary of Biology, 14th edn, 2008, 
p.131).  
 
                                                          
21 S. J. Gould and R. C. Lewontin (1979) describe how these hypotheses may fail. 
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So, what role does the KIP play in cognition? I suggested earlier that the KIP seems to limit the 
generation of Advanced Propositions to those that are reasonably likely given the evidence 
(otherwise we would be inundated with highly unlikely alternative possibilities); and suggested 
that this would seem to be critical to the efficient and efficacious operation of the proposition 
generating mechanism. So, a creature that did not possess a KIP would seem to have no need 
for a proposition generating mechanism; and if a creature did not possess either a KIP or a 
proposition generating mechanism, it would not have intuitions of knowing or of not knowing 
any Advanced Propositions. It would not have intuitions of knowing or of not knowing any 
causes of present events, and not have intuitions of knowing or of not knowing that particular 
future events will arise.  
 
It is hard to see how a creature that had neither a KIP nor a proposition generating mechanism 
would be able to respond to the environmental conditions it encounters in a way that is flexible 
and still efficacious. It would have no basis upon which to produce calculated deliberate 
responses. So, not only does the proposition generation mechanism depend on the KIP, but also 
those devices that produce and control calculated deliberate responses depend on the KIP.  
 
Of course, organisms that have neither a KIP nor a proposition generating mechanism may very 
well still adjudicate Elementary Propositions. They may be able to identify unambiguous, 
perceptible objects, states and events; and such an organism may well be able to produce a 
range of responses to the environmental conditions it encounters that allow it to survive and 
thrive. However, these responses would seem to be limited to those that are reflexive, 
autonomic, and stimulus-responsive (such as startle responses, defensive physical responses, 
and the like). These are rule-based behaviours—stimulus A triggers response B.  
 
Notice that the mechanisms that mediate rule-based behaviour may be relatively simple. Plants 
are capable of it, e.g., the leaves of Mimosa pudica defensively fold inward and droop when 
touched. This is not to suggest that such behaviour is not sometimes astonishing. Several bird, 
insect and fish species are remarkably accurate navigators over relatively great distances—
variously using the earth’s magnetic field, the location of the sun, smells, and chemical 
concentrations in water (Gallistel, 1990, pp.35-56). 
 
Nevertheless, rule-based behaviour is, critically, not able to produce the behavioural flexibility 
that is facilitated by the adjudication of Advanced Propositions. Daniel Dennett’s observations 
about the intelligence of lower species are apposite, 
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Such a smart doggie, but can he figure out how to unwind his leash when he runs 
around a tree or a lamppost? . . . And dolphins, for all their intelligence, are strangely 
unable to figure out that they could easily leap over the surrounding tuna net to safety’. 
(1996, pp.115-116) 
 
Given that the mechanisms that mediate rule-based behaviour may be relatively simple and 
that the term, Cognition, refers to higher mental processes; it seems that the combination of (a) 
the proposition generation mechanism, (b) the KIP, and (c) all those devices that together 
produce and control calculated deliberate responses take up a very large part of Cognition. 
William James’ view of Cognition seems broadly consistent with such a conclusion:  
 
Cognition, in short, is incomplete until discharged in act. And although it is true that the 
later mental development, which attains its maximum through the hypertrophied 
cerebrum of man, gives birth to a vast amount of theoretic activity over and above that 
which is immediately ministerial to practice, yet the earlier claim is only postponed, not 
effaced, and the active nature asserts its rights to the end. (1966, p.18) 
 
Moreover, I suggested earlier that (a) the proposition generation mechanism, and (b) all those 
devices that together produce and control calculated deliberate responses depend on the KIP.  
 
Thus, this initial and cursory look at the situation suggests that the KIP may very well play a key 
role in Cognition generally. So, (just as the function of depth perception follows from the 
function of the trait of being able to respond effectively to our physical environment) I take it 
that it would be worthwhile to explore the possibility that the KIP’s primary Teleonomic 
Function follows from Cognition’s Teleonomic Function. So, I will now attempt to identify a 
plausible hypothesis about Cognition’s Teleonomic Function; and then see if that suggests a 
Teleonomic Function for the KIP. 
 
 
3.2.3 The Environmental Complexity Thesis 
 
Peter Godfrey-Smith (1998) identifies ‘a general family of ideas’ that pertain to the function of 
Cognition. These ideas all suggest that (a) the environment naturally selects Cognitive 
characteristics, and (b) that Environmental Complexity produces selection pressure for complex 
minds. Let us look more closely at (b). 
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Environmental Complexity is an environmental parameter that is relative to a particular 
organism. It has to do with whether an organism’s Inclusive Fitness is affected differently when 
it performs particular behaviours or adopts particular Phenotypes under either different 
environmental conditions that it encounters (i.e., under a type of environmental complexity 
called ‘environmental diversity’), or at different times (i.e., under a type of environmental 
complexity called ‘environmental variability’). If an organism’s behaviour or adopted Phenotype 
positively affects its Inclusive Fitness under some of environmental conditions it encounters but 
not others, or at some times but not others, its environment is viewed as being complex. For 
example, the environment for the plant Hieracium umbellatum is viewed as complex insofar as 
the plant benefits significantly by (i) adopting its bushy, broad leaf Phenotype when it grows on 
rocky, sea-side cliffs, and (ii) adopting its narrow leaf Phenotype when it grows on sand dunes.22 
As I say, there is a general family of ideas that share the view that such Environmental 
Complexity produces selection pressure for complex minds. 
 
I do not intend to suggest that the causal arrow between Environmental Complexity and the 
features of Cognition only points in one direction. Certain Cognitive adaptations may have the 
effect of increasing Environmental Complexity. For example, these adaptations may facilitate 
new ways to exploit an environment and in the process make new features of the environment 
relevant. So, these adaptations increase Environmental Complexity.23 Still, this state of affairs 
does not undermine the thesis that complex environments produce selection pressure for 
complex minds.24 
                                                          
22 More basic examples of environmental diversity are reflected when different foods (available at a given 
time) have different nutritional properties and when different predators (that are active at a given time) 
call for different defences. Environmental variability is reflected when (a) different foraging practices are 
called for in different seasons, (b) different behaviours are called for in the event of significant changes in 
the populations of predators or prey due to disease, and (c) opportunistic invasions into neighbouring 
territories are called for under certain world conditions. 
23 For more see Kim Sterelny (1997, p.555). 
24 The thesis that complex environments produce selection pressure for complex minds is externalistic: It 
looks to environmental explanations for an organism’s internal mechanisms. However, Kim Sterelny 
(1997), Elliot Sober (1997) and James Maclaurin (1998) all suggest that internalistic explanations should 
not be unduly discounted. Maclaurin explains:  
 
A lineage that evolves colour vision puts itself in the way of new selection pressures. Individuals 
will be likely to evolve traits that make use of the more complex information provided by their 
new-found discriminatory abilities. Explanations for some of those adaptations will focus on a 
feature of the lineage (its ability to perceive in colour) at least as much as they will point to 
features of the environment. (p.493) 
 
Nonetheless, when organisms evolve traits that make use of traits they already have, those newly 
evolved traits may still constitute a response to external selection pressures. Moreover, Godfrey-Smith 
maintains that externalistic explanations tend to produce greater explanatory pay-offs than do 
internalistic explanations (1998, p.53). 
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Godfrey-Smith defends a particular thesis that belongs to this family of ideas that I have 
referenced pertaining to the function of Cognition. He calls it the ‘Environmental Complexity 
Thesis’ (ECT)—and neatly expresses it as follows: 
 
ECT: ‘[t]he function of cognition is to enable the agent to deal with environmental 
complexity’ (1998, p.3). 
 
How does Cognition enable the agent to deal with Environmental Complexity? On Godfrey-
Smith’s account, it does so by enabling behavioural flexibility. In complex environments, 
individuals benefit by deploying a multiplicity of specialized behaviours (e.g., responding 
differently to the different behaviours of different predators and prey) rather than by deploying 
fewer general-purpose behaviours. Those specialized behaviours may be more efficacious or 
more efficient under the different world conditions that individuals encounter than are general-
purpose behaviours. (In the human case, these behaviours may include any sort of action, 
attitude or choice.) Cognition facilitates the performance of these specialized behaviours. This 
suggests a corollary of ECT that is more informative and particularly applicable in the human 
case: 
 
ECT’: The function of Cognition is to create or select specialized behaviours that tend 
to be more efficacious and efficient in the different world conditions that the 
individual encounters than would general-purpose behaviours. 
 
One of the main worries about the ECT is that it significantly overgeneralizes, that there may be 
important Cognitive traits that it does not describe.25 Even so, a close look seems to suggest 
                                                          
However, S. J. Gould and R. C. Lewontin take a stronger position in favour of internalism:  
 
organisms must be analysed as integrated wholes, with Bauplane so constrained by phyletic 
heritage, pathways of development and general architecture that the constraints themselves 
become more interesting and more important in delimiting pathways of change than the 
selective force that may mediate change when it occurs. (1979, p.581) 
 
Even so, Daniel Dennett points out that Gould & Lewontin fail to recognize that some selective 
explanations may be very complex, and that the details of such complex accounts may be either 
unknown or incorrect. He asks, “Is it objectionable when meteorologists say, begging the question about 
supernatural forces, that there must be a purely physical explanation for the birth of hurricanes, even if 
many of the details so far elude them?” (1995, p.250). Even so, most biologists hold the conservative 
view that adaptationist explanations are, at least, a good basis for generating hypotheses for subsequent 
testing and investigation.  
25 See for example Kim Sterelny (1997), Elliott Sober (1997) and D. M. Walsh (1997). 
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that it is plausible that the ECT covers enough of Cognition (and perhaps even all of Cognition) 
that it can indeed help us to identify the function of the KIP (which I present in Appendix 1). 
 
ECT’ does suggest a Teleonomic Function for the KIP, viz., flagging the world conditions under 
which our specialized behaviours are to be deployed—or, more generally, flagging when we may 
behave as if a proposition about a world condition is true. Here is a first pass hypothesis of the 
function of the KIP (which I express in terms of the function of Knowledge Intuitions): 
 
First Pass:  In a situation S, the function of intuiting that one knows that a 
proposition p is true is to indicate to oneself that, on the total evidence, 
behaving as if p in S will tend to enhance one’s Inclusive Fitness. 
 
However, it would be hard to make the case that our responses to the situations we encounter 
are all oriented toward the goal of enhancing Inclusive Fitness. Further on (in §4.3.2.3), I find 
that a closer look at the situation suggests that it is more plausible that an individual’s 
calculated, deliberate actions are oriented toward the goal of producing consequences that the 
individual values; and the situation suggests that it is not implausible that our innate and 
acquired values, in turn, very broadly tend to facilitate the goal of enhancing Inclusive Fitness. 
(If they did not do so, then it would be hard to see how our species would have done as well as 
it has.) This suggests a modification to First Pass:  
 
Second Pass: In a situation S, the function of intuiting that one knows that a 
proposition p is true is to indicate to oneself that, on the total evidence, 
behaving as if p in S will tend to produce consequences that one values.  
 
Second Pass suggests that we assess whether behaving as if p will produce valued consequences 
in a two-step process: (1) anticipate the consequences of behaving as if p, and then (2) see 
whether we value those consequences. Consider very briefly a particular feature of step (2), 
valuing consequences.  
 
It seems that the consequences of behaviour that we value are those that are an improvement 
over what would have followed from some alternative behaviour. For example, we value the 
anticipated consequences of an action if we believe that the action (a) will bring about an 
extremely good situation in the place of what would otherwise have been only a good situation, 
or (b) will bring about a moderately bad situation in the place of what would otherwise have 
been an extremely bad one. We do not value the anticipated consequences of an action, if it will 
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not make things better; and we value negatively the anticipated consequences of an action if it 
will make things worse. So, in general terms, we compare the consequences of behaving as if p 
with the consequences of not behaving as if p; and value the former if we view it to be better 
than the latter. This situation suggests a further modification to Second Pass, and the final form 
of my hypothesis of the function of Knowledge Intuitions (and, by extension, the KIP):  
 
F1:  In a situation S, the function of intuiting that one knows that a proposition p is true 
is to indicate to oneself that, on the total evidence, behaving as if p in S will tend to 
produce better consequences than that of not behaving as if p in S. 
 
For clarity: The phrase, ‘behaving as if p’, refers to a sense that the agent has, in the moment, of 
a certain rough range of behaviours that she may perform if she took herself as knowing that p. 
The phrase, ‘not behaving as if p’ refers to a sense that the agent has, in the moment, of a 
certain rough range of behaviours that she may perform if she did not take herself as knowing 
that p. Furthermore, the rough range of behaviour referred to by ‘behaving as if p’ is 
unrestricted (aside from it being consistent with p). This feature is consistent with my earlier 
observation (in §1.2.3) that there are no intrinsic limitations (beyond physical ones) imposed on 
the behaviour that follows from Knowledge Intuitions. If I take myself as knowing and have no 
doubt at all that the man will attempt to kill me, my behaviour may well breach ordinary 
boundaries. 
 
Notice that F1 receives a measure of support from John Hawthorne’s and Jason Stanley’s (2008) 
investigation which found that knowledge is a norm for deliberate action (which I discussed in 
§1.2.3). They point out in that same paper, that knowledge appears also to be a norm for 
further belief, making assertions and making choices.26 They conclude their investigation,  
 
[j]udging by our folk appraisals, then, knowledge and action are intimately related . . . 
Moreover, discussions of knowledge are in many cases silent about this connection. 
This is a shame, since if there is such a connection it would seem to constitute one of 
the most fundamental roles for knowledge. (p.574) 
 
                                                          
26 They suggest, respectively, (1) ‘Treat the proposition that p as a reason for believing q only if one 
knows that p’ (p.577), (2) ‘one should assert only if one knows’ (p.573), and (3) ‘[w]here one’s choice is p-
dependent, it is appropriate to treat the proposition that p as a reason for acting iff you know that p’ 
(p.578). 
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(Even so, there are a number of important differences between our accounts—which I will set 
aside here.) 
 
However, even if F1 follows from the ECT, even if it is consistent with my initial observations (in 
Chapter 1) about the role that Knowledge Intuitions seems to play in our lives, and even if it is 
supported by Hawthorne & Stanley’s investigation, F1 is counterintuitive. In particular, it may 
sound more like a formulation for rational acceptance than for Knowledge Intuitions. 
Nonetheless, as I have said, F1 is tested in Chapters 5 and 6 by seeing whether it is consistent 
with a wide range of knowledge cases, and it will pass that test; and further on (in §4.3.2.4), I 
look at rational acceptance cases closely and find that the mental states that feature in rational 
acceptance cases are distinguishable from Knowledge Intuitions, and also depend upon prior 
Knowledge Intuitions. Additionally, we will find that F1 helps us to explain why we have two 
independent histories in epistemology (Chapter 7) and explain our responses to Gettier-Style 
Cases (in Chapter 8).   
 
 
3.3 A Second Function 
 
Biological research favours the hypothesis that we inherit certain altruistic tendencies. (This 
research is reviewed in Appendix 3.) It seems that under a range of circumstances helping 
others tends to enhance one’s Inclusive Fitness. This state of affairs has profound implications 
for the knowledge theory that I develop on the basis of F1. I will say a little about it here, and 
examine it more closely in Chapter 6.  
 
However, before looking at it, let us be clear that the term ‘altruism’ has a different meaning in 
biology than it does in ordinary use. The main difference is that, in biology, motivations are 
irrelevant. The sole criterion for whether a behaviour is altruistic is whether its immediate (non-
accidental) effect is to decrease the donor’s fitness and increase the recipient’s. So, for example, 
incurring a cost in the process of helping others would be described as ‘altruistic’ in biology—
even if that action follows from the egoistic motivation of creating an indebtedness from the 
recipient to the donor, burnishing the donor’s reputation, or winning God’s grace. I use this 
biological meaning of ‘altruism’ in my investigation in order to be consistent with the biological 
usage. 
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The biological research on altruism supports the thesis that the valuations of the consequences 
of behaviours that F1 refers to may in many cases be oriented toward helping others. Those 
valuations may be made in relation to the practical interests of those who we intend to help or 
envisage helping. So, whereas our valuations of consequences of behaviour may often be 
entirely self-oriented and self-interested, under some circumstances our valuations may be 
other-oriented and other-interested. Accordingly, we may distinguish the Knowledge Intuitions 
that follow from the former, from those that follow from the latter. I refer to the former as 
‘Egoistic Knowledge Intuitions’, and the latter as ‘Altruistic Knowledge Intuitions’.  
 
Often, Altruistic Knowledge Intuitions arise when we intend or envisage communicating 
questioned propositions to others for the purpose of helping them. Our valuations of 
consequences are made in relation to the practical interests of the intended recipients of those 
messages. In fact, Altruistic communication is a common trait among a wide range of species. 
For example, honey bees perform a wagging dance to communicate the location of nectar or 
pollen; receiver bees collect the nectar and pollen; and that nectar and pollen helps feed the 
sender’s hive. I reference Altruistic senders and their intended receivers using defined terms 
‘Senders’ and ‘Receivers’ respectively.  
 
The cases that I will examine in which Altruistic Knowledge Intuitions arise are limited to those 
that involve communications between Senders and Receivers. The function of those Knowledge 
Intuitions are described by F1. However, my discussion of communication cases will be 
facilitated by having a separate formal hypothesis that is specific to the Altruistic Knowledge 
Intuitions produced in these communication cases, and that is expressed in terms of Senders 
and Receivers. It will be a special case of F1: 
 
F2:  The function of a Sender’s Altruistic Knowledge Intuition in relation to p is to 
indicate to herself that communicating that p will tend to help her Receiver(s) 
more than would not communicating that p. 
 
So, for example, say a Sender S has been asked by a Receiver R for directions to the nearest 
open tube station and S adjudicates a proposition p about how to get to that tube station on 
the basis of certain evidence. F2 suggests that, for S, the function of taking herself as knowing 
that p is to indicate to herself that R is better off acting or having an attitude as if p than not 
doing so. The Sender’s Knowledge Intuitions thus facilitate her being able to help her Receivers.  
 
* 
56 
 
 
My account of the Second History (§2.3) ended with an impasse in which Contextualists 
asserted that Epistemic Standards depend on the importance of being right to the attributor, 
and Subject Sensitive Invariantists asserted that these standards depend on the importance of 
being right to the subject of knowledge attributions. Also, we found that in cases involving 
second-person and third-person knowledge attributions, e.g., ‘She knows that p’, Contextualism 
was unable to explain changes in the Epistemic Standards that we seem to set in SSI cases, 
whereas Subject Sensitive Invariantism was unable to explain changes in the Epistemic 
Standards that we seem to set in Contextualism cases. I suggest that the impasse follows from a 
failure to distinguish Egoistic Knowledge Intuitions from Altruistic Knowledge Intuitions. The 
cases on which Contextualists focus exclusively feature Egoistic Knowledge Intuitions (see, for 
example, Case 2-1 and Case 2-2); while the cases on which Subject Sensitive Invariantists focus 
include those that feature Altruistic Knowledge Intuitions (see, for example, Case 2-3 and 2-4). 
This claim that I make will form one small part of the theoretical picture that I develop over the 
next several chapters. 
 
 
3.4 The Hallmark of the KIP Is Flexibility 
 
F1 and F2 suggest that a hallmark of the KIP is flexibility in determining whether the evidence is 
good enough that Knowledge Intuitions should be produced. If true, this would not constitute 
some particularly extraordinary trait. Consider that a certain pragmatic flexibility is evident in 
perceptual processes. While our perceptions may very often provide a faithful picture of our 
situation, they are also subject to systematic distortions and biases that help to protect us. 
Dangerous heights are overestimated by 60% when seen from above, and only 29% when seen 
from below (Stefanucci and Proffitt, 2009, p.427). This bias reduces the incidence of falling 
injuries (Jackson and Cormack, 2007, p.353). Also, the time-to-collision of approaching objects is 
underestimated for menacing objects (e.g., snakes and spiders) compared to non-menacing 
objects (e.g., butterflies and rabbits) (Vagnoni et al., 2012, p.R826). Avoidance behaviour for 
menacing objects that is earlier than it needs to be, tends to serves us better than avoidance 
behaviour that is too late.  
 
F1 and F2 suggest that there are some contexts in which we tend to do well to be trusting even 
with weak evidence, other contexts in which we tend to do well to be sceptical even with strong 
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evidence, and still other contexts in which we tend to do well to be abundantly cautious about 
taking ourselves as knowing propositions to be true. I describe these contexts in turn below. 
 
 
3.4.1 Contexts in Which Subjects Are Trusting Even with Weak Evidence  
 
F1 suggests that if we determine that we would do better to (a) intuit knowing that p (and to 
behave as if p) even if not-p, than to (b) not intuit knowing that p even if p, we may (c) intuit 
knowing that p even if our evidence for p is weak. Often, in these contexts, we value positively 
the consequences that are anticipated to follow from acting or forming an attitude as if p, when 
p is true; and we do not disvalue, or at least not strongly disvalue, the consequences that are 
anticipated to follow from acting or forming an attitude as if p, when p is false. Under these 
conditions, intuiting that one knows that p may be a kind of ‘best bet’. For example, F1 predicts 
that we may take ourselves as knowing to be true the proposition that the email solicitation is a 
scam even with weak evidence. 
 
James Sage alludes to contexts of this type when he points out that when dangers lurk ‘cautious 
belief-forming processes (say, those based on weak inductive generalizations) can 
systematically generate false beliefs, but still be [adaptive]’ (2004, pp.102-103). It can pay to 
‘over detect’ dangerous predators and there are advantages to ‘believing that all spotted 
mushrooms are poisonous (because consumption of spotted mushrooms was once followed by 
illness)’ (p.103).  
 
 
3.4.2 Contexts in Which Subjects Are Sceptical Even with Strong Evidence  
 
F1 suggests that if we determine that we would do better to (a) not intuit knowing that p (and 
not behaving as if p) even if p, than to (b) intuit knowing that p even if not-p, we may (c) not 
intuit knowing that p even if our evidence for p is very strong. Often, in these contexts, we value 
positively the consequences that are anticipated to follow from not intuiting that we know that 
p, when p is false; and do not disvalue, or at least not strongly disvalue, the consequences that 
are anticipated to follow from not intuiting that we know that p, when p is true. Under these 
conditions, not intuiting that we know that p is a kind of ‘best bet’. 
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The sociologist Ted Goertzel alludes to contexts of this type. In those contexts, individuals 
derive important psychological benefits from their knowledge denials. These denials give 
‘meaning to their lives and [enable] them to shape the world’ (1992, p.36). He refers to 
historical revisionists, and particularly to deniers of genocides (Armenian, Jewish, and 
Cambodian). These revisionists find that the evidence in favour of certain events consistently 
fails to meet their standards. ‘With this kind of abuse of sceptical principles, doubt can be cast 
on almost anything, at least in the minds of those who are eager to deny an unpleasant reality’ 
(p.318). He finds the strategy of these deniers comparable to the strategy of those who ‘deny 
the scientific evidence of human evolution’ (p.318).  
 
 
3.4.3 Contexts in Which Subjects Become Abundantly Cautious 
 
My hypothesis, F2, suggests certain conditions under which Senders would require very strong 
evidence in order to take themselves as knowing—even though they otherwise aim to avoid 
being sceptical. In these contexts, Altruistic Senders intend or envisage passing messages to 
large numbers of Receivers—even thousands or millions via the written word or other 
technological means—for the immediate purpose of helping them. I call such Senders 
‘Broadcasters’. (I look at this in detail in §6.4.4.) 
 
As the number of Receivers increases, the potential cumulative benefit produced by a true 
positive, and the potential cumulative harm produced by a false positive, may be multiplied 
very many times over. In §6.4.4, I show how Broadcasters could improve the consequences of 
their communications, from their Receivers’ point of view, by sending messages that are not 
likely to prove false for any of their Receivers. They may do this by requiring very strong 
evidence to support the propositions that they communicate. Particularly, we find that F2 
predicts that in the process of trying to produce benefits for their many Receivers, Broadcasters 
tend to find the following: 
 
(1) It is worthwhile gathering additional evidence that only modestly increases the 
predictive validity of their total evidence.  
 
(2) It is worthwhile incurring a high cost to gather additional evidence.  
 
Prediction (1) is supported, for example, by the fact that, in most every evidence-based 
disciplines, multiple researchers undertake independent studies to confirm a given thesis. For 
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example, at least nine different kinds of experiments have been performed to confirm the value 
of Avogadro’s Constant. Prediction (2) is supported whenever researchers—including say 
historians, archaeologists or botanists—expend a great deal of time and energy, travel great 
distances, or risk life and limb gathering additional evidence. It is further supported by the 
existence of ‘big science’, such as the research that involves the Large Hadron Collider or one of 
the giant telescopes. 
 
Moreover, in §6.4.4, I show that these tendencies would tend to be amplified as Broadcasters’ 
improve their capacities, technologies, resources and strategies for increasing the predictive 
validity of their total evidence. 
 
 
3.5 Second Phase of the Second History and Edward Craig 
 
Notice that F1 may serve as the basis for explanations of the appearance of variation in 
Epistemic Standards. Such an explanation, in a given situation S, would suggest that an 
individual X has a Knowledge Intuition (or, in an alternative scenario, failed to have a Knowledge 
Intuition), which was mediated by an unconscious setting of X’s Epistemic Standard in the 
moment to a level that X’s evidence would meet (or, in the alternative scenario, would not 
meet); the Epistemic Standard was set to this level because X anticipated (unconsciously) that 
having the Knowledge Intuition (or, in the alternative scenario, not having the Knowledge 
Intuition) would tend to produce consequences that X valued more highly than the 
consequences X anticipated would tend to follow from not having the Knowledge Intuition (or, 
in the alternative scenario, having the Knowledge Intuition). In this brief section, I say a few 
words about the place that explanatory accounts have in the Second History (which I outlined in 
§2.3).  
 
Much Second History theory analyses and describes the appearance of variation in Epistemic 
Standards. The literature suggests factors that seem to predict the appearance of this variation. 
This theoretical work may be part of only the first phase of the Second History. In a second 
phase, epistemologists could aim to explain the findings produced in the first phase. This would 
involve explaining the ordinary use of ‘know’. (Even so, such explanatory accounts may have 
analytical and descriptive value, and could supplant some first phase theory.) Edward Craig 
hoped to see just such phasing fully realized in epistemology:  
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Let us suppose, however optimistically, that the problem of the analysis of the everyday 
meaning of ‘know’ had both been shown to exist and subsequently solved, so that 
agreed necessary and sufficient conditions for the ascription of knowledge were now on 
the table . . . I hope that philosophers would not regard it as a terminus . . . I should like 
it to be seen as a prolegomenon to a further inquiry: why has a concept demarcated by 
those conditions enjoyed such widespread use? (Craig, 1999, p.2) 
 
Let us look briefly at Edward Craig’s second phase theory.  
 
Craig’s explanatory account, like my own, is based on identifying the function of knowing. 
According to Craig, the ‘function of “know” is to flag good sources of true belief’ (1999, p.17). 
(So, ‘know’ is viewed as having a significantly more modest role than what is suggested by F1, 
i.e., roughly to flag behaviour that would tend to produce consequences that we value.) Craig 
pictures himself as an inquirer who is narrowly focused on his present practical circumstances 
and whose knowledge ascriptions flag good informants. Further, he takes a ‘totally subjectivist 
stance, the pure here and now for me as I am here and now’ (p.83). This may describe the 
position of individuals who in the moment have Egoistic Knowledge Intuitions. 
 
However, whereas this ‘subjectivist stance’ is natural on Craig’s account, somehow it may not 
actually arise, or, if it arises, it will be short-lived. He explains that ‘if [the subjectivist stance] 
exists, at any time, or in any individual, it will develop in the direction of objectivisation’ (1999, 
p.84). According to Craig, objectivisation follows from practical pressures that inevitably cause 
us to move away from consideration of ‘what any particular person wants at any particular time 
or place’ (p.84) and toward consideration of the inquirer’s future needs (p.84) and the needs of 
others (p.88). Under objectivisation, the function of knowledge is to flag  
 
someone who is a good informant as to whether p whatever the particular 
circumstances of the inquirer, whatever rewards and penalties hang over him and 
whatever his attitude to them. That means someone with a very high degree of 
reliability. (p.91) 
 
Thus, Craig ultimately presents a theory that defends a very high and invariant Epistemic 
Standard. As a result, on my reading, it does not at all solve what he called ‘the problem of the 
analysis of the everyday meaning of ‘know’’ (p.2). Even so, my thesis follows in Craig’s footsteps 
in aiming to contribute to the second phase of the Second History, i.e., aiming to explain the 
ordinary use of ‘know’. Moreover, I assume as Craig does that the production of Knowledge 
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Intuitions is a human trait that has an important role to play in our lives. I even employ Craig’s 
basic methodology: We both develop a hypothesis of the function of knowing, work out the 
implications of that hypothesis, and then test the implications. However, the trajectories of our 
investigations are entirely different; and this is largely due to our different initial hypotheses 
about the function of knowing. While Craig emphasizes inquiry, I emphasize a more general 
matter, behaviour, which I do on the basis of my investigation of the biological literature.  
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Chapter 4: Operating Principles of the 
Knowledge Intuition Producer 
 
 
A new engineering student might be asked to suggest possible basic operating principles of a jet 
engine and to do so without looking inside such an engine. She would need to infer how, in 
principle, it manages to do what it does. The student might, for example, hypothesis (correctly) 
that an air and fuel mixture is ignited, causing burning gases to expand, shoot out the back of 
the engine and produce forward thrust. So too, one may try to work out the operating 
principles of the KIP—under the assumption that it performs the functions described by F1 and 
F2. I try to do so in this chapter. This is critical because these operating principles can suggest a 
set of contextual factors that determine the Epistemic Standards that we seem to set—which, 
in turn, would form a major part of our picture of the triggering-conditions of Knowledge 
Intuitions. In this chapter I propose operating principles of the KIP and propose contextual 
factors that determine our Epistemic Standards.  
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
Much of the work that would need to be done to get a sense of the operating principles of the 
KIP has already been done by others—and especially by Godfrey-Smith (1991; 1998). However, 
his focus was not on the KIP per se, but rather on Cognition; and the task he set for himself was 
to infer operating principles of Cognition under the assumption that the ECT is true. Even so, 
much of that work is applicable to the KIP.  
 
Godfrey-Smith’s first step was to identify the principal operating challenge for Cognition, under 
the assumption that the ECT is true. He suggests that that challenge is to respond to world 
conditions based on evidence about the nature of those conditions that is very often equivocal 
or deceptive, and to respond to them in a way that tends to advance the organism’s Inclusive 
Fitness. I represent the challenge diagrammatically in Figure 4-1. 
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Figure 4-1: Cognition’s Principal Challenge 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The principal input of Cognition is equivocal or deceptive evidence. Its principal output is the 
governance of behavioural responses to world conditions. If ECT is true, then these last 
responses produce a tendency to advance the organism’s Inclusive Fitness. 
 
However, it seems that, in the human case, much of Cognition’s principal challenge falls to the 
KIP. More precisely, the challenge of producing calculated deliberate responses to world 
conditions that tend to advance our interests falls to the KIP. Accordingly, we may reassign 
Cognition’s principal challenge to the KIP (setting aside stimulus-responsive, or rule-based 
behaviour). Call it ‘Principal Challenge of the KIP’. It is as follows: (1) in response to equivocal or 
deceptive evidence, (2) the KIP produces Knowledge Intuitions, (3) that guide our deliberate 
and calculated responses to world conditions in a way that (4) has a tendency to produce 
consequences that we value. (Further on, in §4.3.2.3, I explain that Inclusive Fitness may only 
be indirectly relevant to whether Knowledge Intuitions are produced, and that what is directly 
relevant is, instead, how we value the anticipated consequences of our behaviour.) I show the 
challenge diagrammatically in Figure 4-2. 
 
  Figure 4-2: Principal Challenge of the KIP 
 
 
 
 
 
 
After having identified Cognition’s principal challenge, Godfrey-Smith identifies a theoretical 
approach to addressing that challenge—which in turn suggests Cognition’s operating principles. 
In particular, he points out that Signal Detection Theory (SDT) indicates how evidence might be 
assessed in a way that best advances the individual’s interests. He suggests that it may be that 
the operating principles of Cognition follow SDT principles. Now, we reassigned Cognition’s 
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principal challenge to the KIP. So, we have the suggestion, via Godfrey-Smith, that the operating 
principles of the KIP follow SDT principles. In this chapter, I investigate whether this is plausible.  
 
 
4.2 What is Signal Detection Theory? 
 
4.2.1 Overview 
 
The basic principles of Signal Detection Theory were developed in the 1940’s in a push to design 
effective radar systems. One of the main challenges for designers of those systems was how to 
interpret radar data that is very often equivocal.27 That data consists of an electrical stream 
produced as a radar dish spins on its axis. Different patterns in those electrical streams suggest 
different probabilities of aircraft passing through the system’s airspace. The question was how 
compelling the data should be, or what the standard of data strength should be, for flagging 
that data as a sign of an aircraft. An overly low standard would produce too many false 
detections, i.e., false positives; while an overly high standard would produce too many failures 
to detect aircraft that are in fact in the airspace, i.e., false negatives. 
 
System theorists distinguished ‘signal’ from ‘noise’. ‘Signal’ refers to radar data that originate 
with those objects that the radar operator is trying to detect (‘target objects’), particularly 
aircraft. So, signal is a sign of a target object like aircraft. In contrast, ‘noise’ refers to radar data 
that does not originate with objects that the radar operator is trying to detect. (The terms 
‘signal’ and ‘noise’ are treated as mass nouns because the data to which they refer is generally 
produced in continuous streams.)28 According to SDT, data is flagged as signal on the basis of 
whether its strength meets a threshold level of strength; and the question for radar theorists is 
what that threshold level should be. 
 
SDT is based on the principle that the optimal detection threshold for data strength reflects the 
relative importance to the radar operator of the following two contradictory objectives: (1) 
obtaining a high probability that the data that has been flagged as signal actually is signal (i.e., 
actually is a sign of a target object), and (2) obtaining a low probability of failing to flag as signal 
that data that is in fact signal. For example, if, in a given set of circumstances, objective (1) is 
                                                          
27 For example, see Marcum (1947). 
28 Epistemologists might think of noise as being analogous to the evidence in Gettier-Style Cases, which 
does not have the right kind of connection with the world condition the subject is aiming to identify. 
65 
 
significantly more important than objective (2), then detection thresholds should be set high; 
and vice versa. (Examples follow in a moment.) 
 
SDT recognizes that the relative importance of these two contradictory objectives depends 
entirely on the radar operator’s practical circumstances. For example, radar operators who aim 
to detect approaching enemy fighter planes will likely tend to find objective (2) significantly 
more important than objective (1). It would tend to be important that they achieve a very low 
probability of failing to detect an incoming fighter; and perhaps not terribly important that they 
achieve a very high probability that the detections they make are true. Making a few false calls 
would not be too high a price to pay in order to ensure that they do not miss any calls they 
should have made. So, they will set a relatively low detection threshold. In contrast, radar 
operators who are monitoring incursions into their airspace by a friendly neighbour may well 
find objective (1) more important than objective (2). Say, that the negative repercussions of 
falsely accusing their neighbour of making the incursion is high. Here, it may be more important 
to obtain a very high probability that that which is flagged as an aircraft actually is one, than to 
obtain a very low probability of failing to detect an aircraft. Under such circumstances, a high 
detection threshold may be set. 
 
So, SDT suggests that, in principle, the operator’s optimal detection threshold is determined on 
the basis of how the operator would answer the following question: 
 
Operator’s Question: What is the higher priority for you at this time:  
Objective A:  increasing the probability that detections are in fact target objects (by 
raising the system’s detection threshold), or  
Objective B:  decreasing the probability of failing to detect target objects (by lowering 
the system’s detection threshold)? 
 
The underlying thesis may be expressed as follows: one moves toward the optimal detection 
threshold in the circumstances by determining whether it is more important to (1) decrease the 
risk of being overly trusting (by raising standards) or (2) decrease the risk of being overly 
sceptical (by lowering standards). Consider the extremes. If (1) is consistently deemed to be 
more important than (2), operators would end up being sceptical even with strong evidence (a 
situation that is similar to that described in §3.4.2). If (2) is consistently deemed to be more 
important than (1), operators would end up being trusting even with weak evidence (a situation 
that is similar to that described in §3.4.1).  
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4.2.2 Factors that Determine Optimal Detection Thresholds 
 
SDT suggests circumstantial factors that operators (e.g., radar system operators) would do well 
to take into account when they answer the Operator’s Question. These factors determine 
optimal detection thresholds for the systems they operate, under the circumstances they 
encounter. (These factors will be incorporated into my working hypothesis of the KIP’s 
operating principles; and further on we will see that it is plausible that analogous factors 
determine the Epistemic Standards that we seem to set.) 
 
First, operators do well to take into account the consequences of (1) true positives (i.e., flagging 
data as signal when it is in fact signal) relative to false negatives (i.e., failing to flag data as signal 
when it is in fact signal), and (2) false positives (i.e., flagging data as signal when it is in fact 
noise) relative to true negatives (i.e., not flagging data as signal when it is in fact noise). In other 
words, they do well to assess how the consequences of true positives (relative to false 
negatives) compare with the consequences of false positives (relative to true negatives). The 
early SDT theorist J. Marcum gestures toward this thesis:  
 
What about the operator watching a cathode ray tube—what are his criteria for calling 
“signal”? . . . If he is told that he will be subject to severe penalties if he calls a false 
alarm (calls a signal when it subsequently turns out that there was none), then he will 
be very cautious. If a doubtful pip appears on the screen, he will use discretion and say 
nothing. This means that under these conditions . . . the probability of detecting a 
target at a given range is decreased. (1947, p.10) 
 
Marcum is suggesting that when operators answer the Operator’s Question they do well to take 
into account the cost of false positives. If that cost is substantial (e.g., there are penalties for 
calling a false alarm, or negative repercussions of falsely accusing a neighbour of making an 
incursion into one’s airspace), then an operator may do well to shift her priority toward 
Objective A, increasing the probability that detections are in fact target objects by raising the 
system’s detection threshold. Elsewhere, Marcum suggests the converse: if the benefit of a true 
positive is substantial (e.g., there is a substantial benefit in being alerted to an incursion by an 
enemy fighter), then an operator may do well to shift her priority toward Objective B, 
decreasing the probability of failing to detect target objects by lowering the system’s detection 
threshold. So, we have two fundamental factors: the cost of false positives and the benefit of 
true positives. (I set aside, in my limited discussion of SDT, cases in which there is a cost 
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associated with a true positive, and cases in which there is a benefit associated with a false 
positive.)  
 
Consider the situation of an operator of a radar system that is used to prevent mid-air collisions 
at a busy airport. The benefit of those true positives, which will prevent a collision, is extremely 
high; while the cost of false positives is low, i.e., the cost of having an aircraft make only a small 
(completely unnecessary) course change. So, all other things being equal, the operator of such a 
system may place a priority on Objective B, decreasing the probability of failing to detect target 
objects (by lowering the system’s detection threshold). The operator will prefer to (a) risk being 
overly trusting of her evidence suggesting the presence of an aircraft in the airspace than to (b) 
risk being overly sceptical of it. 
 
SDT suggests, in particular, that operators’ optimal detection threshold correlates with a value 
equal to the cost of a false positive divided by the benefit of a true positive: 
 
Correlation 1: 
optimal 
threshold 
correlates 
with 
cost of a false positive 
benefit of a true positive 
 
So, as the cost of false positives increases, detection thresholds increase; and as the benefit of 
true positives increases, detection thresholds decrease, e.g., at the busy airport where the 
benefit of a true positive for a collision is extremely high and the cost of a false positive is not 
high, the optimal detection threshold may be low.29 
 
I suggested at the outset that when operators answer the Operator’s Question they also do well 
to take into account the consequences of false negatives (i.e., not detecting target objects that 
are, in fact, present) and of true negatives (i.e., not detecting target objects when there are no 
target objects). However, my interest here in SDT is strictly limited to those features that may 
be applied to the knowledge cases that epistemologists have addressed, and to other cases I 
have found worthwhile looking at in this investigation. In almost all of these particular cases, 
these additional factors do not seem to be relevant, in the sense that they do not seem to play 
a role in them. In these particular cases, the consequences of false negatives and of true 
negatives are so small or insignificant that they are not an appreciable practical consideration. 
Even so, they could, in principle, be highly significant in a range of knowledge cases. Let us a 
look at this a little more closely.  
                                                          
29 For additional discussion, see Godfrey-Smith (1991, pp.232-237). 
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Both false negatives and true negatives involve not responding as if a target object is present, 
i.e., not responding as if the questioned world condition exists. There are two general kinds of 
consequences that may follow from such a non-response. The first involves either failing to 
obtain the benefit of a true positive or avoiding the cost of a false positive. However, these 
consequences are already fully accounted for when the benefit of true positives and the cost of 
false positives is factored into answers to the Operator’s Question. So, we do not take this kind 
of false negative and true negative consequence into account when we answer the Operator’s 
Question; because, if we did, we would be taking it into account twice. However, the second 
kind of consequence should be taken into consideration when we answer the Operator’s 
Question. A paradigmatic consequence of the second kind involves the conservation of a limited 
resource that would have been expended by responding: As a result of not responding, a limited 
resource will be available to be better deployed in some other way. A second paradigmatic 
consequence of the second kind arises when a non-response would be met with a sanction, 
punishment or penalty. In these cases, such a non-response constitutes a failure to meet a 
requirement, obligation, duty, or constitutes breaking a law. Even so, as I suggest, while 
consequences of the second kind should, in principle, be taken into account when we answer 
the Operator’s Question, they are generally not significant in the knowledge cases that 
epistemologists investigate. So, for the sake of simplicity, I set aside consideration of both false 
negatives and true negatives. 
 
* 
 
Say there are two radar systems that have very different traffic histories—one located in 
Toronto, Ontario, and the other at an outpost in the Canadian Northwest Territories. Aircraft 
have very often entered the airspace of the former system, call it the ‘high traffic system’; while 
they have only infrequently entered the airspace of the other, the ‘low traffic system’. 
Accordingly, the prior probability of the presence of aircraft in the airspace of the high traffic 
system is significantly higher than it is in the airspace of the low traffic system. As a result, all 
other things being equal, the historic ratio of signal to noise at the high traffic facility is higher 
than that at the low traffic facility—because the higher traffic leads to the production of more 
signal, while the quantity of noise would generally be more or less the same in both systems. 
So, SDT assumes that, all other things being equal, a given radar dataset received by the high 
traffic system is more likely to be signal than is the same dataset received by the low traffic 
system.  
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If, under these circumstances, the detection thresholds of both the high traffic and low traffic 
systems were the same, then, all other things being equal, the ratio of true positives to false 
positives achieved by the high traffic facility would be higher than that achieved by the low 
traffic facility. Under these circumstances, we may expect the operator of the low traffic system 
to tend to place a higher priority on Objective A—increasing the probability that detections are 
in fact target objects (by raising the system’s detection threshold)—than would the operator of 
the high traffic system. Raising the detection threshold in the low traffic system will tend to 
improve its ratio of true positives to false positives. 
 
So, according to SDT, when operators answer the Operator’s Question they do well to take into 
account the prior probability of the presence of target objects. This factor is often referred to as 
the prior probability of signal. It is negatively correlated with the optimal detection threshold: 
the lower the prior probability of signal, the higher is the optimal threshold (e.g., the low prior 
probability of signal that the low traffic system must deal with puts upward pressure on its 
detection threshold, which in turn improves its ratio of true positives to false positives). 
  
Further, according to SDT, when operators answer the Operator’s Question they also do well to 
take into account the prior probability that a given dataset is noise. The latter is a measure that 
is a probability complement of the prior probability of signal, i.e., they add up to 1. In particular, 
SDT suggests that that operators’ optimal detection threshold correlates with a value equal to 
the prior probability of noise divided by the prior probability of signal: 
 
Correlation 2: 
optimal 
threshold 
correlates 
with 
Prior Pr(noise) 
Prior Pr(signal) 
 
I will suggest an intuitive way of seeing why it is necessary to take both the prior probability of 
signal, and its complement, the prior probability of noise, into account. However, I will address 
one matter first. 
 
We may notionally combine the two ratios shown in Correlation 1 and Correlation 2 in order to 
obtain a formulation that includes all the factors that I have described to this point. 
 
Correlation 3: 
optimal 
threshold 
correlates 
with 
cost of a false positive x Prior Pr(noise) 
benefit of a true positive Prior Pr(signal) 
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Correlation 3 suggests that in order to set the optimal threshold (that strikes the optimal 
balance between the risk of being overly sceptical and the risk of being overly trusting), radar 
operators may modulate their detection threshold in a way that correlates (positively) with the 
product of the two ratios.  
 
Let the variable ‘SDT Index’ equal the product of the two ratios above: 
 
SDT Index = 
cost of a false positive 
x 
Prior Pr(noise) 
benefit of a true positive Prior Pr(signal) 
 
Thus, the optimal threshold correlates with the SDT Index. As the latter moves up and down, so 
too should the optimal detection threshold. 
 
Now, let me suggest a way to see why it is necessary to take both Prior Pr(signal) and its 
complement, Prior Pr(noise), into account. View the two numerators of the SDT Index as being 
associated; and view the two denominators as being separately associated as follows:  
 
SDT Index = 
cost of a false positive  x Prior Pr(noise) 
benefit of a true positive x Prior Pr(signal) 
 
Seeing the two numerators multiplied together gives one the sense that the cost of a false 
positive is appropriately weighted by the prior probability that a dataset is misleading; and 
seeing the two denominators multiplied together gives one the sense that the benefit of a true 
positive is appropriately weighted by the prior probability that a dataset is actually indicative of 
the facts. Thus, the product of the two numerators may be viewed as something like the 
expected cost that will be incurred due to false positives (based solely on Prior Pr(noise)).30 
Similarly, the product of the two denominators may be viewed as something like the expected 
benefit that will be produced due to true positives (based solely on Prior Pr(signal)). So, the SDT 
Index as a whole may be thought of as the expected cost of a false positive relative to the 
expected benefit of a true positive (based solely on the Prior Pr(noise) and Prior Pr(signal)). Such 
a conception of the SDT Index has a well-known counterpart in the academic and professional 
business world, in the concept of the ‘risk/reward environment’—which refers to something 
like the expected cost of a bad investment decision relative to the expected benefit of a good 
investment decision. In what is sometimes referred to as a ‘high risk/reward environment’, it 
                                                          
30 Less elliptically, the product may be viewed as something like the projected average cost due to false 
positives prior to the Present Evidence (incurred in a large number of iterations in which the system flags 
a target object and gets that number of false positives suggested by the prior probability value). 
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seems that the expected cost of a bad investment decision is high relative to the expected 
benefit of a good investment decision. So, we are advised to adopt a cautious investment 
strategy in such an environment. In a ‘low risk/reward environment’, the expected cost of a bad 
investment decision is low relative to the expected benefit of a good investment decision. We 
may adopt a less cautious investment strategy in such an environment. In fact, further on, we 
will find it helpful to view the SDT Index in much the same way when we use it to predict or 
explain the Epistemic Standards that we seem to set in knowledge cases. 
 
 
4.3 How Signal Detection Theory Applies to the KIP 
 
4.3.1 Introduction 
 
Biologists use SDT to explain detection threshold levels that various organisms depend on when 
they identify objects, events, or environmental conditions on the basis of equivocal or 
deceptive evidence. These sorts of explanations have been made mainly in relation to innate 
detection thresholds: It seems that nature often selected for the best balance between the risk 
of being overly sceptical and the risk of being overly trusting. For example, SDT explains the 
innate detection threshold level exhibited by female birds when they identify male mating 
signals (Price, 2013), the detection threshold level exhibited by bees when they identify floral 
displays (Leonard et al., 2011), and the innate detection threshold level exhibited by various 
organisms that are involved in triggering the adoption of different Phenotypes (Moran, 1992). 
Recall the earlier example, Hieracium umbellatum, which grows bushy, broad leaves on rocky, 
sea-side cliffs, and grows prostrate with narrow leaves on sand dunes. The evidence that these 
plants gather about soil conditions is equivocal. SDT explains their detection threshold level 
against which this evidence is measured in the process of identifying soil conditions. This in turn 
determines which Phenotype they adopt.  
 
However, SDT may also be used to explain detection threshold levels that individuals set on the 
basis of the world conditions they encounter. D. Harvell (1986) discovered that bryozoans—an 
aquatic, colonial, moss animal—set a detection threshold on such a basis. These creatures 
generally adopt a non-spined Phenotype under ‘normal’ conditions. However, when they detect 
sea slugs in their locality, they may adopt a spined Phenotype. Even so, there are significant 
costs these creatures incur growing those spines; and it is worthwhile doing so only if they are 
necessary in order to protect against the slugs (see Figure 4-5).  
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Figure 4-5: Bryozoan spines31  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Bryozoans detect the slugs by sensing the concentration of a water-borne chemical. The higher 
the concentration, the more likely it is that they are close by. They adopt the spined Phenotype 
when they sense that this concentration meets or exceeds a detection threshold. However, 
bryozoans are able to modify the level of this threshold. In effect, they can make themselves 
more or less ‘sceptical’ about nearby slugs. In particular, Harvell found that the threshold that 
bryozoans adopt when they live in small colonies is higher than it is when they live in large ones 
(p.816). He explains that the cost of producing spines is proportionately greater in smaller 
colonies because the size of the colony periphery is proportionately greater. So, the cost of a 
false positive is higher when they live in smaller colonies, and, as a result, they tend to do better 
being more sceptical about slugs being in their vicinity under these circumstances. 
 
Godfrey-Smith suggests that the detection thresholds that bryozoans set may take standard 
SDT factors into account (1998, pp.207-254). Further, he shows in principle that bryozoans may 
respond to the equivocal evidence they gather (i.e., chemical concentrations) in a way that 
tends to advance their Inclusive Fitness.  
 
The question is: Do SDT principles apply in the human case? In answering this question, we bear 
in mind that these principles might apply to either (a) certain innate detection thresholds, 
which thresholds are not generally dependent on environmental conditions, and (b) detection 
thresholds that individuals seem to set on the basis of the world conditions they encounter. 
Innate detection thresholds seem to be mainly exhibited in our adjudications of Elementary 
Propositions (e.g., something is quickly approaching, or there is a snake in the grass); and often 
govern reflex, autonomic, and a range of stimulus-response behaviours—including startle 
                                                          
31  Copied from D. Harvell (1986, p.812). 
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responses and defensive physical responses. (Even so, it appears that there are important 
exceptions.32) In contrast, the detection thresholds that individuals seem to set on the basis of 
the world conditions they encounter are mainly exhibited in our adjudications of Advanced 
Propositions (e.g., my bank will be open this Saturday); and seem to mainly govern the 
deliberate and calculated performance of actions and formation of attitudes. These thresholds 
seem to be reflected in the Epistemic Standards we seem to set, and relate to the operation of 
the KIP. So, the question on which I am focused here is, more precisely: Do SDT principles 
(which are reflected in the SDT Index) explain the appearance of Epistemic Standards that move 
up and down?  
 
 
4.3.2 Direct Evidence 
 
4.3.2.1 Four Traits 
 
I have outlined indirect or circumstantial evidence that Godfrey-Smith has presented for the 
hypothesis that SDT describes our belief formation practices: He has shown (1) that a belief 
                                                          
32 Some evolutionary psychologists suggest that, under certain world conditions, innate detection 
thresholds in the form of innate Epistemic Standards are employed in relation to certain kinds of 
Advanced Propositions. They suggest that our distant ancestors may have faced protracted selection 
pressure for low Epistemic Standards in relation to these particular propositions. Their theory, called 
Error Management Theory (EMT), “proposes that psychological mechanisms are designed to be 
predictably biased when the costs of false-positive and false-negative errors were asymmetrical over 
evolutionary history” (Haselton and Nettle, 2006, p.81).  
 
Fleeing from an area that contains no predator may be inconvenient but is much less costly than 
the failure to detect a predator that really is close by. [Error management theory] predicts that 
an optimal decision rule [for the behaviours] will minimize not the crude rate of error, but the 
net effect of error on fitness. (Haselton et al., 2005, p.731) 
 
Haselton and Nettle explain further: 
 
For ancestral humans, the [benefit of true positives follow from responding to] aggressive 
intentions on the part of others, whereas the [cost of false positives of] over-inferring 
aggressiveness was low, especially for members of competing coalitions. This asymmetry did not 
characterize inferences about in-group members, in which costly within-coalition conflict would 
have resulted from unwarranted inferences of hostility or aggressiveness. (Haselton and Nettle, 
2006, p.53) 
 
So, certain of the biases that have been identified in the experimental social psychology literature may be 
explained as following from innate predispositions to adopt low Epistemic Standards for certain 
propositions. Prominently, such propositions feature negative conclusions about members of different 
racial or ethnic groups, or members of an ‘out-group’. These include negative conclusions pertaining to 
their generosity and kindness (Brewer, 1979) and to their level of hostility and violence (Quillian and 
Pager, 2001). 
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formation device that operated under SDT principles would be favoured by natural selection; 
(2) that SDT principles may apply to the operation of the device that determines which 
Phenotype bryozoans adopt; and (3) that belief formation devices could in theory be governed 
by SDT principles. However, I believe that a great deal of direct evidence supports the 
hypothesis that SDT principles are reflected in the production of Knowledge Intuitions, in the 
operating principles of the KIP. I outline some of that evidence in this section.  
 
I organize my presentation of this evidence around the plausibility that we possess four 
particular traits. I distinguish the four traits only for the purpose of facilitating an orderly 
presentation of evidence. In fact, it is our possession of just one of those traits, Trait 3, that is 
the heart of the matter: Our possessing that trait alone would constitute a strong indication 
that the KIP follows SDT principles. However, Trait 3 is a broadly defined trait that, in fact, 
includes Traits 1 and 2, i.e., if we possess Trait 3, then we must also possess Traits 1 and 2. So, I 
present evidence for Traits 1 and 2 separately, but ultimately in support of Trait 3. Moreover, it 
seems that Trait 3 could not have evolved unless we possessed Trait 4. So, I present evidence 
for Trait 4 separately, but again ultimately in support of Trait 3. 
 
Even so, all the evidence that I present in relation to these traits is meant only to show that it is 
plausible that the KIP follows SDT principles: I do not suggest that the evidence is strong enough 
to secure the thesis. However, in Chapters 5 and 6, I present a number of diverse knowledge 
cases that further test the thesis; and, in Chapter 7, I show that the developed theory allows me 
to explain basic differences in the variety of theoretical views that are expressed in the 
epistemological literature, which still further tests the thesis. These are the traits that I will 
argue we possess:  
 
Trait 1: We assess evidential strength with a degree of precision and a frequency of 
being correct that are sufficient for the application of SDT principles. 
 
Trait 2: We assess whether our evidence meets our Epistemic Standard in a way that 
depends on the context. 
 
Trait 3: We seem to set Epistemic Standards that correlate (positively) with the SDT 
Index. 
 
Trait 4: We do not possess a cognitive device that can trump the KIP in relation to the 
control of calculated deliberate behaviour. 
75 
 
 
First, it is certainly plausible that we possess Trait 1. We assess the strength of our evidence 
with a degree of precision and a frequency of being correct that is sufficient for the application 
of SDT principles. (To be clear, by ‘strength of our evidence’, I refer to its ‘predictive validity’, 
i.e., its ability to predict that which it is evidence for.) It is easy to reach this conclusion because 
the minimum degree of precision and frequency of being correct called for by SDT are very low.  
 
Regarding precision: SDT principles could in fact apply to a system that was capable of 
distinguishing only between two probability ranges in relation to the existence of a world 
condition, e.g., low probability and high probability. In some contexts, the system’s detection 
threshold could be set so that a world condition is flagged (as existing) only if there is a high 
probability that it exists; while in other contexts, its detection threshold could be set so that the 
world condition is flagged if there is either a low or a high probability that it exists. Even so, 
human probability assessments often seem to be considerably more fine-grained. A physician 
may assess that patient X has a 1 in 10 chance of having ailment Y—suggesting an ability to 
distinguish between 10 probability ranges.  
 
Regarding frequency of being correct: In order for SDT principles to apply to a system, it must 
decide which of the probability ranges that it has distinguished applies to its evidence, and it 
must do so with some minimal frequency of being correct. For example, say that Harry calls 
Sam, Sam does not pick up the phone, and Harry wonders whether this constitutes sufficient 
evidence that he can take it that Sam is not home. Harry distinguishes three probability ranges 
in relation to the strength of his evidence, ‘low’, ‘medium’ and ‘high’; and decides that the 
strength of his evidence is ‘high’. The fact that Sam did not pick up the phone confers a ‘high’ 
probability on the proposition p that Sam is not home. An adjudication of p that is based on SDT 
principles would require that Sam be correct that the evidence confers a ‘high’ probability on p. 
 
In principle, SDT principles could apply to systems even if the frequency with which they 
correctly identify the probability range that applies to its evidence is low—provided that the 
frequency is better than chance. Even so, the ability of SDT principles to lead to behaviour that 
tends to advance individuals’ interests correlates with this frequency of correctness. So, if Harry 
is often incorrect, the ability of SDT principles to advance his interests will be diminished.  
 
However, if we often distinguish only a small number of probability ranges, say 3, 4 or 5 
probability ranges (as Harry does in the last case), then the frequency with which we correctly 
decide which of those ranges applies would seem to be reasonably high. Moreover, if in fact the 
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frequency with which we correctly assess which of these probability ranges applies were 
particularly low, then it would seem that we would not have been as successful a species as we 
have been.  
 
So, I conclude that it is plausible that we possess Trait 1. Considerably more discussion is 
required to show that it is plausible that we possess Traits 2, 3 and 4. I address them in the 
following three sections. 
 
 
4.3.2.2 Trait 2 
 
Is it plausible that we possess Trait 2, according to which we assess whether our evidence 
meets our Epistemic Standard in a way that depends on the context (so that the production of 
Knowledge Intuitions depends on context)? (Further on, in my discussion of Trait 3, I examine 
the separate matter of the particular practical contextual factors that correlate with the 
Epistemic Standard that we seem to set.) SDT suggests that such a state of affairs is critical to 
achieving, in the circumstances, an optimal balance between the risk of being overly sceptical 
and the risk of being overly trusting. 
 
I will make an assumption that is analogous to one standardly made by those who employ SDT 
when they design radar systems or by biologists who employ SDT to understand how an 
organism identifies environmental conditions on the basis of equivocal or deceptive evidence: A 
system’s or organism’s assessments of whether the evidence meets a detection threshold are 
made dependent on world conditions by modulating its detection threshold according to those 
world conditions—and not by modulating its assessments of the predictive validity of the 
evidence. A radar system may be made responsive to world conditions by modulating its 
detection threshold—and not by modulating its assessment of the predictive validity of its input 
data. So, SDT principles are reflected, and only reflected, in the modulation of detection 
thresholds. I make the analogous assumption that if humans assess whether their evidence 
meets their Epistemic Standard in a way that depends on the context, then they do so by 
modulating their Epistemic Standard according to the context. Thus, we may reduce the 
principal question that we address in this section to whether it is plausible that our Epistemic 
Standard depends on context.  
 
Some support for the hypothesis that our Epistemic Standard depends on context is found in 
the substantial body of Contextualist and Subject Sensitive Invariantist literature (which I briefly 
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discussed in §2.3). That literature is largely based on cases in which the use of ‘know’ seems to 
depend on context. 
 
Additional support for the hypothesis that the Epistemic Standards that we seem to set depend 
on context follows from recognizing that the process of adjudicating an Advanced Proposition 
often involves adjudications of additional Advanced Propositions that are ancillary to the 
principal Advanced Proposition. In particular, we often need to adjudicate ancillary Advanced 
Propositions in order to assess the strength of the evidence for the principal Advanced 
Proposition. For example, the committee’s adjudication of the principal proposition that the 
pipeline development would produce a net benefit to the community depends on their 
assessment of the quality of an environmental impact study, which involves an adjudication of 
the ancillary proposition that the study is reliable. Further, adjudications of such ancillary 
propositions are based on ancillary evidence, which may run for or against those ancillary 
propositions; and these adjudications determine whether the ancillary evidence is strong 
enough to meet an Epistemic Standard that applies to the ancillary proposition. So, we may 
further support the hypothesis that the Epistemic Standards that we seem to set depend on 
context by identifying support for the following hypothesis: A context-dependent Epistemic 
Standard is used in our adjudications of the ancillary Advanced Propositions that are required to 
assess the evidence for principal Advanced Propositions. In other words, we may further 
support the main hypothesis we address here by finding that our assessments of the strength of 
evidence (as being sufficient or not) depend on context. 
 
Indeed, it seems that assessments of evidential strength depend on context. For example, 
contrary evidence may be dismissed or viewed as being anomalous in one context, but not in 
another; or contrary evidence may be assessed as being weaker in one context than in another. 
The committee may seem to have treated a high quality environmental impact study as being 
more important in one situation, than it did in another. The judge may have treated the 
partner’s testimony as being more important in one trial than he did in another. 
 
This picture is supported by social psychology experiments that find that we are ‘apt to accept 
[empirical evidence that confirms favoured hypotheses] at face value while subjecting 
“disconfirming” evidence to critical evaluation’ (Lord et al., 1979, p.2098). It looks as if the 
Epistemic Standard that we set in relation to ancillary propositions about the validity of 
evidence depends on whether the evidence confirms or disconfirms favoured hypotheses. 
Disconfirming evidence can even strengthen the intensity of a favoured hypothesis (Batson, 
1975). For example,  
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each side of an international conflict often believes that the other side is up to no good. 
An offer of concessions may be interpreted as a sign of weakness or trickery rather than 
as evidence against the favoured belief. Likewise, if the evidence is mixed, one side may 
attend only to the evidence that supports its [favoured] belief, so that the belief is 
strengthened by this part of the evidence but not weakened by unfavourable evidence. 
(Baron, 2008, pp.208-209)  
 
More generally, a wide range of social psychology experiments reveal a marked tendency to 
assess evidence in a way that supports already held hypotheses; a phenomenon referred to as 
either ‘confirmation bias’ or ‘myside bias’: 
 
Instead of a naïve scientist entering the environment in search of the truth, we find the 
rather unflattering picture of a charlatan trying to make the data come out in a manner 
most advantageous to his or her already held theories. (Fiske and Taylor, 1984, p.88)  
 
(Further on (in §5.3), I advance an explanation for such variation in our assessment of the 
strength of evidence that is consistent with my general theory of Knowledge Intuitions.) 
  
In summary, the support for the hypothesis that we possess Trait 2— that our Epistemic 
Standard depends on context—comes from Contextualist and Subject Sensitive Invariantist 
literature, from prima facie evidence that our assessments of evidential strength depend on 
context, and from social psychology experiments that suggest that our assessments of 
evidential strength depend on context. So, it seems plausible that we possess Trait 2. 
 
 
4.3.2.3 Trait 3 
 
Is it plausible that we possess Trait 3, according to which we seem to set Epistemic Standards 
that correlate (positively) with the SDT Index? Recall that index: 
 
SDT Index = 
cost of a false positive 
X 
Prior Pr(noise) 
benefit of a true positive Prior Pr(signal) 
 
We may determine whether it is plausible that the Epistemic Standards that we seem to set 
correlate with the SDT Index by determining whether it is plausible that those standards 
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correlate positively with each of the two variables that are in the numerator, and correlate 
negatively with each of the two variables that are in the denominator. For example, one part of 
our investigation can be to see whether the Epistemic Standards that we seem to set correlate 
negatively with the benefit of a true positive. In effect, the SDT Index makes four separate 
predictions, one for each of the variables. However, before looking at the variables in turn, we 
need to look briefly at a certain general matter. 
 
When biologists apply SDT, the cost of false positives and the benefit of true positives are 
standardly assessed in relation to Inclusive Fitness;33 and it may well be that innate human 
detection thresholds (which thresholds are not generally dependent on environmental 
conditions, and which thresholds generally govern reflex, autonomic, and a range of stimulus-
response behaviours) reflect the cost of false positives and the benefit of true positives in 
relation to our ancestors’ Inclusive Fitness. However, it seems that the Epistemic Standards that 
individuals set (on the basis of the world conditions they encounter) may not reflect costs and 
benefits that those individuals measure in relation to Inclusive Fitness. Particularly, learning 
may well play a role in how individuals assess the cost of a false positive and the benefit of a 
true positive and we may learn to assess them in a way that does not correlate with Inclusive 
Fitness. However, SDT allows that these variables may be assessed in relation to whatever it is 
that the operator values, i.e., whatever the operator takes to be positive, good or beneficial. For 
example, say that an operator of a radar installation valued not being interrupted during her 
afternoon nap. For that operator, the cost of a false positive during naptime is much higher 
than it is at other times. As a result, during naptime, the SDT Index and optimal detection 
threshold (which correlates with the index) is higher than usual. The operator may manually 
raise the detection threshold of her system at naptime and thereby decrease the probability of 
being woken up. So, my working hypothesis is that we assess the cost of a false positive and the 
benefit of a true positive on the basis of our values, which may or may not help us to enhance 
our Inclusive Fitness. (It seems that many individuals have values that are not conducive to 
enhancing their Inclusive Fitness. It is another matter entirely as to whether our values are 
generally conducive to enhancing Inclusive Fitness. However, it would be hard to see how we 
would have done well as we have as a species if this were not so.) 
  
Let us now see whether it is plausible that the Epistemic Standards that we seem to set 
correlate in the right way with each of the four constituent variables of the SDT Index. 
                                                          
33 More precisely, biologists standardly look at proxies for Inclusive Fitness such as the ability to defend 
against predators or the caloric intake necessary to maintain a mechanism. 
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1. Cost of False Positives 
 
It does indeed seem that the Epistemic Standards that we seem to set correlate positively with 
the cost of a false positive, consistent with what the SDT Index predicts. As this cost increases, 
the Epistemic Standard that we seem to set does too. This is precisely what is revealed in the 
knowledge attribution cases that Contextualists and Subject Sensitive Invariantists use to 
support their theories. (In Contextualist cases, attributors focus on the costs relative to their 
own practical interests; whereas, in Subject Sensitive Invariantist cases, attributors focus on the 
costs relative to the subject’s practical interests.) For example, in Stanley’s Low Stakes Case and 
Stanley’s High Stakes Case, the cost of a false positive—i.e., the cost of assuming that the bank 
is open on Saturday when it is not—is higher in the High Stakes case than it is in the Low Stakes 
case; and so too is the Epistemic Standard that we seem to set.34 
 
In addition, there is some social psychology research that suggests that, in circumstances in 
which the cost of a false positive is relatively low, the Epistemic Standard that we seem to 
adopt tends also to be low: ‘people appear to be sensitive to the context in which they make 
their predictions, and tend to exhibit greater optimism . . . when they expect that the 
consequences of being inaccurate will be less severe’ (Armor and Taylor, 2002, p.339).  
 
 
2. Benefit of True Positives 
 
Let us see whether the Epistemic Standards that we seem to set correlate negatively with the 
benefit of a true positive; whether, for example, high benefits correlate with low Epistemic 
Standards. If so, the situation would be analogous to a radar operator setting a low detection 
threshold in order to avoid failing to detect approaching enemy fighters and to avoid failing to 
obtain the benefit that such a detection may produce.  
 
Such a correlation appears to be revealed very often when evidence of a threat emerges, and 
the agent is in the position of being able to defend herself effectively against that threat. So, if 
the threat is real, the benefit of a true positive is the benefit produced by defensive actions. For 
                                                          
34 A number of contrasting paired cases presented in the literature reveal this correlation. See, for 
example, Stewart Cohen’s airport case (1999, p.58), Jeremy Fantl & Matthew McGrath’s train cases 
(2002, pp.67-68), and Chandra Sripada & Jason Stanley’s allergy cases (2012, pp.11-12). 
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example, there may be a substantial benefit in taking oneself as knowing that the email that 
includes a solicitation is a scam, and deleting it. This puts downward pressure on our Epistemic 
Standard we set when we consider whether the email is a scam.  
 
The situation predicts a tendency to over-detect dangers, to be overly cautious. James Sage 
predicts that such over detection may be a trait that is common to a range of species: ‘cautious 
belief-forming processes (say, those based on weak inductive generalizations) can 
systematically generate false beliefs, but still be [adaptive]’ (2004, pp.102-103). We may tend to 
believe ‘that all spotted mushrooms are poisonous (because consumption of spotted 
mushrooms was once followed by illness)’ (p.103). Similarly, the situation predicts 
inappropriate defensiveness or hypervigilance. For example, under ordinary circumstances, 
working alongside someone who has HIV should be perfectly safe, given the way in which the 
HIV virus is known to be transmitted. However, it is widely reported that many people exercise 
excessive caution in relation to working alongside someone who has that condition. Again, if we 
would tend to benefit by behaving as if a threat exists, then downward pressure on the 
Epistemic Standard for the proposition that the threat exists is produced. 
 
Additionally, a substantial experimental literature seems to indicate a negative correlation 
between the benefit of a true positive and the Epistemic Standard that seems to be set in 
relation to a range of positive propositions about the self. Taylor and Brown outline some of the 
benefits of taking oneself to know such propositions as being true:  
  
overly positive self-evaluations, exaggerated perceptions of control or mastery, and 
unrealistic optimism . . . appear to promote . . . the ability to care about others, the 
ability to be happy or contented, and the ability to engage in productive and creative 
work. (Taylor and Brown, 1988, p.193)  
 
Further, these positive attitudes allow many individuals to perform at higher levels:  
 
It is widely believed that misjudgement produces dysfunction. Certainly, gross 
miscalculation can create problems. However, optimistic self-appraisals of capability 
that are not unduly disparate from what is possible can be advantageous, whereas 
veridical judgments can be self-limiting. When people err in their self-appraisals, they 
tend to overestimate their capabilities. This is a benefit rather than a cognitive failing to 
be eradicated. If self-efficacy beliefs always reflected only what people could do 
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routinely, they would rarely fail but they would not mount the extra effort needed to 
surpass their ordinary performances. (Bandura, 1989, p.1177) 
 
It seems plausible that many of the benefits of the positive self-assessments indicated in the 
literature would only materialize if those assessments turned out to be not far from the truth. 
For example, perceptions of control and estimates of capabilities would only be beneficial if 
they are not far from the truth, not ‘unduly disparate’ from the truth as Bandura puts it. So, the 
benefit of a true positive, or of a close-to-true positive, in relation to positive self-appraisals is 
the benefit produced by the various actions implied above, e.g., engaging in creative work and 
mounting extra effort. The social psychology research suggests that this seems to lead to a 
lowering of Epistemic Standards. For example, that research indicates that members of 
different groups tend to hold such optimistic beliefs—including entrepreneurs, physicians, 
clinical psychologists, lawyers, negotiators, engineers and security analysts.35 36 
 
It seems that epistemologists have paid very little attention to the apparent effect of the 
benefit of a true positive on Epistemic Standards. However, the subject seems to have come up 
in other areas of philosophy, particularly in studies of self-deception, wishful thinking and 
motivated irrationality. 
 
 
3. Prior Probability of Signal 
 
Recall the example I offered earlier that I suggest shows why radar operators would tend to do 
well to negatively correlate the detection thresholds of their systems with the prior probability 
of signal. Aircraft have very often entered the airspace of a radar facility located in Toronto, 
Ontario, the high traffic facility; and aircraft have only infrequently entered the airspace of 
another radar facility located at an outpost in the Canadian Northwest Territories, the low 
traffic facility. The prior probability of signal is high at the former facility and low at the latter 
facility. As a result, the historic ratio of signal to noise at the high traffic facility is higher than it 
is at the low traffic facility. So, all other things being equal, if the high traffic and the low traffic 
                                                          
35 A comprehensive listing of these studies is found in Griffin and Tversky (2002, p.230). 
36 Even so, Julie Norem suggests that anxious personality types lower their Epistemic Standard, not in 
relation to optimistic propositions about the self, but rather in relation to pessimistic propositions about 
the self.  This ‘pessimism is a strategy that helps us to work through our anxious thoughts rather than 
denying them, so that we may achieve our goals’ (2001, p.3). Her research shows a marked tendency for 
these individuals to take themselves as knowing these pessimistic propositions as being true; and they 
seem to lower their Epistemic Standards in these cases. However, I set analysis of these findings aside. 
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systems both used the same detection threshold, then the ratio of true positives to false 
positives achieved at the high traffic facility would be higher than that achieved at the low 
traffic facility; and the operator of the low traffic system would tend to do better, tend to 
improve its ratio of true positives to false positives, with a higher detection threshold than 
would the operator of the high traffic system. My suggestion is that the situation in relation to 
the setting of Epistemic Standards is analogous to this situation. We tend to do well if our 
Epistemic Standards correlate negatively with what, for us, is analogous to the prior probability 
of signal. What is, for us, analogous to the prior probability of signal? 
 
The expression ‘prior probability of signal’ may be viewed as the prior probability of the 
presence of target objects. At a radar installation, it is the prior probability of aircraft being in 
the system’s airspace. This notion may be transposed to analyses of knowledge cases by 
generalizing from it: The prior probability of signal concerns the prior probability that 
questioned world conditions are present; or, alternatively, the prior probability that a 
questioned Advanced Proposition is true. Let us here focus on this prior probability that a 
questioned Advanced Proposition is true. I will refer to it as ‘Prior Pr(p=TRUE)’. The overarching 
question for us is whether the Epistemic Standards that we seem to set correlate negatively 
with Pr(p=TRUE). 
 
However, I suggest that Prior Pr(p=TRUE) be viewed only as an analytical construct: This 
measure is not a particularly faithful representation of assessments that we ordinarily make—
though it may help us to analyse knowledge cases. In particular, it does not seem plausible that 
the production of ordinary Knowledge Intuitions depends on our making actual prior probability 
calculations—coming up, for example, with a number between zero and one that reflects the 
number of times the proposition might be true out of one hundred iterations of the present 
circumstances. However, it does seem plausible that we keep track of the ‘natural frequency’ of 
events; and that the Epistemic Standards that we seem to set tend to be negatively correlated 
with such a frequency. So, Prior Pr(p=TRUE) is an analytical construct that gets at these natural 
frequencies. 
 
The natural frequency of events is a frequency that we experience or envision. For example, the 
natural frequency with which I receive mail delivery (i.e., old-fashioned paper mail) is once a 
day, and the natural frequency with which I am disturbed by Fido’s barking is three or four 
times a day. This sense we have of the natural frequency of events need not be terribly fine 
grained. For example, my sense of the frequency with which the word of politicians pronounced 
in a hotly contested race is kept when they are in office is that this quite often does not occur. 
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Likewise, my sense of the frequency with which cars in my neighbourhood remain where they 
are parked overnight (because they are not stolen) is that this almost always occurs.  
 
A series of cognitive psychology experiments over the last several decades reveal that we are 
good at reasoning with natural frequencies—while we are not characteristically good at 
reasoning with probabilities. For example, in one study, subjects were apt to provide correct 
responses to questions based on the statement that ten out of every 1000 forty-year-old 
women participating in routine screening have breast cancer. It seems that they were readily 
able to picture 1000 participants in these screenings, and ten of them having the ailment. 
However, subjects were not good at answering questions based on the statement that the 
probability of breast cancer is one percent for forty-year-old women participating in routine 
screening (Gigerenzer and Hoffrage, 1995, cited in McCarley and Benjamin, 2013, p.469).37  
 
As I suggested, it seems that our Epistemic Standards in relation to questioned propositions 
tend to be negatively correlated with such natural frequencies (and I support this hypothesis in 
the pages and chapters that follow). Accordingly, when I use the defined term, Pr(p=TRUE), in 
my analysis of knowledge cases, I will be referring to the subject’s sense of certain natural 
frequencies (which I look at more closely in a moment). 
 
To see the effect of our assessments of the Prior Pr(p=TRUE) on Epistemic Standards, it is 
helpful to first distinguish two basic kinds of evidence that we may use when we adjudicate 
propositions: (1) the evidence that gives us a sense of Prior Pr(p=TRUE), which is broadly-based 
or historical in nature, and (2) evidence that is directly connected to the specific proposition 
and, very often, recently gathered. We may not be consciously aware that our adjudications are 
partly based on the former type of evidence, whereas the latter type is always prominent in the 
context. (I do not view these evidence categories as being hard and fast, but rather as family 
resemblance descriptions of evidence types that will facilitate my analysis.) I refer to the latter 
type, the type (2) evidence, as “Present Evidence”.  
 
In knowledge cases, type (1) evidence, and type (2) evidence or Present Evidence, both confer a 
probability on the questioned proposition p; and the sum of the two probabilities equals the 
total probability conferred on p. For example, the sense a doctor has of the total probability 
                                                          
37 Jason S. McCarley and Aaron Benjamin review the history of this research (2013, pp.468-470). They 
suggest that a number of studies that focused only on reasoning with probabilities or relative 
frequencies, and not on natural frequencies, incorrectly concluded that we are not good at Bayesian 
reasoning which takes prior probabilities into account. 
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conferred on the proposition p that his patient has diabetes, is based on both (a) type (1) 
evidence, the historical incidence of diabetes relative to that segment of the population that 
has the patient’s medical profile, and which gives the doctor a sense of Prior Pr(p=TRUE); and 
(b) the Present Evidence, the patient’s present symptoms and lab results.  
 
It is evident that we would do well to negatively correlate our Epistemic Standards with Prior 
Pr(p=TRUE)—simply because the weaker our historical evidence is (i.e., the lower our sense of 
the Prior Pr(p=TRUE)), the stronger our Present Evidence will need to be in order to fully 
compensate for that weakness, and so the higher our Epistemic Standards will need to be. If the 
doctor has the sense that Prior Pr(p=TRUE) is very low (i.e., the natural frequency with which 
individuals of the patient’s medical profile contract diabetes is very low), then he would do well 
to set a very high Epistemic Standard, i.e., he would do well to require very strong Present 
Evidence (e.g., highly consistent symptomology and compelling lab results) to compensate for 
the weakness in his historical evidentiary support for p.  
 
It is intuitively plausible that the Epistemic Standards that we seem to set are negatively 
correlated with Prior Pr(p=TRUE). For example, in this last case in which the doctor has the 
sense that Prior Pr(p=TRUE) is very low, it is plausible that the doctor would have set a very high 
Epistemic Standard, i.e., he would have required very strong Present Evidence in order to 
remove any doubt that his patient has the ailment. On the other hand, say the doctor had 
another patient who might also have contracted diabetes. However, this patient’s medical 
profile included several strong correlates with diabetes—so that the doctor had the sense that 
Prior Pr(p=TRUE) is high. It seems plausible that the doctor would have set only a moderate 
Epistemic Standard, i.e., only moderately strong Present Evidence would have been sufficient to 
remove doubt that the patient has the ailment. 
 
* 
 
If, as I suggested, our sense of Pr(p=TRUE) informs our adjudications of everyday Advanced 
Propositions that arise in quick succession, then clearly that sense does not generally come 
from statistical studies of the kind that the doctor relies on. As I proposed earlier, that sense of 
Pr(p=TRUE) generally comes from our sense of certain natural frequencies. I will demonstrate 
this using Stanley’s Low Stakes Case.  
 
In this case, Hannah sets an Epistemic Standard in relation to the proposition p that the bank 
will be open the coming Saturday. This standard is low and positively correlated with the low 
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cost of a false positive in the case. I suggest additionally that the standard is negatively 
correlated with her sense of Pr(p=TRUE). For example, it may have been that Hannah had the 
sense that Pr(p=TRUE) was relatively high, i.e., that the prior probability of the bank being open 
on Saturday is high; and, if so, this would have put additional downward pressure on her 
Epistemic Standard. Let us look at how she might have gotten such a sense of Pr(p=TRUE).  
 
Hannah might have reflected on the frequency with which propositions that are of the same 
kind as p are true. For example, she might have recognized that (i) two months ago, the 
proposition p1, that the competing nearby bank A will be open the coming Saturday, would 
have been true, (ii) one month ago, the proposition p2, that nearby bank B will be open the 
coming Saturday, would have been true, and (iii) two weeks ago, the proposition p3, that nearby 
bank C will be open the coming Saturday, would have been true. Thus, propositions that are of 
the same kind as p are frequently true. Having a sense of this may constitute Hannah’s sense 
that Pr(p=TRUE) is high, i.e., that the prior probability of the bank being open on Saturday is 
high (which would have put downward pressure on her Epistemic Standard in the case). 
 
SDT predicts that if, instead, Hannah had the sense that the Pr(p=TRUE) was low, then this 
would have put upward pressure on her Epistemic Standard, and potentially raised it to a level 
that her Present Evidence would not have been strong enough to meet. Under such 
circumstances, she would not have taken herself as knowing that the bank would be open—
even though the stakes are low. In fact, precisely such an affect is suggested in Keith DeRose’s 
Contextualist theory (which I outlined in §2.3).  
 
While DeRose argues that context determines the range of relevant alternatives, his examples 
seem to indicate that it is, in particular, the subject’s sense of Pr(p=TRUE) that determines the 
range of relevant alternatives. He seems to suggest, for example, that if the subject has the 
sense that Pr(p=TRUE) is low, then the range of alternatives may be extended, effectively 
raising the subject’s Epistemic Standard. Referring to his low stakes bank case (which I 
reproduced in §2.3), he makes the following suggestion: 
 
If very many nearby banks have discontinued their Saturday hours in the last two 
weeks, then it seems that my original claim to know may well have been false, and if I 
admit that I did not know after this surprising fact about local banks is called to my 
attention, I will be taking back and contradicting my earlier claim to have known. (1992, 
p.921) 
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If DeRose learns that very many nearby banks have discontinued their Saturday hours, then he 
will have the sense that Prior Pr(p=TRUE) is lower than what he assumed; and he will, as a 
result, require stronger Present Evidence (which in the case consists only of his having seen that 
the bank was open two weeks before on a Saturday) in order to eliminate doubt. His Epistemic 
Standard is effectively lifted, and his Present Evidence fails to meet it. So, he fails to take 
himself as knowing that the bank will be open on Saturday. 
 
Additionally, the hypothesis that Epistemic Standards negatively correlate with our sense of 
Pr(p=TRUE) is broadly consistent with a hypothesis that Stewart Cohen defends. As I pointed 
out (in §2.3), he suggests that an alternative possibility becomes relevant and needs to be ruled 
out (in order for the subject to have knowledge) if the subject’s internal statistical evidence 
indicates that the probability of the alternative is high (1988, p.102). Notice that if a subject’s 
internal statistical evidence indicates that the probability of an alternative is high, then that 
subject will have the sense that Pr(p=TRUE) is low; and if the latter is low, then SDT predicts 
that the subject’s Epistemic Standard will be high. This is a state of affairs that is broadly 
consistent with the subject finding that she has an additional alternative possibility that is 
relevant and that needs to be ruled out. 
 
 
4. Prior Probability of Noise 
 
Let us see whether the Epistemic Standards that we seem to set correlate positively with what 
is, for us, analogous to the prior probability of noise. Earlier I transposed the notion of the prior 
probability of signal to knowledge cases by generalizing from the former to the notion of the 
Prior Probability that a questioned Advanced Proposition is true. Further, I suggested that I 
would use the term, Pr(p=TRUE), to refer to the sense we get of the natural frequency with 
which propositions of the kind that are in question are true. So too, let us transpose the notion 
of the prior probability of noise to knowledge cases by generalizing from it to the notion of the 
Prior Probability that a questioned Advanced Proposition is false; and let us use the term, 
Pr(p=FALSE), to refer to the sense we get of the natural frequency with which propositions of 
the kind that are in question are false. 
 
Because Prior Pr(p=TRUE) and Prior Pr(p=FALSE) are probability complements that add up to 1, 
when one increases, the other decreases. So, if it is plausible that the Epistemic Standards that 
we seem to set are negatively correlated with Prior Pr(p=TRUE) (and I believe that I have shown 
that it is so), we may predict that the Epistemic Standards that we seem to set are positively 
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correlated with Prior Pr(p=FALSE). As this probability increases, our Epistemic Standard should 
increase.  
 
* 
 
To summarize, it is plausible that the Epistemic Standards that we seem to set correlate in the 
right way with each of the four constituent variables of the SDT Index. Therefore, it seems 
plausible that the Epistemic Standards that we seem to set correlate positively with the SDT 
Index, and that we possess Trait 3.  
 
 
4.3.2.4 Trait 4 
 
Is it plausible that we possess Trait 4, according to which we do not possess a cognitive device 
that can trump the KIP in relation to the control of calculated deliberate behaviour? Before 
answering this question, note the critical connection between this trait and Trait 3 above 
(according to which the Epistemic Standards that we seem to set correlate positively with the 
SDT Index). It would seem that Trait 3 could not have evolved if we had not already possessed 
Trait 4. Trait 3 allows us to tend to intuit knowing that which we would tend to do well to intuit 
knowing—because the KIP will have sought to achieve an appropriate balance between the risk 
of being overly sceptical and the risk of being overly trusting in the circumstances. However, if 
the KIP and the Knowledge Intuitions it produces could be trumped by some other cognitive 
device in relation to the control of calculated deliberate behaviour (particularly if it could be 
trumped by a device that is not governed by SDT principles) then the adaptive pressure for Trait 
3 could be significantly diminished, if not eliminated. (So, it may well be that Traits 3 and 4 are 
best viewed as a single more inclusive trait. However, as I suggested earlier, I separated the 
traits for presentational reasons.) 
 
A look at the plausibility of the hypothesis that we possess Trait 4 reveals a wide range of 
apparent counterexamples. These suggest that behaviour may be controlled by a cognitive 
device that is not the KIP. I have in mind all those cases in which the Present Evidence fails to 
meet the Epistemic Standard that appears to be set, but in which the subject decides to take a 
chance by acting or forming an attitude as if the questioned proposition is true anyway. The KIP 
seems to advise us to not act as if the questioned proposition is true; but we do so anyway. For 
example, I do not know that my house will catch fire, and yet I buy fire insurance; and I do not 
know that I will win the lottery, and yet I buy a lottery ticket. The behaviour that is featured in 
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such cases generally depend on a conscious, rational cognitive device. (We will see that this 
cognitive device does not appear to be governed by SDT principles: It does not seem to depend 
on whether the strength of the Present Evidence meets an Epistemic Standard that correlates 
with the SDT Index.) 
 
However, a close look at these cases reveals that the conscious, rational cognitive device to 
which I refer nonetheless depends on Knowledge Intuitions. These Knowledge Intuitions arise in 
these cases not in relation to the main questioned proposition, but rather in relation to certain 
other propositions. As a result of this, control of behaviour by the KIP is maintained. In this 
section, I discuss these cases and defend this last claim. 
 
Given that all these apparent counterexamples involve an agent taking some sort of chance—
insofar as they have failed to take themselves as knowing to be true the main questioned 
proposition—it would seem that the counterexamples would all have one or the other of the 
following two features:  
 
(1)  The agent’s behaviour is precautionary in nature, performed in order to avoid a 
potential harm. I call these ‘Insurance Cases’. 
 
(2) The agent’s behaviour constitutes a gamble taken in the hope of obtaining a 
benefit. I call these ‘Gambling Cases’. 
 
In Insurance Cases, agents assume or conclude that they would be harmed by the occurrence of 
an event. They question whether the harmful event will occur, and find that they cannot rule 
out the possibility that it will. So, they take an appropriate precaution, performing a particular 
action or forming a particular attitude. They act though they do not intuit knowing that the 
event will occur. For example, I assume that it would be bad for me if my house was damaged 
or destroyed by fire, and I cannot rule out the possibility that it will. So, I buy fire insurance even 
though I do not intuit knowing that my house will catch fire. Or, I assume that my clothes would 
get uncomfortably wet if it rained, and I cannot rule out the possibility of rain. So, I take an 
umbrella even though I do not intuit knowing that it will rain. Or, I conclude that my stock 
market investment would be adversely impacted by a market crash, and I cannot rule out that 
possibility. So, I sell off my stocks even though I do not intuit knowing that the market will 
crash.  
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In Gambling Cases, agents assume or conclude that the performance of a particular action or 
forming a particular attitude could produce some benefit, and they are not able to rule out the 
possibility that the action would not produce this benefit. So, they perform that action or form 
that attitude with the hope that the benefit would be produced, even though they do not know 
whether it will. For example, I assume that buying a lottery ticket could lead to a win, and I am 
not able to rule out the possibility that it would not. So, I buy a lottery ticket even though I do 
not intuit knowing that I will win. Or, I know that the restaurant is either on Oak Street or Pine 
Street, but do not know which. I assume that turning down Oak Street could lead directly to the 
restaurant, and am not able to rule out the possibility that it would not. So, I will turn down Oak 
Street even though I do not intuit knowing that the restaurant is on Oak Street. If I do not find 
the restaurant on Oak Street, then I will try Pine Street. 
 
Before looking more closely at this, notice that F1 predicts that we would not take ourselves as 
knowing the main questioned proposition in either Insurance or Gambling Cases. For example, 
F1 predicts that in a typical case in which an individual buys fire insurance that individual would 
not take herself as knowing that her house will catch fire; and in a typical case in which an 
individual buys a lottery ticket that individual would not take herself as knowing that she will 
win. To see this, recognize that, under F1, when one takes oneself as knowing that p, behaving 
as if p has no limitations or restrictions (beside physical limitations). For example, if I take 
myself as knowing and have no doubt at all that the man will attempt to kill me, my behaviour 
may well breach ordinary boundaries. (This may be viewed as the reason that, in some cases, 
the elimination of all doubt requires very strong evidence.) So, according to F1, if the agent in 
Insurance and Gambling Cases took herself as knowing that p, then their actions and attitudes 
as if p would be unlimited or unrestricted. If, in fact, I took myself as knowing, as having no 
doubt at all, that my house will catch fire, I would do much more than buy fire insurance. I may 
take any kind of reasonable and practical preventative action; if I was not aware of any such 
action, then I may make inquiries about this; and if, finally, I concluded that there were no 
preventive actions that I could perform, I would move out of my house. Similarly, if, in fact, I 
took myself as knowing, as having no doubt at all, that I would win the lottery, I would do much 
more than buy a lottery ticket. I might also buy a yacht. Finally, F1 suggests that for Knowledge 
Intuitions to be produced one must have assessed that (unrestricted) behaving as if p would 
tend to produce better consequences than would (unrestricted) not behaving as if p. However, 
given the kinds of unrestricted behaviour that may follow from behaving as if p in Insurance and 
Gambling Cases (e.g., moving out of the house, buying a yacht), and given the strength of the 
Present Evidence standardly featured in these cases, we do not assess that (unrestricted) 
behaving as if p will tend to produce better consequences than that of (unrestricted) not 
91 
 
behaving as if p. So, F1 predicts that we would not take ourselves as knowing. In a typical 
lottery case, we assess that unrestricted behaving as if the lottery ticket is a winner would not 
tend to produce better consequences than that of unrestricted not behaving as if it is. So, F1 
predicts that the individual would not take herself as knowing that the ticket is a winner. 
 
Let us now look more closely at Insurance and Gambling Cases. In both kinds of cases, the 
agent’s Present Evidence is not strong enough to produce Knowledge Intuitions in relation to 
the main questioned proposition, e.g., my house will catch fire, or I will win the lottery. Even so, 
agents have a strategy for dealing with such situations: They (1) take themselves as knowing 
that the main questioned proposition, p, is a practical possibility, and then (2) adjudicate a 
different proposition specifically about whether it would be either prudent or worthwhile to 
behave in some limited way as if p, e.g., buy fire insurance (but do not sell the house), or buy a 
lottery ticket (but do not buy a yacht).38 For example, if I recognize that I am not going to be 
able to take myself as knowing whether or not it will rain, then I may (1) take myself as knowing 
that it might rain (i.e., that rain is a practical possibility) and (2) adjudicate the separate 
proposition that it would be prudent to behave in some limited way as if p, e.g., take an 
umbrella with me (but not change my plans altogether). If I realize that I am not going to be 
able to take myself as knowing that the stock market will crash, then I may (1) take myself as 
knowing that it might crash, and (2) adjudicate the separate proposition that it would be 
prudent to behave in some limited way as if it will crash, e.g., sell my stocks (but not bet against 
or ‘short’ the stock market). If I realize that I am not going to be able to take myself as knowing 
that I will win the lottery, then I may (1) take myself as knowing that I might win, and (2) 
adjudicate the separate proposition that it would be worthwhile to behave in some limited way 
as if I will win, e.g., buy a lottery ticket.39  
 
Critically, in both Insurance and Gambling Cases, all other things being equal, deliberate action 
still depends on having Knowledge Intuitions: All other things being equal, agents’ actions and 
attitudes depend on their taking themselves as knowing (1) that the main questioned 
proposition is a practical possibility, and (2) that it is either prudent or worthwhile to perform 
                                                          
38 It may be that my sense that it is worthwhile to buy a lottery ticket consists in my sense that the 
expected utility of buying the ticket is positive. 
39 If in a given case, subjects have taken themselves as knowing that the questioned proposition is a 
practical possibility but have not taken themselves as knowing to be true a proposition about the 
prudence or worthwhileness of a particular limited action, then they may try to identify and adjudicate an 
alternative proposition about the prudence or worthwhileness of a different limited action. For example, 
if I intuit knowing that it might rain, but do not take myself as knowing that it is prudent to take an 
umbrella, then I may adjudicate the alternative proposition that it would be prudent to wear my hooded 
coat. Then, if I intuit that I know that it is worthwhile wearing my hooded coat, all other things being 
equal, I will do so. 
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particular actions or to form particular attitudes. All other things being equal, my taking an 
umbrella depends on my taking myself as knowing (1) that it might rain, and (2) that it is 
prudent to take an umbrella. All other things being equal, my buying a lottery ticket depends on 
my taking myself as knowing that (1) I might win the lottery, and (2) that it is worthwhile to buy 
a ticket. So, although the actions that are performed and attitudes that are formed in these 
cases do not depend on intuitions of knowing the main questioned proposition; they do depend 
on knowing the two secondary propositions to which I refer. Further, it seems that if one does 
not take oneself as knowing either the main questioned proposition or the two secondary 
propositions, then, in the moment, one is stuck and unable to act.40 
 
* 
 
It appears as though there is another class of counterexamples to the hypothesis that we 
possess Trait 4, suggesting that behaviour may be controlled by a cognitive device other than 
the KIP. These are ‘rational acceptance’ cases—in which an agent performs an action or forms 
an attitude on the basis of rationally accepting a proposition that they do not take themselves 
as knowing. Michael Bratman claims that such cases indicate ‘that the cognitive attitudes 
guiding practical reasoning and action go beyond our beliefs’ (1999, p.15); and, further, ‘we 
need to make room for both [belief and rational acceptance] in [a] model of practical reasoning’ 
(pp.20-21). Addressing these cases not only deals with the problem of apparent 
counterexamples to the hypothesis that we possess Trait 4; doing so will also help us deal with 
the objection (raised in §3.2.3) that what I am calling Knowledge Intuitions, and am analysing as 
having function F1 (and F2), would be better called, not that, but ‘intuitions of rational 
acceptability’. 
                                                          
40 Compare the feelings of certainty or apprehensiveness of subjects in standard knowledge cases with 
those of subjects in Insurance and Gambling Cases. In the former cases, the subject takes herself as 
knowing the main questioned proposition, e.g., Hannah knowing that the bank is open on Saturday. In 
these cases, the subject feels, in the moment, certain that one would do well to act or form an attitude as 
if p, e.g., Hannah feels, in the moment, certain that she will do well to wait until Saturday to deposit her 
cheque. In Insurance and Gambling Cases, subjects do not take themselves as knowing the main 
questioned proposition, and, accordingly, do not feel certain that they will do well when they act or form 
an attitude as if p. If you do not take ourselves as knowing that the stock market will crash and 
nonetheless find that it would be prudent to sell your stocks, then you do not feel certain that you will do 
well when you sell your stocks. You may instead feel apprehensive. So, the mental states of subjects in 
Insurance and Gambling Cases are very different than those of subjects in standard knowledge cases. 
 
Even so, when subjects intuit knowing the two secondary propositions that come up in Insurance and 
Gambling Cases, they feel certain about those two propositions. They feel certain that the main 
questioned proposition is a practical possibility and certain that it is prudent or worthwhile to perform 
the particular limited action or to form the particular attitude. If you do not take ourselves as knowing 
that the stock market will crash, then you may feel certain that it is prudent to sell your stocks. 
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Consider one kind of case that Bratman brings to our attention. Say that my very close friend, 
Tonya, has been accused of acting badly on a particular occasion and that I do not take myself 
as knowing that she did not do so. It seems at least possible that she did. The matter of her 
behaviour comes up in conversation with a third party. It is clear to me that if I say nothing 
about the behaviour, then the third party would infer that I believe that Tonya acted badly. So, 
on my reading of the social situation, I have two unpleasant alternative courses of action: either 
say nothing and thereby condemn my close friend by allowing the third party to make 
condemnatory inferences, or defend my close friend even though I do not take myself as 
knowing that she did not behave badly. So, I rationally accept that Tonya did not behave badly 
and defend her accordingly. Bratman suggests that, in such a case, rational acceptance assumes 
control of action, instead of knowledge.41 I do not know that my close friend did not behave 
badly, but I rationally accept that she did not do so, and my defence of her is based on rational 
acceptance, not a Knowledge Intuition.  
 
However, look more closely. Let us make a plausible assumption about the case: My defence of 
Tonya that followed my rational acceptance (that she did not behave badly) was less vigorous 
than it would have been had it followed my taking myself as knowing (that she did not behave 
badly). Had it followed Knowledge Intuitions, my defence may have included a pronounced and 
sincere evincing of moral indignation about the suggestion that Tonya behaved badly, that she 
could have behaved that way—which was not included in the defence that followed rational 
acceptance. With this, we see that this rational acceptance case is a Gambling Case: (1) I 
intuited knowing that Tonya might not have behaved badly, i.e., I intuited knowing that the 
main questioned proposition is a practical possibility; and (2) I intuited knowing that it would be 
worthwhile to defend Tonya in some limited way, i.e., with limited vigour. I took a gamble on 
Tonya’s innocence. Moreover, had I not taken myself as knowing these last two secondary 
propositions, I would not have defended Tonya at all. I find that all the cases that Bratman 
presents in his typology of rational acceptance cases (1999, pp.20-26) are either Insurance or 
Gambling Cases. 
 
* 
 
It seems that the mediation of behaviour in Insurance and Gambling Cases involves certain 
conscious states, and that these states depend on Knowledge Intuitions. I refer to the conscious 
                                                          
41 See also Jonathan Cohen (1989).  
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states that arise in Insurance Cases as considered decisions to act cautiously; and refer to the 
conscious states that arise in Gambling Cases as considered decisions to act incautiously. If I 
have decided to act cautiously, I may buy an insurance policy or take an umbrella along with me 
in case it starts to rain. If I have decided to act incautiously, I may buy a lottery ticket.  
 
My use of these expressions, ‘considered decisions to act cautiously’ and ‘considered decisions 
to act incautiously’, is not meant to suggest that the decisions to which I refer are either (a) 
objectively cautious or incautious, or that (b) individuals take them to be excessively cautious or 
incautious. Rather, I want to suggest that, in the moment that such decisions are made, the 
agent is not certain that she will do well when she behaves accordingly; and I want to suggest 
that the agent has the sense that her behaviour is appropriately cautious or appropriately 
incautious. (This contrasts situations in which individuals take themselves as knowing that the 
main questioned proposition is true. If I take myself as knowing it will rain, and, on that basis, 
take an umbrella, then, at least in that moment, I am certain that I would do well to do so.)  
 
It seems that the mental states that are often referred to as rational acceptances involve either 
considered decisions to act cautiously or considered decisions to act incautiously. For example, 
my rational acceptance that Tonya did not act badly involves a considered decision to act in a 
way that is appropriately incautious. Even so, it seems that rational acceptances are still 
somehow different than either the considered decisions to act cautiously in Insurance Cases or 
the considered decisions to act incautiously in Gambling Cases. While I may make a considered 
decision to act in a way that is appropriately incautious when I buy a lottery ticket, it would be 
odd to suggest that I have rationally accepted that I would win. (I set aside any further 
investigation into the relation between these mental states.) 
 
However, let us look more carefully at the Knowledge Intuitions on which our considered 
decisions to act depend, i.e., the Knowledge Intuitions produced in Insurance and Gambling 
Cases. My decision to act cautiously and buy fire insurance depends on two prior Knowledge 
Intuitions: 
 
KI (1): The Knowledge Intuition that it is a practical possibility that my house will catch 
fire, and  
 
KI (2): The Knowledge Intuition that it would be prudent to behave in some limited way 
as if my house will catch fire, viz., prudent to buy insurance. 
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When I had KI (1), I started behaving as if that proposition is true. I did so by adopting an 
ambivalent attitude about whether my house would catch fire; and if I had not had KI (1), I 
would probably instead have had the definitive attitude that my house would not catch fire. 
Further, when I had KI (2), I started behaving as if that proposition is true. I did so by adopting a 
positive attitude about buying fire insurance; and if I had not had KI (2), I would probably 
instead have had a negative attitude about buying fire insurance. It seems clear that the 
considered decision to act cautiously that led to me buying fire insurance depended on these 
two attitudes, (1) my ambivalence about whether the house would catch fire, and (2) my 
positive attitude about buying fire insurance. An analogous analysis of the rational acceptance 
case may be made. The conclusion of that analysis is that the rational acceptance that led to me 
defending Tonya depended on (1) my ambivalence about whether she behaved badly, and (2) 
my positive attitude about defending her with a certain limited vigour. Thus, the critical control 
by Knowledge Intuitions and the KIP of behaviour is maintained in these cases. 
 
Also, the foregoing constitutes an account of the difference between knowing and rationally 
accepting. In a word, Knowledge Intuitions permit unlimited actions and attitudes as if p, 
whereas rational acceptance (which must be supported by taking oneself as knowing to be true 
certain secondary propositions) permit certain limited actions and attitudes as if p. 
 
* 
 
In this section I brought forward important classes of counterexamples (the only ones I can 
think of) to the hypothesis that we possess Trait 4, according to which we do not possess a 
cognitive device that can trump the KIP in relation to the control of calculated deliberate 
behaviour. However, I found in these cases that control of behaviour is maintained by the KIP 
and the Knowledge Intuitions it produces. I take it from this that it remains plausible that we 
possess Trait 4. 
 
 
4.3.2.5 Conclusion 
 
In conclusion, it seems plausible that we possess the four traits that I identified, and this 
constitutes direct evidence that the operating principles of the KIP are SDT principles, evidence 
that the production of ordinary Knowledge Intuitions and our use of ‘know’ reflects SDT 
principles. Accordingly, my working hypothesis shall be that our Epistemic Standards correlate 
with the SDT Index. I add that the support for this hypothesis that comes from the direct 
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evidence above, will be accompanied by support from a wide range of consistent examples that 
I present in Chapters 5 and 6.  
 
However, the term ‘SDT Index’ does not seem particularly fitting in discussions of everyday 
knowledge cases. It is unnatural, abstract, and does not seem particularly connected to the 
experience of taking oneself as knowing. Even so, recall (from §4.2.2) that a different way of 
conceptualizing the index emerges when we view the numerators as being connected, and the 
denominators as being separately connected. It may be conceptualized as the expected cost of 
a false positive relative to the expected benefit of a true positive, based on the prior evidence. 
This conception is analogous to the notion that is referred to as ‘risk/reward environment’. I 
find that discussions of knowledge cases using this picture to be quite natural, and resonant 
with how we feel when we take ourselves as knowing. So, I will begin now to refer to the SDT 
Index as the ‘Risk/Reward Quotient’. Thus, 
 
Risk/Reward Quotient = 
cost of a false positive  x Prior Pr(p=FALSE) 
benefit of a true positive x Prior Pr(p=TRUE) 
 
 
4.4 On Tracking Truth 
 
If the Epistemic Standards that we seem to set correlate with the Risk/Reward Quotient; and if, 
in the moment, the Risk/Reward Quotient is low, then we may intuit knowing that p even if our 
evidence for p is weak. This prediction seems to go against the view suggested by some 
philosophers that natural selection favours reliable belief-formation processes. Richard 
Feldman explains the latter view.  
 
[I]f a being has beliefs at all, it is better (that is, more conducive to survival) for it to 
have true beliefs than false beliefs. True beliefs about where one's food is are more 
helpful for finding food, and surviving, than are false beliefs. Similarly, true beliefs 
about where one's predators are and how to escape them are more survival enhancing 
than false beliefs about these matters. So, natural selection is likely to select for 
believers that have mostly true beliefs. The best way, perhaps the only way, for 
believers to have mostly true beliefs is for them to have reliable belief-forming 
mechanisms or strategies. Reliable mechanisms or strategies are ones that lead mostly 
to true beliefs. Hence, natural selection will select believers that have reliable belief-
forming mechanisms. (1988, p.218) 
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Additionally, Christopher Stephens develops a detailed model that predicts that under what 
would seem to have been prevalent circumstances ‘non-reliable belief formation policies will 
get the organism into trouble’ (2001, p.183) and produce selection pressure for the production 
of reliable belief formation processes. Kim Sterelny (2003) similarly finds that in the human 
case, selection ‘will favour more reliable mechanisms over less reliable ones’ (2003, p.32) that 
track truth. (I do not suggest that either Feldman, Stephens or Sterelny conclude from this that 
true-belief producing Cognitive processes necessarily evolved.)42 
 
Even so, notice that neither F1 nor SDT suggest that the purpose of intuiting that one knows on 
the basis of weak evidence is to have false beliefs, because false beliefs are better. Instead, SDT 
suggests that Epistemic Standards may be set low for the purpose of not failing to believe those 
propositions that advance our interests, whether they are true or not. The situation is analogous 
to a radar operator setting a low detection threshold: She may do so in order to avoid failing to 
detect approaching enemy fighters (i.e., to avoid failing to obtain the benefit of a true positive).  
 
Further, F1 and SDT suggest that even if, under some circumstances, we do not track truth 
particularly well; under other circumstances, particularly when the Risk/Reward Quotient is 
high, we do track truth well. Under the latter circumstances, the KIP will have to produce 
Knowledge Intuitions that are reliable. Truth will be ‘a fuel for success in dealing with the world’ 
(Godfrey-Smith, 1998, p.172).  
 
It seems that the view that nature favours an invariably reliable belief-formation process fails to 
take into account the benefit that can follow from modulating evidential standards; while SDT 
fully takes such benefits into account. In fact, if SDT principles govern the KIP, then the hallmark 
of the KIP is that it actively adjusts Epistemic Standards up and down in different contexts.  
 
  
                                                          
42 Relatedly, correspondence theories of truth have been supported by naturalist philosophers, who 
suggest that correspondence may explain behavioural success. Godfrey-Smith provides a general 
discussion of this literature (Godfrey-Smith, 1998, Chapter 6). 
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Chapter 5: How Do We Do It? 
 
In the last chapter, I found that it is plausible that SDT principles govern the production of 
Knowledge Intuitions and our use of ‘know’, so that the Epistemic Standards that we seem to 
set correlate with the Risk/Reward Quotient. In this chapter, I focus on practical matters—
particularly on how we adjudicate propositions in a way that takes the Risk/Reward Quotient 
into account. Additionally, I look at special practical circumstances under which we strategically 
suspend Knowledge Intuitions, even though our Present Evidence meets our Epistemic Standard 
(in §5.2); how we adjudicate special propositions that are not associated with either a particular 
practical situation or any particular action or attitude (in §5.3); and how good we are at setting 
Epistemic Standards, and whether or not those standards are optimal, i.e., whether they lead to 
Knowledge Intuitions that tend to produce consequences that are the best that we are capable 
of achieving, given our circumstances, limitations, and so on (in §5.4).  
 
 
5.1 The Basic Method 
 
We may get a sense of how we go about adjudicating Advanced Propositions in a way that takes 
the Risk/Reward Quotient into account by looking at what it is like to have a sense of (a) the 
Risk/Reward Quotient, and (b) the strength of our Present Evidence and Epistemic Standard.  
 
The Risk/Reward Quotient: Before looking at the Risk/Reward Quotient as a whole, let us look 
more closely at the sense we get of the Prior Probability that a questioned proposition is true, 
Prior Pr(p=TRUE), and also Prior Pr(p=FALSE). Earlier (in §4.3.2.3), I suggested that in my 
analyses, these measures would refer to a sense we have of a ‘natural frequency’ (the 
frequency with which experienced or envisioned events occur).43 In particular, I indicated that 
Prior Pr(p=TRUE) refers to the sense we have of the natural frequency with which propositions 
of the kind in question are true (and that Prior Pr(p=FALSE) refers to the sense we have of the 
natural frequency with which propositions of the kind in question are false). In my earlier 
example, Hannah, in Stanley’s Low Stakes Case, might have recognized that (i) two months ago, 
the proposition p1, that the competing nearby bank A will be open the coming Saturday, would 
                                                          
43 I pointed out (in §4.3.2.3) that a series of cognitive psychology experiments over the last several 
decades reveal that we are good at reasoning with natural frequencies while we are not characteristically 
good at reasoning with probabilities. We are also not good at reasoning with relative frequencies (see fn. 
37). 
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have been true, (ii) one month ago, the proposition p2, that nearby bank B will be open the 
coming Saturday, would have been true, and (iii) two weeks ago, the proposition p3, that nearby 
bank C will be open the coming Saturday, would have been true. She might then have gotten 
the sense that propositions that are of the same kind as p are frequently true. 
 
However, there are a vast number of everyday Advanced Propositions that we adjudicate; and 
it does not seem plausible that, for all of these, we would be able to get a sense of the natural 
frequency with which propositions of the kind that are in question are true. Even so, it seems 
that we manage under these circumstances by disregarding those features of propositions of 
the kind that are in question that are unlikely to be important. So, it seems more plausible to 
suggest that we may concern ourselves with the natural frequency with which general 
propositions of the kind that is in question are true. For example, Hannah’s sense of the Prior 
Probability that her bank is open this Saturday may be derived, not so much from recognizing 
the situation in relation to the particular banks A, B and C. Instead, it may be derived from her 
getting the sense that banks generally are open on Saturdays (disregarding all the irrelevant 
particulars). So, it seems plausible that we arm ourselves with the ability to get a sense of Prior 
Pr(p=TRUE) and Prior Pr(p=FALSE) (which we use in our adjudications of everyday Advanced 
Propositions) by noticing and keeping track of the frequency of the appearance or occurrence 
of different general kinds of objects, relations, states and events—such as the frequency with 
which banks generally are open on Saturdays.  
 
With this, let us consider the sense we may get of the Risk/Reward Quotient. Recall again the 
quotient: 
 
Risk/Reward Quotient = 
cost of a false positive  X Prior Pr(p=FALSE) 
benefit of a true positive X Prior Pr(p=TRUE) 
 
The sense we have of the Risk/Reward Quotient plausibly involves (a) modulating the negative 
valuation that constitutes our sense of the cost of a false positive in accordance with Prior 
Pr(p=FALSE), (b) modulating the positive valuation that constitutes our sense of the benefit of a 
true positive in accordance with Prior Pr(p=TRUE), and (c) weighing the numerator against the 
denominator. 
 
However, on my account, we adjudicate Advanced Propositions in quick succession in order to 
flag the best course of action available to us from moment to moment. Is it plausible that we 
possess the cognitive speed and capacity to perform these multiple assessments in ‘real time’? I 
100 
 
think so. First, notice that these assessments are not very different from those that are made 
when we determine the expected utility of actions or events—a measure widely used by 
economists and game theorists. These expected utility calculations seem to predict a wide 
range of human behaviours. Second, there are other domains in which, it seems, we take 
multiple factors into account almost instantly. For example, depth perception is produced by a 
process that takes many varied cues into account.44 Third, it seems that infra-human species 
make analogous assessments. C. R. Gallistel offers an account of an experiment that suggests 
that ducks modulate their assessment of the benefit of an event in accordance with the 
frequency of its occurrence. 
 
Every day two naturalists go out to a pond where some ducks are overwintering and 
station themselves about 30 yards apart. Each carries a sack of bread chunks. Each day 
a randomly chosen one of the naturalists throws a chunk every 5 seconds; the other 
throws every 10 seconds. After a few days’ experience with this drill, the ducks divide 
themselves in proportion to the throwing rates; within 1 minute: after the onset of 
throwing, there are twice as many ducks in front of the naturalist that throws at twice 
the rate of the other. One day, however, the slower thrower throws chunks twice as 
big. At first the ducks distribute themselves two to one in favour of the faster thrower, 
but within 5 minutes they are divided fifty-fifty between the two "foraging patches." 
This behaviour is predicted by a model of an evolutionarily stable foraging strategy. The 
model assumes that ducks and other foraging animals can represent rates of return, the 
number of items per unit time multiplied by the average size of an item. (Gallistel, 1990, 
p.2) 
 
 
The strength of the Present Evidence and Epistemic Standard: Let us now consider what it is like 
to have a sense of the strength of the Present Evidence and the Epistemic Standard. For 
example, in Stanley’s High Stakes Case, what is it like for Hannah to have a sense of the strength 
of her evidence—that the bank was open two weeks before? And what is it like for her to have 
a sense of her Epistemic Standard?  
 
We may measure the strength of Present Evidence and Epistemic Standards using probabilities. 
For example, the Present Evidence may confer a 95% probability of truth on p; and find that the 
Epistemic Standard requires that the evidence confers a 98% probability of truth on p. 
                                                          
44 Simon Grondin presents a summary of principle findings on depth perception cues (2016, pp.103-110). 
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However, as I pointed out earlier, we are, apparently, not good at reasoning with probabilities; 
whereas we are good at reasoning with natural frequencies. So, it may be that the sense we 
ordinarily have of both the strength of our Present Evidence and our Epistemic Standards 
consists of our sense of certain natural frequencies. Particularly, we may represent the strength 
of our Present Evidence to ourselves as the frequency with which evidence like our Present 
Evidence correctly predicts propositions like the proposition in question. For example, in 
Stanley’s Low Stakes Case, Hannah may represent the strength of her Present Evidence (i.e., the 
bank having been open two weeks before on a Saturday) to herself as the frequency with which 
such evidence would correctly predict propositions of the sort that is in question. Say that she 
has noticed that since she switched to her present bank over a decade ago, the bank has only 
changed its operating hours five or six times. This would allow her to infer that evidence like her 
Present Evidence would generally correctly predict propositions like the questioned 
proposition, that the bank will be open this Saturday. 
 
Notice that the yardstick we use to measure the strength of the Present Evidence should also 
be used to set Epistemic Standards. Epistemic Standards are merely thresholds that the 
strength of the Present Evidence must meet in order for Knowledge Intuitions to be produced. 
This state of affairs suggests that we may represent Epistemic Standards to ourselves as the 
minimum natural frequency with which evidence like our Present Evidence correctly predicts 
propositions like the proposition in question. For example, in Stanley’s High Stakes Case, 
Hannah’s sense of her Epistemic Standard may consist of her sense that she requires Present 
Evidence of a kind that would practically never fail to correctly predict proposition of the kind 
that is in question. If so, she may find that her Present Evidence, which she assesses would 
generally predict propositions such as that the bank will be open this Saturday does not meet 
this Epistemic Standard. 
 
So, it would seem that in order to be armed with the ability to get a sense of the strength of the 
Present Evidence, we would need to notice and keep track of the frequency with which different 
general kinds of objects, relations, states or events correctly predict other different general kinds 
of objects, relations, states or events. For example, I have noticed that my friend almost always 
does what she says she will do. This arms me with the ability to get a sense of the strength of 
Present Evidence that consisted of my friend saying what she will do. Similarly, I have noticed 
that the word of politicians pronounced in a hotly contested race frequently fails to predict their 
policies once in office, that the conclusions of an outlier social psychology experiment very 
often proves to be incorrect; that circumstantial evidence regularly fails to predict the guilt of a 
trial defendant; that three consistent and independent eye-witness accounts almost always 
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describes what in fact occurred; and that a randomized controlled trial in relation to 
propositions about the efficacy of a new medical treatment is almost always correct.  
 
In this emerging picture, it would seem that the way in which we set Epistemic Standards is 
straightforward. We first get a sense of the Risk/Reward Quotient in the circumstances and 
then associate by positive correlation this sense directly with an Epistemic Standard. For 
example, if one has the sense that the Risk/Reward Quotient is high, then one’s Epistemic 
Standard may be high, say requiring that evidence like the Present Evidence almost always 
correctly predicts propositions like the questioned proposition; and if one has the sense that 
the Risk/Reward Quotient is low, then one’s Epistemic Standard may be low, say requiring that 
evidence like the Present Evidence very often correctly predicts propositions like the questioned 
proposition.  
 
In summary, I have outlined a general method by which Advanced Propositions may be 
adjudicated. I will refer to it as the ‘Basic Method’.  
 
(1)  We notice and keep track of the frequency of the appearance or occurrence of 
different general kinds of objects, relations, states or events. These frequencies are 
the basis for the sense we get of the Prior Pr(p=TRUE) in particular instances. We 
may then get a sense of the Risk/Reward Quotient by modulating our sense of the 
cost of a false positive and the benefit of a true positive accordingly, and weigh the 
numerator of the Risk/Reward Quotient against its denominator.  
 
(2) We associate by positive correlation the Risk/Reward Quotient with an Epistemic 
Standard. 
 
(3) We notice and keep track of the frequency with which different general kinds of 
objects, relations, states or events correctly predict other different general kinds of 
objects, relations, states or events. These frequencies are the basis for the sense 
we get of the strength of the Present Evidence in particular instances. 
  
(4) We produce Knowledge Intuitions in relation to the questioned proposition if and 
only if the assessed strength of the Present Evidence meets our Epistemic 
Standard. 
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As I suggested, the sense we have of the frequencies that inform our sense of the Prior 
Pr(p=TRUE) and inform our sense of the strength of the Present Evidence in particular instances 
are largely (if not entirely) learned. This state of affairs explains the practice of criticizing 
incorrect productions of Knowledge Intuitions that fail to take experienced events into account; 
and the practice of forgiving incorrect productions of Knowledge Intuitions that are caused by a 
lack of experience. For example, if Julie betrayed Florence and Florence has previously known 
Julie to betray others, then Harry may be warranted in blaming Florence for trusting Julie. On 
the other hand, if Julie betrayed Sally and Sally had never known Julie to betray others, then 
Harry would not be warranted in blaming Sally for trusting Julie. 
 
 
5.2 The Adding Evidence Thesis 
 
F1 predicts that under certain circumstances the Basic Method may be suspended. That is, it 
predicts that under certain circumstances the production of Knowledge Intuitions may be 
strategically barred or suspended—even if the Present Evidence meets the Epistemic Standard 
that is predicted by the Basic Method. Such a state of affairs may arise when we are presented 
with the opportunity to benefit by reducing the risk of a false positive—which we may do by 
gathering additional evidence, and thereby strengthening Present Evidence. However, for such 
a suspension to occur, the anticipated benefit of reducing false positive risk must outweigh the 
anticipated cost of gathering the additional evidence.  
 
Recall F1: 
 
F1:  In a situation S, the function of intuiting that one knows that a proposition p is true 
is to indicate to oneself that, on the total evidence, behaving as if p in S will tend to 
produce better consequences than that of not behaving as if p in S. 
 
F1 predicts that if behaving as if p (which entails not gathering additional evidence) would not 
tend to produce better consequences than not behaving as if p (which may include gathering 
additional evidence), then Knowledge Intuitions would not be produced. Moreover, F1 is 
fundamental to my theory; whereas SDT (and, by extension, the Basic Method) have the 
supporting role of suggesting operating principles of the KIP that would allow it to perform the 
functions described by F1 (and F2). However, SDT simply does not apply to the cases I outlined 
in which Knowledge Intuitions are suspended.  
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These special cases would arise only in virtue of our ability (a) to delay the production of 
Knowledge Intuitions, and delay performing an action or forming an attitude as if p (which 
would otherwise follow from the Basic Method), (b) to assess the value of reducing false 
positive risk by gathering additional evidence, (c) to assess the cost we are likely to incur in the 
process of gathering additional evidence, and (d) to determine whether the assessment in (b) 
outweighs the assessment in (c). SDT is not intended to apply to systems or organisms when 
they exercise such a set of abilities. The theory assumes a more static situation in which a 
system or an organism has certain fixed evidence, and must determine in the context whether 
that evidence is sufficient for it to behave as if the questioned world condition exists.  
 
Consider an example based on Stanley’s Low Stakes Case. 
  
Case 5-1 
It is Friday, and Hannah has just got off work with her paycheque in hand. As she 
starts her drive home, she reflects on a bill coming due. While she has enough funds in 
her bank account to cover it, the account’s balance would drop below the minimum 
monthly balance and she would incur a small bank service charge. Even though the 
charge is small, she would like to avoid it. So, she plans to stop at the bank on the way 
home to deposit her paycheque.  
Sometime later she arrives at the bank, and as she drives past it, she notices that 
the queues are very long. She then recalls that the bank was open two weeks before on 
a Saturday and decides to return to the bank tomorrow to make the deposit.  
Suddenly, Hannah realizes that the bank app on her smartphone would indicate 
the bank’s operating hours instantly. She reminds herself that banks do change their 
hours. She checks her app and it indicates that the bank is indeed open on Saturdays. 
Hannah feels fully reassured. She continues on her way home and plans to go to the 
bank on Saturday. 
 
Hannah addresses the proposition p that the bank will be open on Saturday. Initially, her 
Present Evidence is limited to the bank having been open on a Saturday two weeks before; and, 
initially, that Evidence meets her Epistemic Standard. That initial standard is not particularly 
high because the Risk/Reward Quotient in her situation is low: If Hannah fails to deposit her 
cheque over the weekend, then she only faces having to pay a small bank charge.  
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However, even though the cost of a false positive for Hannah is low, she would nonetheless 
benefit by reducing her risk of a false positive; and she realizes that she has the opportunity to 
do so by checking her bank app. Moreover, Hannah realizes that the cost of checking her app is 
negligible. So, Hannah would plausibly find that the benefit of reducing false positive risk 
outweighs this cost. Accordingly, Hannah finds that it is worthwhile to check the app. She is 
happy to be reassured about the Saturday hours.  
 
Generally, in these cases, subjects rightly assume that it is likely (but not certain) that the 
additional evidence they would gather would strengthen or confirm the evidence they have in 
hand—because the latter is strong enough to meet the Epistemic Standard that they associate 
with the Risk/Reward Quotient. For example, the evidence Hannah has prior to checking her 
bank app, i.e., the bank having been open two weeks before on a Saturday, gives her good 
reason to believe that the bank app will confirm p, that the bank will be open on Saturday. Even 
so, in these cases, subjects find that the benefit of reducing false positive risk outweighs the 
cost of gathering the additional evidence.  
 
To be clear, the cost of gathering additional evidence in these cases may include multiple 
components. Particularly, it may include the subject’s valuation of the energy and resources 
required to gather the additional evidence, and her valuation of lost opportunities to perform 
other actions while gathering the evidence. Such lost opportunities may include small things, 
such as having the opportunity to maintain the flow of a conversation (e.g., the cost of 
interrupting a flowing conversation to confirm a small point).  
 
After Hannah realizes that it is worthwhile to gather additional evidence, she reminds herself 
that banks do change their hours. This reflects a suspension of her Knowledge Intuition about 
the bank being open, which she had up until that moment. It reflects the occurrence of a new 
doubt.45 
                                                          
45 It may be that Antonio Damasio’s ‘somatic-marker hypothesis’ describes the process by which 
Knowledge Intuitions may thus be suspended. A somatic-marker is a sensation, like a gut-feeling, that 
accompanies anticipated consequences of actions. Damasio explains: 
  
[a bad gut-feeling] forces attention on the negative outcome to which a given action may lead, 
and functions as an automated alarm signal which says: Beware of danger ahead if you choose 
the option which leads to this outcome. The signal may lead you to reject, immediately, the 
negative course of action and thus make your choose among other alternatives. (1994, p.173) 
 
Perhaps, when one is struck by the sense that one would do well to not behave as if p and to gather 
additional evidence in relation to p—even if one’s Present Evidence meets the Epistemic Standard 
associated with the Risk/Reward Quotient in the circumstances—the moment is accompanied by a 
somatic-marker that causes the suspension of the Knowledge Intuition. 
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Finally, after Hannah checks her app (gathers the additional evidence) and finds that it confirms 
p, her total Present Evidence more than meets her Epistemic Standard (that continues to reflect 
the unchanged Risk/Reward Quotient). She is fully reassured about the bank being open and 
her Knowledge Intuition that the bank will be open re-emerges.  
 
The scenario I describe suggests an additional contextual factor in the production of Knowledge 
Intuitions.  
  
Adding Evidence Thesis:  One’s Knowledge Intuitions are suspended in the moment 
(even if one’s Present Evidence meets the Epistemic Standard 
predicted by the Basic Method) if one believes that (a) 
reducing false positive risk by gathering additional evidence is 
a practical possibility, and (b) the benefit of this reduction in 
false positive risk exceeds the cost of gathering the additional 
evidence. 
 
When Knowledge Intuitions are suspended under the Adding Evidence Thesis, one’s Epistemic 
Standard is effectively raised in the period during which additional evidence is gathered. So, the 
Adding Evidence Thesis is a truth-conducive contextual factor in the production of Knowledge 
Intuitions. 
 
Notice too that the Adding Evidence Thesis suggests that Knowledge Intuitions may be 
suspended anytime the practical possibility of gathering additional evidence is identified; and 
also that identifying practical possibilities to gather evidence depends entirely on one’s 
capacities, technologies, resources and strategies for doing so. In other words, one’s ability to 
extract evidence from the world determines whether the Adding Evidence Thesis is relevant in 
particular cases. In Case 5-1, Hannah’s ability to gather additional evidence depended on her 
having a smartphone with a bank app installed on it in her possession, and depended on her 
ability to use this technology.  
 
The Adding Evidence Thesis resonates with Patrick Rysiew’s suggestion that the function of 
knowledge attributions is to mark ‘the opening and closing of specific lines of inquiry’ (Rysiew, 
2012, p.275). (Rysiew acknowledges that his approach is similar to that taken by Chris Kelp 
(Kelp, 2011) and Klemens Kappel (Kappel, 2010).) My thesis suggests that the production of 
Knowledge Intuitions and the use of ‘know’ depends on whether practical possibilities to gather 
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evidence have been identified; and so they depend on whether lines of inquiry are open or 
closed. Accordingly, they mark the openings and closings Rysiew refers to.  
 
 
5.3 Basic Assumptions 
 
We very often take ourselves as knowing to be true propositions that are not, in the moment, 
associated with a particular practical situation, nor a particular range of possible practical 
situations, nor any particular action or attitude, nor a particular range of possible actions or 
attitudes. For example, at this moment, the following two propositions meet such a description 
for me: Paris is the capital of France, and Albert Einstein proposed that E=mc2. If the Basic 
Method is true, then the Epistemic Standards that we set under such circumstances would track 
our assessment of the Risk/Reward Quotient in the moment. But how are we to assess the 
Risk/Reward Quotient in relation to such propositions given that they are not directly 
associated with practical matters? I propose an answer to this question in this section. 
  
It seems plausible that most (if not all) of the adjudications of propositions that we make—even 
those that are not directly associated with practical matters—serve a purpose. Further, it seems 
that very often the purpose of adjudicating propositions that are not directly associated with 
practical matters relates to the potential support the adjudications provide for our 
adjudications of other propositions, ones which are associated with practical matters. I propose 
that the situation is a little like that which Otto Neurath referred to in his famous boat 
metaphor. 
 
Neurath likened the enterprise of building a body of knowledge using the scientific method to 
the task of sailors rebuilding their boat while at sea: They are not able to take the boat into dry 
dock, and must stand on one plank while repairing another (Neurath, 1932/1983, p.92). Quine 
suggested that the metaphor applies to philosophy:  
 
The philosopher and the scientist are in the same boat. If we improve our 
understanding of ordinary talk of physical things, it will . . . be by clarifying the 
connections, causal or otherwise, between ordinary talk of physical things and various 
further matters which in turn we grasp with help of ordinary talk of physical things. 
(Quine, 1960, p.3) 
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I am suggesting that the metaphor may be extended further to the adjudication of ordinary 
Advanced Propositions. Consider first that, for the agent, the ability of Present Evidence to 
predict a proposition generally depends on the agent taking herself as knowing certain ancillary 
propositions as being true. For example, say that I am considering driving to my friend’s place to 
pay him a surprise visit. However, I want to first check to see if the storm has let up. So, I look 
out the window and see that the streets are very icy. On the basis of this Present Evidence, I 
take myself as knowing the proposition p: it is dangerous to drive at this time. On that basis, I 
decide to stay home. The Present Evidence (i.e., the streets being very icy) predicts p (i.e., that 
it is dangerous to drive at this time). However, my ability to make that prediction on the basis of 
that Present Evidence depends entirely on my taking myself as knowing that, in general, ice is 
slippery. I depend on a general ancillary proposition which we may view as a Neurathian plank I 
stand on when I adjudicate p on the basis of my Present Evidence.  
 
Consider also that the Basic Method indicates that our adjudications of Advanced Propositions 
are based on intuitions of knowing (a) the frequency of the appearance or occurrence of 
different general kinds of objects, relations, states or events, and (b) the frequency with which 
different general kinds of objects, relations, states or events, predict other different general 
kinds of objects, relations, states or events. These propositions about frequencies are again 
general ancillary propositions that facilitate our being able to adjudicate the main questioned 
proposition. These too may be viewed as Neurathian planks. Consider some examples. 
 
1. In Stanley’s Low Stakes Case, Hannah’s Knowledge Intuition about the bank being open on 
Saturday depends on the Epistemic Standard she sets, which (according to the Basic Method) in 
turn depends on her sense of the Prior Probability of the bank being open. In this example, 
Hannah’s sense of this Prior Probability in turn depends on assumptions such as that banks in 
her area are usually open on Saturdays, and that disruptions of regular bank hours (due to 
power failures, currency shortages, labour disruptions or robberies) are extremely rare. 
 
2. A doctor’s Knowledge Intuition that his patient has type 2 diabetes depends on the Epistemic 
Standard he sets, which in turn depends on his sense of the Prior Probability of the patient 
having that ailment. This Prior Probability depends on an assumption that he makes about the 
frequency with which type 2 diabetes occurs in that segment of the population that has the 
patient’s medical profile. For example, if the occurrence of the ailment is extremely rare, then 
the Epistemic Standard that the doctor would set would be extremely high. 
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3. Say that you are a pedestrian at a busy street corner waiting for an opportunity to cross 
safely. A vehicle stops opposite you; and you and the driver make eye contact. She clearly 
waves you on, suggesting that she will wait while you cross; and you intuit knowing the 
proposition p that it is safe to cross the street under these circumstances. Your Knowledge 
Intuition depends on the Epistemic Standard you set for p; which, in turn, depends on your 
sense of the Prior Probability that p is true. This sense of the Prior Probability depends on such 
assumptions as (a) that the frequency with which drivers attempt to run over pedestrians is 
very low, (b) that the frequency with which drivers lose control of their vehicles due to medical 
conditions is very low, and (c) that the frequency with which cars lurch forward on their own 
due to a mechanical malfunction is very low. Your taking yourself as knowing to be true these 
ancillary propositions leads you to set a low Epistemic Standard in relation to p. 
 
Let us assume that these sorts of ancillary propositions are derived from more general 
propositions. For example, the proposition, the frequency with which drivers attempt to run 
over pedestrians is very low, derives from the more general proposition, the frequency with 
which people in my area attempt to cause serious harm to others who mean them no harm is 
very low. The proposition, the frequency with which cars lurch forward on their own due to a 
mechanical malfunction is very low, derives from the more general proposition, the frequency 
with which cars have major mechanical malfunctions is very low.  
 
I suggest that when we use such general ancillary propositions to facilitate our adjudications, 
we ordinarily believe without doubt in the moment that they are true: We stand on those 
planks that we feel safe standing on. I call such general ancillary propositions that are Advanced 
Propositions and that in the moment we take ourselves as knowing ‘Basic Assumptions’.  
 
I assume that we have previously positively adjudicated the Advanced Propositions that are the 
content of Basic Assumptions—whether we remember doing so or not. Further, I assume that 
when we make such an adjudication, we anticipate that it would serve a purpose—particularly 
the purpose of supporting future adjudications of other Advanced Propositions). I call 
propositions that constitute candidate content for a new Basic Assumption, ‘Basic Propositions’. 
For example, I assume that at some point I adjudicated the Basic Proposition that the frequency 
with which people in my area attempt to cause serious harm to others who mean them no 
harm is very low (even though I do not remember doing so), and further that I knew that if I 
took myself as knowing this Basic Proposition to be true, then I would in effect be accepting a 
new Basic Assumption that would have the potential of being used in a range of future 
adjudications. 
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If we take ourselves as knowing that a Basic Proposition is true, that proposition will be the 
basis for a new Basic Assumption that may be used over and over again in future adjudications. 
So, acquiring a new Basic Assumption has the potential of being highly consequential; and some 
new Basic Assumptions may be extremely consequential, e.g., Basic Assumptions about the 
virtue and power of the scientific method and about the existence of a personal God.  
 
If the Basic Method applies to our adjudications of Basic Propositions, then the Epistemic 
Standard that we set should correlate with the Risk/Reward Quotient in the situation. However, 
one may well not be able to anticipate the practical circumstances surrounding many, if not 
most, of the future adjudications in which a new Basic Assumption will play a role. So, how 
would one get a sense of the Risk/Reward Quotient under these circumstances? 
 
It seems that we do get some reasonably clear sense of the general risk and the general reward 
that could go with adopting a new Basic Assumption. We may get a sense of this by first 
recognizing that the set of all of an individual’s Basic Assumptions constitutes a basis for her 
ongoing adjudications of Advanced Propositions, and so a basis for the performance of 
deliberate actions and formation of attitudes. I will call an individual’s set of Basic Assumptions 
her ‘Worldview’.  
 
Further, we might recognize that some Worldviews are better than others—insofar as they 
better facilitate successful ongoing adjudications of ordinary Advanced Propositions, and better 
facilitate adjudications of Advanced Propositions that are difficult to correctly adjudicate (say 
because they are highly abstract, or are not well supported by Present Evidence). In general, 
better Worldviews are better at helping us to advance our interests. 
 
In this picture, it appears that the principal risk of incorporating a new Basic Assumption into 
one’s Worldview is that it has a deleterious effect on that Worldview, i.e., it combines with 
already held views in a way that makes us worse adjudicators of new Advanced Propositions; 
and it appears that the principal reward of incorporating a new Basic Assumption into one’s 
Worldview is that it has a helpful effect—by combining synergistically with already held views in 
a way that makes us better adjudicators of new Advanced Propositions. 
 
Further, we may predict the extent to which a new Basic Assumption will be either deleterious 
or helpful on the basis of whether or not certain relations would obtain between that Basic 
Assumption and our already-held views. For example, Basic Assumptions that are compatible 
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with already held views are more likely to be synergistic and not deleterious than are 
incompatible Basic Assumptions—particularly when assessed against already held views that 
have in the past played an important role for us in making important and successful 
adjudications.  
 
Second, Basic Assumptions that are coherent with already held views are more likely to be 
synergistic and not deleterious than are Basic Assumptions that do not cohere with already held 
views. The notion of coherence suggested by Laurence Bonjour seems to work here: Coherence 
between beliefs is afforded by ‘various sorts of inferential, evidential and explanatory relations’ 
(Bonjour, 1985, p.93). Again, this is particularly so when assessed against already held views 
that have played an important role in making important and successful adjudications.  
 
Third, Basic Assumptions that are complementary with already held views are more likely to be 
synergistic and not deleterious than are Basic Assumptions that are not complementary. A Basic 
Assumption is complementary to the extent that it extends or fills in gaps in one’s Worldview—
while not diminishing its coherence. Doing so may allow us to broaden the range of the 
Advanced Propositions that we are successfully able to adjudicate. 
 
So, we may get a sense of the Risk/Reward Quotient when we are adjudicating Basic 
Propositions by weighing the three factors to which I referred—the compatibility, coherence, 
and complementarity of a Basic Proposition in relation to our already held views. If a Basic 
Proposition is compatible, coherent and complementary with them, then allowing it to be the 
content of a new Basic Assumption would likely not be risky, and may very well be helpful. So, 
the Risk/Reward Quotient in relation to that Basic Proposition would be low—and one may 
associate with it a low Epistemic Standard. Generally, the Risk/Reward Quotient is negatively 
correlated with the extent to which a Basic Proposition is compatible, coherent and 
complementary with already held views. 
 
Experimental social psychology supports the picture that I have sketched. I refer to the research 
that deals with confirmation bias (which I discuss in §4.3.2.2). Recall Fiske & Taylor’s summary 
of the picture that emerges from this research: 
 
Instead of a naïve scientist entering the environment in search of the truth, we find the 
rather unflattering picture of a charlatan trying to make the data come out in a manner 
most advantageous to his or her already held theories. (Fiske and Taylor, 1984, p.88) 
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However, even if confirmation bias is strong and our Epistemic Standards in relation to 
propositions that are compatible and coherent with already held views are low, my theory 
suggests that our Worldview may well develop in way that tends to make us better adjudicators 
of Advanced Propositions. It may well be that not every new Basic Assumption that is added to 
that Worldview is perfectly compatible and coherent, and may well be that we put a high 
priority on adding highly complementary Basic Assumptions, that increases the range of 
Advanced Propositions that we can successfully adjudicate. The situation would be like that 
which Neurath describes for the sciences in his final version (there were several) of his boat 
analogy: 
 
Imagine sailors, who, far out at sea, transform the shape of their clumsy vessel from a 
more circular to a more fishlike one [which would presumably traverse the waters more 
smoothly and efficiently]. They make use of some drifting timber, besides the timber of 
the old structure, to modify the skeleton and the hull of their vessel. But they cannot 
put the ship in dock in order to start from scratch . . . A new ship grows out of the old 
one, step by step . . . The whole business will go on in a way that we cannot even 
anticipate today. That is our fate. (1944, p.47) 
 
However, the prospect of ever-improving Worldviews is diminished to the extent that we assess 
the compatibility, coherence and complementarity of a Basic Proposition (for possible inclusion 
into our Worldview as a new Basic Assumption) in relation to only a small subset of Basic 
Assumptions. If so, we would tend to adopt new Basic Assumptions that are coherent with 
some already held views but not others. Such a process would lead to the creation of islands of 
coherent Basic Assumptions, so that the Basic Assumptions that constitute one island are not 
generally coherent with those of others. For reasons spelled out by coherentists, including the 
early work of C. I. Lewis (see §2.2), a failure to establish broad coherence increases the 
likelihood that individual islands of coherent Basic Assumptions contain significant falsehoods. 
So, the worry here is that while the process by which Worldviews develop generally serves our 
interests, those Worldviews may nonetheless contain caricature-like, narrowly coherent, but 
broadly incoherent elements. 
 
 
5.4 Optimality 
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If indeed the Epistemic Standards that we seem to set are determined by the Basic Method 
under the Adding Evidence Thesis, are those standards optimal? That is, do they tend to 
produce consequences that are the best that we are capable of achieving, given our 
circumstances, limitations, and so on? Such a question is prompted because (1) SDT was 
developed largely for the purpose of determining optimal detection thresholds for systems and 
organisms, and (2) SDT is used by adaptationists to explain selection pressure for detection 
thresholds (which are exhibited in the response patterns of the organisms they investigate).46 
We find that there is reason to assume that our Epistemic Standards may very well not be 
optimal.  
 
Recall my earlier distinction between mechanisms that govern autonomic and stimulus-
response behaviours, and the mechanism that governs the performance of calculated 
deliberate actions and the formation of attitudes (in §4.3.1):   
 
Mechanisms that govern autonomic and stimulus-response behaviours. These depend 
on innate detection thresholds that are more or less fixed for individuals. For example, 
visual data must be strong enough to meet an innate detection threshold in order for 
me to reflexively respond to an object that is fast approaching my head, e.g., by ducking 
or blinking. Call these ‘Type A’ mechanisms. 
  
A mechanism that governs the performance of calculated deliberate actions and the 
formation of attitudes. This mechanism depends on the KIP which sets Epistemic 
Standards on the basis of the world conditions we encounter. Call this a ‘Type B’ 
mechanism. 
 
Let us assume that much of the evolutionary history of Type A mechanisms predates much of 
the evolutionary history of the Type B mechanism. Such an assumption is plausible because it 
would seem that very many multi-cell organisms have Type A mechanisms. They are capable of 
capable of responding to stimuli and employ an innate detection threshold. On the other hand, 
only few, relatively sophisticated, species possess a Type B mechanism. So, we may view the 
former as early stage systems, and that latter as a late stage system.  
 
                                                          
46 The working hypothesis in these investigations is that these detection thresholds evolve to optimality. 
Earlier I offered these examples: (1) detection threshold exhibited by female birds for male mating signals 
(Price, 2013), (2) the detection threshold exhibited by bees for floral displays (Leonard et al., 2011) and 
(3) the detection threshold exhibited by the plant Hieracium umbellatum for soil types. The latter grows 
bushy, broad leaves on rocky, sea-side cliffs, and grows prostrate with narrow leaves on sand dunes. 
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Late stage adaptations sometimes evolve from earlier adaptations that had different functions. 
For example, the lungs in land animals evolved from the swim bladder in fish—a gas-filled sack 
used to control buoyancy. Andy Clark explains that ‘if evolution proceeds as a tinkerer, then 
each step in the evolutionary chain exploits a ‘net historical opportunity’ whose nature is 
determined by whatever materials happen to be available to adapt to a new requirement’ 
(1987, p.283). It may well be that some of the cognitive components of the Type B mechanism 
also evolved from earlier adaptations that had different functions. For example, the Basic 
Method suggests that we possess a device that keeps track of the frequency of the appearance 
or occurrence of different general kinds of objects, relations, states or events. Such a frequency 
of appearance or occurrence allows us to get a sense of the Prior Pr(p=TRUE), which helps us 
assess the Risk/Reward Quotient and set Epistemic Standards in the circumstances. So, in the 
late-stage system, the frequency-tracking device’s function is to contribute one piece of 
contextually relevant information which we use in combination with several other pieces of 
information in order to set an Epistemic Standard. Calculated and deliberate action may or may 
not follow. However, this frequency-tracking device may have evolved from a much earlier 
device that had a different function. For example, it may have evolved from a device that 
facilitated automatic conditioned responses—like the device that mediates the Pavlovian 
responses exhibited today in many infra-human species, e.g., the device mediating Pavlov’s 
dog’s salivating when hearing a bell. The organism acquires a particular response to an 
unconditioned stimulus when the frequency of co-occurrence of that unconditioned stimuli 
with a conditioned stimulus meets a threshold. Such a function is very different than the 
function of the more evolved, modern frequency-tracking device used in the Type B 
mechanism.  
 
Andy Clark calls adaptions that have this sort of evolutionary history, i.e., that involve 
gerrymandered design elements, ‘kludges’. The performance of kludges may well not be 
optimal. For example, when the swim bladder becomes the basis for a breathing device, 
 
the initial elegance is lost. The new device, though functional, may be expected to 
embody design principles appropriate to swim bladders and in all likelihood 
inappropriate, from a pure design perspective, to lungs. At best, then, we may hope for 
elegant solutions to the earliest and most telling cognitive problems which faced our 
ancestors. In all other cases - including, sadly, most of those studied by contemporary 
cognitive science - we may expect to find cognitive kludges. (Clark, 1987, p.290) 
 
This suggests that the Type B mechanism may not be optimal.  
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However, the Basic Method allows that our adjudications of Advanced Propositions may 
continuously improve. First, the Basic Method allows the possibility of improving our sense of 
the frequency of the appearance or occurrence of different general kinds of objects, relations, 
states or events. This, in turn, allows us to get better at predicting the value of Prior 
Pr(p=TRUE), and so, better at assessing the Risk/Reward Quotient and setting advantageous 
Epistemic Standards. Second, our assessments of the strength of our Present Evidence may 
continuously improve: The Basic Method allows the possibility of improving our sense of the 
frequency with which different general kinds of objects, relations, states or events correctly 
predict other general kinds of objects, relations, states or events. Third, the Adding Evidence 
Thesis allows the possibility of improving our sense of the cost of gathering additional evidence. 
This in turn allows us to get better at determining whether we would do well to suspend 
Knowledge Intuitions and gather additional evidence.47 
  
                                                          
47 These conclusions are consistent with a suggestion Carolyn Price makes about the function of the 
systems that control learning. Roughly, that function is to improve our reasoning in the direction of a 
certain ideal (Price, 2002, p.613). 
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Chapter 6: Altruistic Knowledge Intuitions 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
We found that an agent adjudicating a proposition may tend to produce consequences that she 
values by modulating her Epistemic Standard in accordance with the Risk/Reward Quotient; 
and, we assumed that the Risk/Reward Quotient reflects risks and rewards for the adjudicator 
and not someone else. That is, we assumed that the adjudicator assesses the benefit of a true 
positive and the cost of a false positive in relation to her own practical interests, and not in 
relation to those of others.  
 
However, sometimes we anticipate that our adjudications of propositions will directly affect the 
practical interests of others; and sometimes, in these circumstances, we are focused on this 
effect, and not on our own immediate practical situation. Moreover, sometimes, not only are 
we concerned that those others are not harmed in any way as a result of our adjudications and 
actions, but, we are hopeful that are adjudications and actions have positive consequences for 
those others. 
 
It would seem that under these circumstances, in order to tend to produce positive 
consequences for those others, our Epistemic Standards should modulate in accordance with a 
Risk/Reward Quotient that reflects the risks and rewards for those others whose practical 
interests we hope to advance. That is, we should assess the benefit of a true positive and the 
cost of a false positive, not in relation to our own practical interests, but in relation to those of 
others; and his seems to be precisely what we do. Moreover, I find that this practice is key to 
explaining the multiple impasses that we find in the epistemological literature—particularly, 
between Contextualists, Subject Sensitive Invariantists and Classic Invariantists—and key to 
explaining why we have two independent histories in epistemology (see Chapter 2). So, let us 
investigate the following thesis: 
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The Altruistic 
Assessment 
Thesis (AAT): 
We are sometimes focused on helping others; and when we 
are, our adjudications of relevant Advanced Propositions 
are based on our assessments of the benefit of true 
positives and the cost of false positives in relation to the 
practical interests of those others. 
 
Earlier, I introduced and defined the term ‘Altruistic Knowledge Intuitions’. That term may, 
alternatively, be viewed as the Knowledge Intuitions that arise in the situations to which the 
AAT refers. (In contrast, my defined term ‘Egoistic Knowledge Intuitions’ are the Knowledge 
Intuitions that follow from self-oriented assessments.)48 
 
* 
 
My terminology suggests that I regard the cases to which I refer as cases of altruism. Let us be 
reminded of the point I made earlier (in §3.3) about the particular meaning of the term 
‘altruism’ in the biological literature, which meaning I employ here. In everyday use, ‘altruism’ 
refers to behaviour that follows from an ultimate desire or motivation to help others, and not 
from a desire or motivation that is ultimately egoistic. However, in biology, ultimate desires and 
motivations are entirely irrelevant. The sole criterion for whether behaviour is altruistic is 
whether its direct (non-accidental) effect is to decrease the donor’s Inclusive Fitness and to 
increase the recipient’s. So, from a biological perspective, altruistic behaviour may well stem 
from egoistic ultimate desires or motivations, such as the desire to enhance one’s reputation or 
to create an indebtedness. As I suggested earlier, in order to keep my investigation consistent 
with the biological literature, I employ the biological meaning. 
 
However, I find the application of the standard biological meaning problematic in one respect. 
Recall the suggestion I made earlier (in §4.3.2.3) that we do not assess the consequences of our 
behaviour directly on the basis of Inclusive Fitness, but rather on the basis of our values (i.e., 
whatever it is that is taken to be positive, good or beneficial). Moreover, it seems that in some 
cases, our values—which may, to a significant extent, be learned—do not seem to be 
compatible with Inclusive Fitness. This state of affairs potentially complicates the present 
                                                          
48 I allow the possibility that we are sometimes primarily self-interested and secondarily other-interested, 
or vice versa. An analysis of such cases might proceed by focusing on the primary orientation. Further, it 
seems plausible that an individual may in some instances vacillate between orientations in relation to the 
same proposition and in the same general context. Certain self-ascriptions of knowledge may be 
anticipated to lead to both self-oriented actions and to other-oriented actions. However, I set aside 
consideration of such cases. 
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discussion. So, I will remedy the problem by making ‘altruism’ a defined term, and define it in 
relation to values. Let us say that an individual’s behaviour or thought (including an adjudication 
of an Advanced Proposition) is ‘Altruistic’ if and only if she values neutrally or negatively its 
direct consequences in relation to her own practical and self-oriented interests, and values 
positively its consequences in relation to the practical interests of those she intends or 
envisages helping.49 
 
There are, of course, many ways in which we may help others. However, most of the cases in 
the epistemological literature in which Altruism plays a role feature an agent who is focused on 
helping others by means of communicating a proposition to those others. I focus on just such 
cases.  
 
Recall that I refer to these last agents as ‘Senders’ and those to whom their communications are 
directed as ‘Receivers’. Further, in the cases on which I am focused, Senders assume that their 
Receivers are very likely to take their communicated propositions as being true. As a result, 
Senders assume that Receivers are very likely to behave as if their communicated propositions 
are true and likely to benefit if they are true and be harmed if they are false. In these cases, if 
the Altruistic Assessment Thesis is true, Senders’ adjudications of their communicated 
propositions are based on their assessments of these Receivers’ benefits and harms. 
 
Earlier (in §3.3), I proposed a primary function for Altruistic Knowledge Intuitions that arise in 
these communication cases, F2—which is an applied special instance of my primary function 
hypothesis F1. F2 suggests that the function of a Sender’s Altruistic Knowledge Intuition in 
relation to p is to indicate to herself that communicating that p will tend to help her Receiver(s) 
more than would not communicating that p.50 51 
                                                          
49 Notice that I have not appealed to the values of those who we intend or envisage helping. This is 
relevant when there is a marked difference between the two. For example, I have suggested that if I 
intend to help or envisage helping a masochist, I will assess the consequences of my behaviour, not on 
the basis of the masochist’s values, but rather on the basis of my own. This assumption simplifies the 
theory and the analysis; and I do not have an opinion as to how much data (if any) this move would 
potentially leave unexplained.  
50 Knowledge cases that involve communications do not necessarily involve Altruistic Knowledge 
Intuitions. An individual X who has an Egoistic Knowledge Intuition in relation to p may communicate p to 
an agent Y in order to either get Y to perform an action or form an attitude that X believes would advance 
her own interests, regardless of whether or not it is good for Y. Or, an individual who performs an action 
on the basis of an Egoistic Knowledge Intuition may merely report on having performed that action after 
the fact. I may say to myself ‘It is 5 pm. So, I’ll go home now” and then later explain “I knew it was 5 pm. 
So, I went home’. 
51 F2 suggests that if (a) Altruistic Knowledge Intuitions arise in these cases, then (b) we have the sense 
that communicating that p will tend to help our Receiver(s) more than would not communicating that p. 
However, it does not suggest that if (b), then (a). F2 allows, for example, that circumstances may arise 
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6.2 Human Altruism 
 
Let us consider whether the AAT is plausible. On one hand, it is obvious that we sometimes 
focus on helping others, obvious that we are often successful in helping others, and obvious 
that we sometimes take the practical interests of others into account. On the other, it is not 
evident that our taking the practical interests of others into account extends to the unconscious 
operations of the KIP. That is, it is not at all clear that the production of Knowledge Intuitions 
sometimes depends on the agent’s reading of the practical interests of others, as the AAT 
suggests. Even so, the thesis is supported by a range of ordinary knowledge cases with which it 
is consistent; and supported also by the biological literature. Let us first look at the latter. 
 
Biological research, which I review in Appendix 3, suggests that we possess Altruistic traits. It 
suggests that we are innately Altruistic (under the assumption that individuals’ values very 
broadly tend to support their respective Inclusive Fitness). Further, it suggests that not only do 
we attempt to help others, but we actually often succeed in doing so, and that benefits for 
others are often produced. In fact, the evolution of Altruistic traits depends on producing those 
benefits. But, how does our behaviour tend to produce positive consequences for others? As I 
suggested earlier, Signal Detection Theory offers an answer to the question, just as it did in 
relation to the production of positive consequences for ourselves, viz., when we intend to help 
or envisage helping others and we are adjudicating propositions that are anticipated to lead to 
behaviour that would affect those others, we assess the benefit of true positives and the cost of 
false positives in relation to the practical interests of those others.  
 
Further, the biological research predicts the particular circumstances under which ceteris 
paribus Altruistic behaviour will arise—and predicts also that Altruistic behaviour is generally 
not likely to arise outside of them. It is thus plausible that the Altruistic Assessment Thesis will 
                                                          
under which a Sender has the sense that communicating what she takes to be a falsehood will tend to 
help her Receiver(s) more than would not communicating the presumed falsehood. I set aside cases of 
the latter kind. As I indicated earlier (in §3.5), in this investigation, I set aside cases in which the 
knowledge attributor is intentionally ironic or dishonest—even if they are doing so for the purpose of 
helping their Receivers. 
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ceteris paribus be applicable under these particular circumstances, though it may not be 
applicable outside of them.52 These are those circumstances, roughly described: 
 
(1) The individual intends or envisages communicating with closely-related kin—or a 
more distantly related individual, if the cost of preparing and sending a helpful 
communication is a small fraction of the latter individual’s expected benefit (see 
§A.3.1 in Appendix 3). 
 
(2) The individual intends or envisages communicating with someone with whom she 
has an ongoing relationship that involves reciprocal interactions, e.g., one is an 
employee, and the other her employer (assuming that the employee’s work in fact 
benefits the employer and the employer regularly reciprocates by paying the 
employee’s wages) (see §A.3.2). 
 
(3) The individual with whom one is intending or envisaging communicating is a ‘co-
operator’ (i.e., someone who has a good record of reciprocating and helping 
others), and others in the community will learn about the communication 
producing reputational rewards for the altruist (see §A.3.3). 
 
(4) The individual has a co-operative character or personality, and it is strong enough 
to compel her to provide the level of co-operation called for in the circumstances 
(see §A.3.4). 
 
Let us look at how Senders employ the Basic Method under the AAT. They first get a sense of 
the benefit for their Receivers of a true positive and the cost for their Receivers of a false 
positive. This enables them to get a sense of the Risk/Reward Quotient. They then associate the 
Risk/Reward Quotient with a particular Epistemic Standard, e.g., a high Risk/Reward Quotient is 
associated with a high Epistemic Standard. (I look at how Senders assess whether the conditions 
contained in the Adding Evidence Thesis have been met under the AAT in §6.3.) A low stakes 
example and high stakes example follow.53 
 
Case 6-1: Low Stakes 
                                                          
52 It may be that the Altruistic Assessment Thesis would not be relevant even under one of the described 
circumstances, if, in the moment, contrary egoistic or other motivations outweigh the individual’s 
Altruistic motivations. 
53 These are based on Stanley’s Low Stakes Case and Stanley’s High Stakes Case. 
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Sarah is driving her sister Hannah home on a Friday afternoon. Sarah asks Hannah 
if she would mind if they stopped at the bank on the way so that she can deposit her 
paycheque. Sarah explains that while it is not important that she do so as she has no 
impending bills, it would nonetheless be efficient. Coincidentally, Hannah also uses the 
same bank and knows that they will not have to go too far out of their way to get there. 
She tells Sarah that she does not mind stopping.  
As they drive past the bank, they notice that the lines inside are very long. Hannah 
says, ‘I know the bank will be open tomorrow, since I was there just two weeks ago on 
Saturday. You might prefer coming back and depositing your paycheque then’. 
 
Case 6-2: High Stakes 
Sarah is driving her sister Hannah home on a Friday afternoon. Sarah asks Hannah 
if she would mind if they stopped at the bank on the way so that she can deposit her 
paycheque. Sarah explains that she has a very important impending bill coming due, 
and not enough in her account to cover it. So, she has to make sure that she deposits 
her paycheque by Saturday. Coincidentally, Hannah also uses the same bank and knows 
that they will not have to go too far out of their way to get there. She tells Sarah that 
she does not mind stopping.  
As they drive past the bank, they notice that the lines inside are very long. Hannah 
says, ‘The bank was open just two weeks ago on Saturday. Mind you, it is very 
important that you deposit your cheque by Saturday, and banks do change their hours. 
I can’t say I know that the bank will be open tomorrow. It’d be a good idea to deposit 
your cheque now’.  
 
In both cases, Hannah is a Sender to her Receiver, her sister Sarah; in both cases, Hannah 
adjudicates the proposition p that the bank will be open on Saturday; and, in both cases, her 
Present Evidence consists of her memory of the bank being open two weeks before on a 
Saturday. Still, she plausibly takes herself as knowing that p, in the first case, and plausibly does 
not take herself as knowing in the second. Yet we know nothing about Hannah’s practical 
interests. This seems to show that Hannah’s Epistemic Standard in relation to p is determined 
by her sense of the cost of a false positive for Sarah, which is much higher in the second case 
than it is in the first. 
 
Case 6-1 features a first-person knowledge attribution, and Case 6-2, a first-person knowledge 
denial. Even so, the Basic Method under the AAT may be employed in cases that feature 
second-person or third-person knowledge attributions or denials. Here are examples that are 
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modifications of Case 2-3 and Case 2-4—which cases I used in §2.3 to support Subject Sensitive 
Invariantism. 
 
Case 6-3: Low Stakes  
Frank knows that his brother Herman wants to get a sense of the American 
political scene just so that he can better understand and enjoy political newscasts. 
Herman tells Frank that he has learned from a newspaper article that Clinton is a 
Democrat. Frank replies, ‘Good, you know that Clinton is a Democrat’. 
 
Case 6-4: High Stakes 
Frank’s brother Herman is a Democratic Party strategist. Frank knows that 
Herman is worried that Hillary Clinton quietly switched party affiliations, from the 
Democratic Party to the Republican Party. Frank knows that this would be very bad 
news for Herman. Herman tells Frank that he has learned from a newspaper article that 
Clinton is a Democrat. Frank replies, ‘No, you do not know that Clinton is a Democrat on 
the basis of that article’. 
 
Frank plausibly intuits knowing that his brother Herman knows in the low stakes case, and 
plausibly does not intuit knowing that Herman knows in the high stakes case. Yet we know 
nothing about Frank’s practical interests. This seems to show that Frank’s Epistemic Standard is 
determined by his sense of the cost of a false positive for Herman, which is higher in the high 
stakes case than it is in the low stakes case. 
 
 
6.2.1 An Aside on Subject Sensitive Invariantism and Contextualism 
 
Case 6-3 and Case 6-4 support Subject Sensitive Invariantism (the view that the truth conditions 
for knowledge attributions depend on the practical interests of the subjects of those 
attributions). Frank’s knowledge attribution in the low stakes case, and his knowledge denial in 
the high stakes case, depend on the subject’s practical interests. Clearly, a wide range of cases 
that feature (a) second-person or third-person attributions or denials, and (b) the employment 
of the Basic Method under the AAT—would be consistent with SSI. These are, in particular, 
cases in which the attributor assesses the Risk/Reward Quotient in relation to the practical 
interests of the subject of her second-person or third-person knowledge attribution or denial. 
On the other hand, these cases are clearly not consistent with Contextualism (the view that the 
truth conditions for knowledge attributions depend on the attributor’s practical interests). 
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As I suggested earlier (in §2.3), cases that feature first-person attributions or denials under 
egoistic assessments of the practical circumstances support both SSI and Contextualism. As an 
egoistic assessment, the attributor’s Epistemic Standard is determined by her own practical 
interests. However, the attributor and the subject of those attributions or denials are one and 
the same. So, it is also true that Epistemic Standards in these cases are determined by the 
subject’s practical interests; and cases that feature first-person attributions or denials and the 
employment of the Basic Method under egoistic assessments (i.e., not under AAT) support both 
SSI and Contextualism.  
 
Also, I suggested earlier (again in §2.3) that cases that feature second-person or third-person 
attributions or denials under egoistic assessments of the practical circumstances support 
Contextualism. The attributor’s egoistic assessments make her adjudications dependent on her 
own practical interests. So, cases that feature second-person or third-person attributions or 
denials and the employment of the Basic Method under egoist assessments support 
Contextualism.  
 
This situation suggests that both Subject Sensitive Invariantism and Contextualism are correct 
within the boundaries that I have suggested here; and that they are complementary in the 
sense that they make correct predictions in relation to different cases. However, they both 
overgeneralize by suggesting universal applicability of a theory that in fact applies to only a 
subset of cases. 
 
 
6.2.2 An Aside on the Receiver’s Point of View 
 
I have examined the production of Knowledge Intuitions and the use of ‘know’ in 
communications cases from the point of view of the Sender. These cases may also be 
investigated from the point of view of the Receiver. In fact, many epistemologists focus on the 
latter, the Receiver’s point of view. Case 6-5 below exemplifies cases of the kind that these 
epistemologists are interested in.  
 
Case 6-5 
Jonah is in London to attend an important meeting. He is on his way to the 
meeting, which starts very soon. So, he is in a great hurry to find the nearest tube 
station. He remembers that his colleague, Hayley, lives in the neighbourhood in which 
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he is presently situated and uses the tube to get to work. Jonah says to himself, ‘Hayley 
will know how to get to the nearest station. I’ll call her’. Jonah calls Hayley, and she tells 
him that he should turn left on Wellesley Road. Jonah thanks Hayley and says, ‘I knew 
you would know’.  
 
Jonah has set an Epistemic Standard for (a) Hayley knowing where the nearest station is, and 
for (b) himself knowing where it is. This Epistemic Standard seems to be determined by his own 
practical interests. Typically, in these cases, the Receiver’s Epistemic Standard seems to be 
determined by their own practical interests.54  
 
So, these cases feature the Receiver’s Egoistic Knowledge Intuitions; and I addressed cases of 
this kind in the previous chapter. However, certain investigations by others into such 
communication cases from the Receiver’s point of view suggest that a fundamental function of 
‘know’ is revealed in just such cases. So, their findings compete with my F1 (and F2, which is a 
special case of F1). So, let us look briefly at some of this literature. 
 
Edward Craig refers to Receivers as ‘inquirers’, and suggests that the function of ‘know’ follows 
from their need to flag reliable sources of information (1999).55 So, in Case 6-5, Jonah is an 
inquirer who uses ‘know’ to flag Hayley as a reliable source of information. Jonah says, ‘Hayley 
will know where the nearest station is’.  
 
Steven Reynolds suggests that the function of ‘know’ follows from Receivers having an interest 
in rewarding Senders. They do so for the purpose of getting Senders to communicate messages 
that are more reliable: 
 
the aim of improving testimony explains why we have and use our concept of 
knowledge. If we were to introduce a term of praise for testimony, using it at first to 
praise testimony that apparently helped us in our practical projects, it would come to 
be used as we now use the word ‘know’. (2002, p.139) 
 
                                                          
54 Even so, Receivers may, in some cases, intend or envisage resending the messages they receive for the 
purpose of helping others. Such Receivers adjudicate the messages they receive as a Sender to third-
party Receivers. I look at cases of this kind in §6.4.4.  
55 See §3.5 for a general discussion of Craig’s book. 
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John Greco has a somewhat similar view. He suggests that the function of ‘know’ follows from 
Receivers intending to ‘give the person [i.e., the Sender] credit for getting things right [for 
coming to true belief] . . . due to his own abilities, efforts and actions’ (2003, p.111).  
 
Let us compare. Craig’s suggestion about the function of ‘know’ relates to the process by which 
Receivers flag reliable sources of information. Reynolds’ and Greco’s suggestions about the 
function of ‘know’ seem to relate largely to ensuring that the reputations of good Senders are 
promoted, and that their good work is acknowledged and rewarded. I suggest that these 
hypotheses about the function of ‘know’, if they are correct, are secondary or ancillary to the 
fundamental function of Knowledge Intuitions that my theory postulates: An individual’s 
Egoistic Knowledge Intuitions identify Advanced Propositions that will be a good basis upon 
which she may navigate the world; and an individual’s Altruistic Knowledge Intuitions identify 
Advanced Propositions that will be a good basis upon which others may navigate the world. The 
process of navigating the world (or helping others to do so) sometimes involves Craig’s 
suggested flagging of reliable sources of information. However, as we have seen, it often 
involves very much more, e.g., flagging propositions about the existence of non-perceptible 
world conditions as ones which may be taken as being true. Further, Reynolds’ and Greco’s 
suggested praise-giving or credit-giving may be viewed as helping Receivers establish the 
circumstances under which it is plausible that the Altruistic Assessment Thesis will ceteris 
paribus be applicable, and Senders will be inclined to help Receivers. The praise-giving or credit-
giving help produce rewards for Altruism. (Recall circumstance (3) under which the AAT is 
plausibly applicable: The individual with whom one is intending or envisaging communicating is 
a ‘co-operator’ and others in the community will learn about the communication producing 
reputational rewards for the altruist.) So, while ‘know’ may sometimes be used to praise or give 
credit to Senders, this is ancillary to the larger function of identifying Advanced Propositions 
that will be helpful to Receivers.  
 
 
6.3 The Adding Evidence Thesis Holds for Senders 
 
I have said that Senders set Epistemic Standards using the Basic Method under the AAT, i.e., 
they assess the cost of false positives and the benefit of true positives in relation to their 
Receivers’ practical interests. I now add that the Adding Evidence Thesis may apply to Senders. 
That is, Senders assess whether the conditions contained in the Adding Evidence Thesis have 
been met; and if they have, their Knowledge Intuitions may be suspended, even if their Present 
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Evidence meets the Epistemic Standard indicated by the Basic Method under the AAT. In 
particular, their Knowledge Intuitions will be suspended if (a) they believe that reducing false 
positive risk for their Receivers by gathering additional evidence is a practical possibility, and (b) 
they value the benefit for their Receivers of such a reduction in risk more than they value the 
cost of gathering the additional evidence (e.g., saving energy and resources). Here is an 
example. 
 
Case 6-6 
Sarah is driving her colleague Hannah home on a Friday afternoon. Sarah asks 
Hannah if she would mind if they stopped at the bank on the way so that she can 
deposit her paycheque. Sarah explains that while it is not terribly important that she do 
so as she has no impending bills, it would nonetheless be efficient. Coincidentally, 
Hannah also uses the same bank and knows that they will not have to go far out of their 
way to get there. She tells Sarah that she does not at all mind stopping.  
As they drive past the bank, they notice that the lines inside are very long. 
Realizing that it isn’t very important to Sarah that her paycheque be deposited right 
away, Hannah says, ‘I know the bank will be open tomorrow, since I was there just two 
weeks ago on Saturday. I truly do not mind waiting now. However, you might prefer 
coming back and depositing your paycheque tomorrow’. 
Suddenly, Hannah realizes that the bank app on her smartphone would indicate 
the bank’s operating hours instantly. She reminds herself that banks do change their 
hours. Hannah then says, ‘Just to make sure that the bank’s open, I’ll check a bank app 
that I have on my phone. It’ll just take a second’. She checks and finds that the bank is 
indeed scheduled to be open tomorrow. Hannah feels reassured. 
 
Just as in Case 6-1, it seems plausible and natural that Hannah would initially take herself as 
knowing that the bank will be open on Saturday, given that it was open just two weeks before 
on a Saturday. Moreover, it seems that her Epistemic Standard in that moment tracks a 
Risk/Reward Quotient based on Sarah’s practical situation, i.e., the AAT applies to Hannah’s 
assessment of the Risk/Reward Quotient. However, a moment later, it seems that Hannah has 
determined that the benefit of reducing false positive risk for Sarah by checking her bank app 
outweighs the very small cost of doing so; and, consistent with the Adding Evidence Thesis, her 
Knowledge Intuitions are suspended while she checks her app. So, while Hannah is checking her 
app, her Epistemic Standard is raised so that her Present Evidence is not strong enough to meet 
it; and the suspension of her Knowledge Intuition is indicated by her reminding herself that 
banks change their hours. 
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* 
 
Senders may find themselves in the position of being able to gather additional evidence and 
reducing false positive risk for their Receivers, while having their Receivers incur the cost of 
gathering that evidence. In these cases, Senders, as Altruists, take the cost of gathering 
evidence, which is incurred by their Receivers, into account when they assess whether it is 
worthwhile gathering the evidence. So, in these cases, the suspension of Senders’ Knowledge 
Intuitions (under the Adding Evidence Thesis) depends on valuations of the benefit to the 
Receiver of reducing false positive risk, and on the cost incurred by the Receiver gathering 
additional evidence. The pair of cases that follow, taken together, demonstrate this principle.  
 
Case 6-7  
Jonah, a physician, has just received the results of tests he ran on his patient Peter 
and feels he now has more than enough evidence to diagnose condition C. In fact, Peter 
presents as a textbook case of C. The preferred treatment for C is highly effective, and 
produces only mild side effects. He will meet with Peter tomorrow to inform him. 
Later that day Jonah learns of a test for C that has just become available for use, 
and that has very high predictive validity. Peter would have to pay only a very small fee 
for the test and Jonah could easily administer it in his office. Jonah feels that he would 
be happy to have the diagnosis confirmed, because he would prefer that Peter not have 
to incur unpleasant side effects (though they are mild) without obtaining any benefit. 
He lets Peter know that he would like to administer the additional test before settling 
on a treatment plan.  
 
Case 6-8 
Jonah, a physician, has just received the results of tests he ran on his patient Peter 
and feels he now has more than enough evidence to diagnose condition C. In fact, Peter 
presents as a textbook case of C. The preferred treatment for C is highly effective, and 
produces only mild side effects. He will meet with Peter tomorrow to inform him. 
Later that day Jonah learns of a test for C that has just become available for use, 
and that has very high predictive validity. Unfortunately, it would take Peter a full day 
to get to the closest medical facility that could administer the test. Jonah knows that 
this would be very hard on Peter. Jonah reminds himself that he already has more than 
enough evidence to diagnose for C, and he is sure that the new test would only confirm 
his diagnosis. Jonah tells himself that he knows that Peter has C. Jonah does not 
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consider the matter further, and plans to meet with Peter tomorrow to talk about his 
diagnosis. 
 
In both cases, Jonah considers the proposition p that Peter has condition C; and Jonah’s Present 
Evidence is constituted by tests that he has already administered. We assume, in both cases, 
that Jonah’s Epistemic Standard for p tracks his assessment of the Risk/Reward Quotient under 
the AAT, i.e., Jonah’s assessment of the cost of a false positive and the benefit of a true positive 
is based on the seriousness of condition C for Peter, Peter’s prognosis, and the efficacy of the 
recommended treatment.  
 
In Case 6-7, Jonah’s Present Evidence initially meets his Epistemic Standard; and, initially, he 
takes himself as knowing that Peter has C. However, later in the day, these Knowledge 
Intuitions are suspended when he learns about a new test and assesses that it would be 
worthwhile to administer it—the cost of which, for Peter, would be very small. Jonah also learns 
of a new test in the second case. However, there, the cost of administering the test for Peter 
would be high, Jonah does not find it worthwhile to have Peter take it, and Jonah’s initial 
Knowledge Intuitions are not suspended. So, it seems as if the suspension of Senders’ 
Knowledge Intuitions under the Adding Evidence Thesis can depend on Senders’ valuations of 
the cost that Receivers incur gathering additional evidence.56  
 
 
6.4 Communicating with Multiple Receivers 
 
Let us look at cases in which a Sender intends or envisages communicating the same message 
to a number of Receivers. To start, we focus on cases in which the Sender assumes that the 
relevant practical circumstances of her multiple Receivers are similar, or in which the message 
may produce some minimum benefit for all. This is the state of affairs, for example, for a social 
worker who is about to advise a group of inmates prior to their release from prison to dress 
neatly and conservatively for job interviews; and it is the state of affairs for a lawyer who is 
about to explain to a group of CEOs of major corporations that a new federal regulation applies 
to their companies. 
                                                          
56 This difference in Jonah’s response in the second case is broadly consistent with the finding that the 
“display of cost information [for laboratory tests] . . . can lead to a modest reduction in ordering of 
laboratory tests” (Horn et al., 2014, p.708). However, the costs to which Horn’s study refer are actually 
born by the American government’s Medicaid program. Even so, it seems likely that the effects of cost 
information would be at least as great if they were born by the patient. 
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I suggest that, regardless of the number of Receivers for a given communication, Senders’ 
Epistemic Standards are set using the Basic Method under the Adding Evidence Thesis. In 
§6.4.1, look at how the Basic Method is employed, and what it predicts about the effect that 
increasing the number of Receivers has on Epistemic Standards. Then, in §6.4.2, I look at what 
the Adding Evidence Thesis predicts about the effect that increasing the number of Receivers 
has on Epistemic Standards. 
 
 
6.4.1 The Basic Method with Multiple Receivers 
 
Senders may employ the Basic Method by first getting a sense of the Risk/Reward Quotient for 
their group of Receivers (which, in these cases, is a practical possibility because Senders assume 
that the relevant practical circumstances of their multiple Receivers are similar, or that their 
messages may produce some minimum benefit for all). For example, the Risk/Reward Quotient 
may be low for the social worker suggesting to the inmates that they would do well to dress 
neatly and conservatively for job interviews. The cost of a false positive is low, i.e., the cost to 
the inmates of dressing neatly and conservatively for job interviews, when doing so would in 
fact not be helpful, is low; while the benefit of a true positive may well be very high, i.e., 
dressing that way may significantly improve their chances of landing a job. The social worker 
may then associate the low Risk/Reward Quotient with a low Epistemic Standard: She may not 
require particularly strong Present Evidence in order to take herself as knowing that neat and 
conservative clothing will help. On the other hand, the Risk/Reward Quotient may be very high 
for the corporate lawyer telling the CEOs that a new federal regulation applies to their 
companies. The cost of a false positive for the CEOs may be high, i.e., the cost of unnecessary 
compliance may be high; while the benefit of a true positive, from the CEOs’ perspective, may 
well be very low, or even so low as to be inappreciable, i.e., they will not be at all rewarded, 
honoured or congratulated for complying with a new federal regulation. The lawyer may then 
associate the high Risk/Reward Quotient with a high Epistemic Standard: She may require 
strong Present Evidence in order to take herself as knowing that the new regulation applies to 
the CEOs’ companies.57 
                                                          
57 This is a case in which a significant cost of a false negative could arise: If the CEOs failed to take 
themselves as knowing that the new regulation applies, and failed to comply with the regulation, when in 
fact it does apply, then, if they get caught, their companies would be subject to federal fines. However, 
recall (from §4.2.2) that I would aim to simplify my investigation by setting aside false negative and true 
negatives. To simplify the analysis of the CEO case, let us assume that the fines would be very small 
relatively to corporate incomes, and that the CEOs believe that the likelihood of getting caught is low. So, 
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Further, the Basic Method seems to predict that under certain circumstances the Epistemic 
Standard that Senders set depends on the number of Receivers to whom they intend or 
envisage sending a message. (I set aside consideration of the Adding Evidence Thesis for the 
moment.) Consider, for example, the situation that the corporate lawyer faces as a Sender. As 
the number of Receiver-CEO’s increases, the lawyer senses that the total cost of a false positive 
incurred by the multiple CEOs increases, whereas the total inappreciable benefit of a true 
positive gained by the multiple CEOs remains inappreciable. So, as the number of Receiver-
CEO’s increases, the Risk/Reward Quotient and the lawyer’s Epistemic Standard are predicted 
to increase. Here, the Sender’s Epistemic Standards positively correlate with the number of 
Receivers. (However, if one has assumed that the lawyer’s Epistemic Standard was very high to 
begin with, it might be difficult to appreciate the increase.) The opposite effect is predicted 
when Senders get the sense that the cost of a false positive for Receivers is so low that it is 
inappreciable, whereas the benefit of a true positive for Receivers is appreciable: All other 
things being equal, Senders’ Epistemic Standards are here predicted to negatively correlate with 
the number of Receivers. (These valuations need not correlate in a linear way with the number 
of Receivers. It may well be that we are, in general, increasingly insensitive to a given increase 
in the number of Receivers.) 
 
Even so, the Basic Method predicts that in cases in which the Sender has a sense that both the 
benefit of a true positive and the cost of a false positive for Receivers are appreciable, Senders’ 
Epistemic Standards are not affected by the number of Receivers. All other things being equal, 
as the number of Receivers multiplies, Senders may get the sense that the cost of a false 
positive, and the benefit of a true positive, for a typical Receiver, are both being multiplied by 
the same number, i.e., the number of Receivers. So, Senders may get the sense that the ratio 
expressed by the Risk/Reward Quotient remains unchanged, producing no change in pressure 
on Epistemic Standards. Let us look at an example. 
 
A municipal official has received a report from the national weather service that a raging storm 
front has turned sharply and is moving directly toward her municipality. It is scheduled to land 
in approximately 12 hours. In the moment, the official will determine whether or not she takes 
herself as knowing the proposition p that an evacuation order is warranted. Moreover, in that 
                                                          
the expected cost of a false negative is inappreciably low. Even so, we are left with the question as to 
what would motivate the CEOs to comply with the new law if they took themselves as knowing that it 
applies. To answer, let us say that some of the CEOs would comply with the law out of principle, while 
others would comply because their employment contracts require them to do so.   
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moment, she is mindful that if she issues the evacuation order and the storm does not hit, then 
those residents who evacuated will have been greatly and unnecessarily inconvenienced, i.e., 
that the cost of a false positive for the townsfolk is significant. She is also mindful that if she 
does issue the order and the storm hits, then those residents who evacuated will have avoided 
three or four days of impassable roadways, possible power outages, and freezing temperatures, 
i.e., the benefit of a true positive for the townsfolk is also significant. Further, the total cost of a 
false positive produced for the entire community will be the product of the cost of a false 
positive for a typical resident multiplied by the number of effected residents; and the total 
benefit of a true positive produced for the entire community will be the product of the benefit 
of a true positive for a typical resident again multiplied by the number of effected residents. So, 
the official may be mindful that the costs or benefits may be multiplied thousands of times 
over. However, the ratio of the total cost of a false positive for the townsfolk to the total 
benefit of a true positive does not depend on the number of residents. The ratio would be the 
same whether there are 50 or 50,000 residents—because both the numerator and denominator 
of the ratio are multiplied by the number. So, the Basic Method predicts that the official’s 
Epistemic Standard in relation to p would not depend on the population of her community. The 
Basic Method explains that for the official, all other things being equal, the ratio expressed by 
the Risk/Reward Quotient remains unchanged as the number of townsfolk increases; and, as a 
result, her Epistemic Standard in relation to p does not change. This prediction seems to be 
correct. 
 
In summary, the Basic Method seems to correctly predict that the Epistemic Standard that 
Senders set depends on the number of Receivers to whom they intend or envisage sending a 
message if and only if either (1) the cost of a false positive for Receivers is appreciable, whereas 
the benefit of a true positive for them is so low that it is inappreciable, or (2) the cost of a false 
positive for Receivers is so low that it is inappreciable, whereas the benefit of a true positive for 
them is appreciable. Moreover, under (1), Epistemic Standards are positively correlated with 
the number of Receivers; while under (2), they are negatively correlated. 
 
 
6.4.2 The Adding Evidence Thesis with Multiple Receivers 
 
Recall that under the Adding Evidence Thesis, a Sender’s Knowledge Intuition may be 
suspended if she assesses that (a) the benefit for her intended or envisaged Receiver(s) of 
reducing false positive risk (by gathering additional evidence), outweighs (b) the cost of 
gathering the additional evidence. The importance of the Adding Evidence Thesis is multiplied 
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when there are multiple receivers because (a) the total benefit produced for these Receivers 
(by reducing false positive risk) multiplies as their numbers multiply, whereas (b) the cost of 
gathering additional evidence is not affected by Receiver numbers. Senders may gather 
additional evidence just once, and then leverage that evidence many times over when they 
provide well supported messages to their many Receivers. Thus, the greater the number of 
Receivers, the greater is the prospect that (a) the total benefit of reducing false positive risk, 
will outweigh (b) the cost of gathering additional evidence—provided that the cost of a false 
positive for a typical Receiver is not inappreciable low. So, the greater the number of Receivers, 
the greater is the prospect that Senders’ Knowledge Intuitions will be suspended while they 
gather additional evidence, again provided that the cost of a false positive for a typical Receiver 
is not inappreciable low. Thus, increasing the number of Receivers tends to put upward 
pressure on Senders’ effective Epistemic Standards.58 
  
Further, the effect of increasing Receiver numbers on the total benefit of reducing false positive 
risk depends on how high the cost of a false positive is for a typical Receiver. For example, in 
the corporate lawyer case in which the cost of a false positive for a typical Receiver is high, 
increasing Receiver numbers would greatly increase the total benefit of reducing false positive 
risk. With high Receiver numbers, the corporate lawyer may find it to be worthwhile to gather 
additional evidence even if the cost of doing so is very high. However, even if the cost of a false 
positive for a typical Receiver is relatively low, increasing Receiver numbers sufficiently could 
make it worthwhile to gather additional evidence and lead to Senders’ Knowledge Intuitions 
being suspended while additional evidence is gathered. Consider the situation in the social 
worker case. Recall, she communicates the proposition p that the inmates would do well to 
dress neatly and conservatively for job interviews. However, say that there is some small cost of 
a false positive for a typical inmate, a small cost for them behaving as if p when p is false. 
Dressing neatly and conservatively for job interviews would require such an inmate to buy 
clothes on a tight budget and make them feel a little awkward having to dress in a way they are 
not used to. The Adding Evidence Thesis suggests that the number of Receivers could increase 
to the point that the social worker’s valuation of the total benefit or reducing false positive risk 
for the many inmates would outweigh her valuation of the cost she would incur gathering 
                                                          
58 Notice that the positive correlation (between the number of Receiver and Epistemic Standards) which 
is predicted by the Adding Evidence Thesis cannot be mitigated by a negative correlation predicted by the 
Basic Method in multiple-Receiver cases. The former positive correlation only applies to cases in which 
the cost of a false positive for Receivers is not inappreciably low, whereas the latter negative correlation 
predicted by the Basic Method only applies to cases in which the cost of a false positive is inappreciably 
low (and the benefit of true positive for Receivers is appreciable). 
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additional evidence. If this occurred, then her Knowledge Intuitions would be suspended and 
her Epistemic Standard would effectively increase while she gathered that additional evidence.  
 
This state of affairs prompts three ceteris paribus predictions. First, as Receiver numbers 
increase, it becomes increasingly likely that Senders’ Knowledge Intuitions will be suspended 
under the Adding Evidence Thesis. The second prediction follows from considering the 
circumstances under which it would not be worthwhile gathering additional evidence. A Sender 
may find that in a particular context it is not worthwhile to gather additional evidence because 
either (a) the improvement that the additional evidence is anticipated to produce in the 
predictive validity of the total Present Evidence is too low, or (b) the cost of gathering the 
evidence is too high. Even so, if the number of Receivers increased sufficiently (producing a 
corresponding increase in the total benefit of reducing false positive risk for Receivers), then it 
may well be worthwhile to gather that same additional evidence. The second prediction comes 
into sight: As Receiver numbers increase, (i) the minimum improvement in predictive validity of 
the total Present Evidence required in order to make it worthwhile to gather additional 
evidence decreases, and (ii) the maximum cost that it is worthwhile incurring to gather 
additional evidence increases. Third, as Receiver numbers increase, increasingly unlikely 
alternative hypotheses may become relevant and needing to be ruled out in order for the 
Sender to take herself as knowing.  
 
 
6.4.3 Alfred Hitchcock’s Rear Window 
 
We have looked at the effect of increasing Receiver numbers on Epistemic Standards which are 
suggested by the Basic Method and by the Adding Evidence Thesis. Let us now look at the 
picture that emerges when these effects are combined.  
 
We found that the Basic Method predicts a positive correlation between Epistemic Standards 
and Receiver numbers when the cost of a false positive is appreciable and the benefit of a true 
positive is inappreciable; and we found that the Adding Evidence Thesis predicts a positive 
correlation between Epistemic Standards and Receiver numbers when the cost of a false 
positive is appreciable, regardless of whether the benefit of a true positive is inappreciable. 
Together, these predictions suggest the following: 
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Multiple Receivers Prediction: Senders’ Epistemic Standards correlate positively with 
Receiver numbers—except when there is no 
appreciable false positive risk for Receivers.59 
 
If the Multiple Receivers Prediction is true, then it would seem that the potential could be 
created for rather strange epistemic conflicts and tensions. Senders may intuit knowing that p 
in the moment that they intend or envisage communicating to only a few Receivers, and find 
too that their Knowledge Intuitions are suspended in the moment that they intend or envisage 
communicating with many Receivers—even though the strength of their Present Evidence 
remains unchanged. It seems that this is the nature of the central dramatic tension in Alfred 
Hitchcock’s movie Rear Window.  
 
The movie’s protagonist, Jeff, is laid up at home due to a serious injury. He spends his days in a 
wheelchair, in front of a window overlooking a courtyard and an apartment building. He 
sometimes has company. He is visited regularly by a personal care nurse and his girlfriend. Even 
so, he is alone enough that he has taken to spying on a neighbour who lives in an opposite 
apartment. After a number of days of this, his observations lead him to consider the proposition 
p that his neighbour has killed and dismembered his wife.  
 
Over the course of the movie, Jeff continuously gathers evidence for p. At early stages, his 
Present Evidence appears to be strong enough to report the matter to people who are close to 
him, but not strong enough to report the matter to the police. I suggest that calling the police 
constitutes, for Jeff, a communication to a large number of Receivers. It is, in effect, a call to 
many members of the police force, members of the judiciary, and, in a sense, a call to the 
broader community. 
 
There are three discernible stages in the movie that correspond to three levels of strength of 
Jeff’s Present Evidence. In the first stage, the strength of that evidence is such that he is 
comfortable asserting that p to his nurse and his girlfriend, but only to them. Here, he explains 
the situation to his girlfriend,  
                                                          
59 There is a second general prediction that follows from combining these effects, which I do not focus on. 
We found that the Basic Method predicts a negative correlation between Epistemic Standards and 
Receiver numbers when the cost of a false positive is inappreciably low and the benefit of a true positive 
is appreciable; and found that the Adding Evidence Thesis does not predict that Epistemic Standards 
would be effected by Receiver numbers when the cost of a false positive is inappreciably low. So, the 
Adding Evidence Thesis does not predict either a mitigation or an amplification of the effect of Receiver 
numbers on Epistemic Standards predicted by the Basic Method in these cases. 
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“Why would a man leave his apartment three times on a rainy night with a suitcase, and 
come back three times? . . . Why didn’t he go to work today? . . . What’s interesting 
about a butcher knife and a small saw wrapped in newspaper? . . . Why hasn’t he been 
in his wife’s bedroom all day? . . . There’s something terribly wrong . . . That’d be a 
terrible job to tackle. Just how would you start to cut up a human body?”. (Hitchcock, 
1954, 37:00 - 39:00 minutes)  
 
In this scene, Jeff does not appear to have any doubt at all that p. So, at this stage, Jeff seems to 
have the sense that his Present Evidence is strong enough to meet an Epistemic Standard that is 
appropriate for providing testimony to his nurse and girlfriend, but not strong enough to meet 
an Epistemic Standard that is appropriate for providing testimony to the police. 
 
The second stage is reached after Jeff sees the neighbour handling a large trunk secured with 
rope. With this evidence, Jeff is comfortable providing testimony that expresses p, not only to 
his nurse and girlfriend, but also to his friend, Tom, a police detective. He calls him on the 
phone, and says, indignantly, ‘It is probably nothing important at all, just a little neighbourhood 
murder. That’s all’ (42:00 minutes). The nurse overhears Jeff’s phone conversation with Tom 
and asks ‘You called the police?’ Jeff replies, ‘It wasn't an official call. He's just a friend’ (48:00 
minutes). Jeff later insists that Tom investigate without reporting the matter to police officials. 
Tom reassures Jeff: ‘I won’t report this to the department . . . No sense in you getting a lot of 
ridiculous publicity’ (52:40 minutes).  
 
Finally, in the third stage, Jeff has gathered enough additional evidence to be comfortable 
making an official call to the police. 
 
So, the movie seems to support the Multiple Receivers Prediction, i.e., Jeff’s Epistemic 
Standards seem to correlate positively with the number of Receivers that he intends or 
envisages communicating with. Moreover, much of the dramatic tension in the movie is created 
by the discordance between, on one hand, Jeff taking himself as knowing that the grisly murder 
has taken place when he is talking to his close confidants; and on the other, him finding that his 
Present Evidence is not strong enough that he can call the police. Near the end of the movie, 
this tension is released when Jeff finally has enough evidence to call the police. 
 
 
6.4.4 Broadcasts 
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Let us look at cases in which a Sender intends or envisages passing a message to a very large 
number of Receivers—hundreds, thousands or even millions. Messages may be passed orally or 
by the written word, may spread well beyond the community, and may be picked up in the 
distant future. I call such Senders, ‘Broadcasters’, and call their intended or envisaged 
communications ‘Broadcasts’.  
 
Published philosophers are Broadcasters, i.e., they intend or envisage passing messages to 
hundreds or thousands of Receivers. Consider Descartes: In a dedicatory letter to the Sorbonne 
for his Meditations on First Philosophy he explains that the intended audience for his book 
includes all those who do not have faith that the  
 
soul does not die with the body, and that God exists . . . [and one does well to direct 
such a book to these people because, for them, there is] practically no moral virtue, 
that they can be persuaded to adopt until these truths [about the soul and God] are 
proved to them by natural reason. (1996, p.3) 
 
Descartes also intended that his Meditations serve as a stable foundation for science:  
 
I realized that it was necessary . . . to demolish everything completely and start again 
right from the foundations if I wanted to establish anything at all in the sciences that 
was stable and likely to last. (p.12) 
 
Like other Senders, Broadcasters are Altruistic. So, I suggest that the Altruistic Assessment 
Thesis is applicable in Broadcast cases. That is, Broadcasters’ adjudications of the propositions 
they communicate are based on their assessments of the benefit of true positives and the cost 
of false positives in relation to the practical interests of their Receivers. Even so, the biological 
research would seem to allow that this claim is plausible only in relation to Broadcasts that are 
made under one (or more) of the four circumstances I described earlier (in §6.2 and Appendix 3). 
Recall the four circumstances. 
 
(1) The individual intends or envisages communicating with closely-related kin—or a 
more distantly related individual, if the cost of preparing and sending a helpful 
communication is a small fraction of the latter individual’s expected benefit (see 
§A.3.1 in Appendix 3). 
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(2) The individual intends or envisages communicating with someone with whom she 
has an ongoing relationship that involves reciprocal interactions, e.g., one is an 
employee, and the other her employer (assuming that the employee’s work in fact 
benefits the employer and the employer regularly reciprocates by paying the 
employee’s wages) (see §A.3.2). 
 
(3) The individual with whom one is intending or envisaging communicating is a ‘co-
operator’ (i.e., someone who has a good record of reciprocating and helping 
others), and others in the community will learn about the communication 
producing reputational rewards for the altruist (see §A.3.3). 
 
(4) The individual has a co-operative character or personality, and it is strong enough 
to compel her to provide the level of co-operation called for in the circumstances 
(see §A.3.4). 
 
It seems that Broadcasts would only rarely be made under either of the first two of these 
circumstances, while they may very frequently be made under the third or fourth. Regarding 
circumstance (1), it seems that, in most Broadcast cases, most Receivers would not be closely-
related to the Broadcaster. Regarding circumstance (2), it is simply not a practical possibility for 
Broadcasters to have ongoing dyadic relations with significant numbers of the very large 
audience for their Broadcasts. However, regarding circumstance (3), it seems that prospective 
Broadcasters generally envisage that others in the community will learn that they have sent a 
helpful message to co-operators; and, regarding circumstance (4), it may well be that the 
character or personality of many or most prospective Broadcasters is co-operative enough that 
they feel compelled to incur the cost associated with Broadcasting certain messages regardless 
of the self-oriented benefits that follow. So, it does seem that the biological research would 
allow that it is plausible that the Altruistic Assessment Thesis is applicable in Broadcast cases. 
 
* 
 
The Multiple Receivers Prediction calls for a positive correlation between Senders’ Epistemic 
Standards and Receiver numbers—except when the cost of a false positive is inappreciably low; 
and recall that much of this correlation has to do with the suspension of Knowledge Intuitions 
under the Adding Evidence Thesis. If this is correct, then in Broadcasting cases (which feature 
extremely high numbers of Receivers) Broadcasters set very high Epistemic Standards, and find 
that their Knowledge Intuitions are very often suspended while they gather additional 
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evidence—except when the false positive risk for Receivers is inappreciably low. This prediction 
is supported by the general view in the sciences that scientific conclusions, though they may be 
reliable, are nonetheless tentative. Further, if this correct, then Broadcasters tend to find the 
following: 
 
(1) It is worthwhile gathering additional evidence that only modestly increases the 
predictive validity of their total Present Evidence. This prediction is supported 
when multiple researchers undertake independent studies to confirm a given 
hypothesis, which is common in most evidence-based disciplines. For example, at 
least nine different kinds of experiments have been performed to confirm the 
value of Avogadro’s Constant. 
 
(2) It is worthwhile incurring a high cost to gather additional evidence. This prediction 
is supported when researchers—including say historians, archaeologists or 
botanists—expend a great deal of time and energy, travel great distances, or risk 
life and limb gathering additional evidence. It is further supported by the existence 
of ‘big science’, such as the research that involves the Large Hadron Collider or one 
of the giant telescopes.  
 
I pointed out earlier (in §5.2) that the Adding Evidence Thesis suggests that the possibility of 
suspending Knowledge Intuitions arises in each instance in which we identify the practical 
possibility of gathering additional evidence; and further that a subject’s prospects for making 
those identifications depends entirely on her capacities, technologies, resources and strategies. 
So, it would seem that as our capacities and technologies improve, the two tendencies I 
outlined under (1) and (2) above would strengthen. This picture is particularly important in 
Broadcasting cases because of the multiplication of benefits that comes from sending well-
supported messages to large numbers of Receivers. 
 
* 
 
The fact that a given Broadcast messages may be sent to diverse Receivers whose practical 
circumstances may be very different, who live in different communities or in the distant future, 
or who have very different Worldviews, has implications for the kind of messages that 
Broadcasters do well to send. They should send messages that have a broad relevance, and that 
are of general importance. However, such messages may present a challenge for many 
Receivers, i.e., applying the general messages that they receive to their own particular 
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circumstances, or taking practical guidance from them. Some Receivers may not see the 
importance or relevance of such highly general messages. So, the generality of messages can 
constitute a significant barrier to producing benefits by Broadcasting.  
 
Even so, this lost opportunity to produce benefits may in large part be recovered. Local ordinary 
Senders may be able to help relatively small numbers of local Receivers derive practical benefits 
from these messages. Moreover, these local Senders may do so under any of the four 
circumstances I outlined above (i.e., helping kin, advancing dyadic reciprocation, burnishing the 
Sender’s reputation and exercising the Sender’s helpful or co-operative character). As a result, a 
division of labour may arise between Broadcasters and local Senders that has to do with passing 
helpful messages. Both kinds of Senders would play an important role in what may be viewed as 
an information economy. They both facilitate the distribution, not of the community’s physical 
wealth, but of its informational wealth; and that distribution would be controlled by the 
‘invisible hand’ of human Altruism. 
 
In this picture, Broadcasters provide helpful information to some number of local Senders as 
shown in Figure 6-1. These latter Senders may then use those Broadcast messages to fashion 
derivative messages that they send to local Receivers—which (to avoid confusion in this 
context) I call ‘End-Users’ (see Figure 6-1). These derivative messages are intended to be 
helpful, relevant and understandable to End-Users. (Further, local Senders may well base their 
local communications on the messages of several Broadcasters.)  
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Informational flows of this kind are prevalent in modern communities. A representative of the 
European Banking Authority (a Broadcaster) may depend on a large number of analysts, 
commentators and local authorities (local Senders) to assist them in putting their economic 
assessments to good use, and realizing the benefits that this information can produce. A public 
health researcher (a Broadcaster) may depend on a large number of dieticians (local Senders) to 
advise dietary managers in hospitals and schools. Generally, basic science depends on a wide 
network of local Senders to produce benefits for large numbers of End-Users. 
 
* 
 
The correlation between Broadcasters’ Epistemic Standards and their Receiver numbers, 
together with the potentially great diversity among the End-Users of their messages, would 
seem to strain or even break the connection between Broadcasters and the practical interests 
of any particular End-User. Broadcasters do not need to get a sense of the cost of a false 
positive, the benefit of a true positive, or the Risk/Reward Quotient for any particular End-User, 
but do need to do so for the group of End-Users.  
 
The picture that emerges here is that Broadcasters’ Epistemic Standards are (a) very high, and 
(b) do not accord with Epistemic Standard Variabilism, i.e., those standards are not affected by 
Broadcaster 
Figure 6-1: Schematic flow of information and reciprocity in an information economy 
Sender (local level) Sender (local level) 
End-User End-User End-User End-User 
Flow of information 
Flow of the rewards of Altruism 
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the interests of any particular End-User. The situation is consistent with the standard view of 
knowledge taken by First History theorists, i.e., Classic Invariantism. Moreover, I suggest that 
the reason that the present theory comes together with the First History view in this way is that 
First History theorists are, by and large, focused on Broadcasters’ Knowledge Intuitions. In the 
following chapter, I look at this more carefully and suggest that these theorists’ narrow focus on 
Broadcasters’ Knowledge Intuitions facilitates their being able to play an important role in an 
information economy.60 
 
Before moving on, I would remind us that we have found in this chapter that Classic 
Invariantism, Contextualism and Subject Sensitive Invariantism are all correct within their own 
boundaries, and that these boundaries do not, by and large, overlap. (There is a general class of 
exceptions in relation to overlap: Cases that involve first-person attributions or denials, and the 
employment of the Basic Method under egoist assessments, support both Contextualism and 
SSI). They all make correct predictions in relation to different kinds of cases; and so, in this 
sense, they are all complementary (outside of the exception I just described). However, again, 
they overgeneralize by suggesting universal applicability of a theory that in fact applies to only a 
subset of cases. 
 
  
                                                          
60 Edward Craig and I both purport to offer a naturalistic explanation for the appearance of high Epistemic 
Standards that do not accord with Epistemic Standard Variabilism. So, let us compare our conclusions.   
 
Recall, from my earlier discussion of his theory (in §3.5), his suggestion that it is normal that our view in 
relation to epistemic matters ‘will develop in the direction of objectivisation’ (1999, p.84). That is, 
practical pressures normally cause us to move away from consideration of ‘what any particular person 
wants at any particular time or place’ (p.84) and toward consideration of our own future needs (p.84) and 
the needs of others (p.88). Under objectivisation, the function of knowledge is to flag  
 
someone who is a good informant as to whether p whatever the particular circumstances of the 
inquirer, whatever rewards and penalties hang over him and whatever his attitude to them. That 
means someone with a very high degree of reliability. (p.91)  
 
Moreover, he suggests that the alternative to objectivisation, in which individuals focus on the pure ‘here 
and now for me as I am here and now’ (p.83) may not actually ever arise; or, if it arises, it will be short-
lived (p.84). So, Craig’s theory, in its final form, is focused on, or limited to, a post-objectivisation 
situation. 
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Chapter 7: Why Epistemology Bifurcated 
 
 
In Chapter 2, I suggested that the epistemological literature bifurcated over the last 100 years 
or so, and sketched two independent histories within epistemology that I called the First History 
(in §2.2) and the Second History (in §2.3). The theory of Knowledge Intuitions that I developed 
in Chapters 3, 4, 5 and 6 suggests an explanation of why the literature would have bifurcated in 
the way that it has. In the first section of this chapter, I present and defend that explanation. In 
the second section, I address the view suggested by many First History theorists that Second 
History theory is not of particular philosophical importance. If they are right, there would not be 
much point in worrying about this bifurcation: We ought to concern ourselves only with First 
History theory. 
 
 
7.1 Why the Literature Bifurcated in the Way That It Has 
 
To see how the theory of Knowledge Intuitions that I have laid out explains the bifurcation of 
the epistemological literature, one must first recognize that the epistemologists who contribute 
to the two histories are Broadcasters, i.e., Altruistic Senders to large numbers of diverse End-
Users. They intend to help or envisage helping both readers of philosophy journals and others 
who may potentially benefit, directly or indirectly, from good epistemology. Further, it would 
seem that epistemological messages could be helpful to End-Users in two general ways—one of 
which may be associated with the First History, and the other with the Second History. Let us 
look at these two ways to help.  
 
First, Broadcasters in epistemology could help large numbers of End-Users (indirectly) by 
helping Broadcasters in other fields achieve their aims of helping End-Users—particularly, those 
other Broadcasters who work in evidence-based disciplines like the sciences. Epistemologists 
who pursued such an aim would have a special role in the information economy of which they 
are a part. If my Figure 6-1 represented their information economy, then these epistemologists 
would hold a position that is on a higher level than that of the other Broadcasters represented 
in that figure. They would send messages that are primarily directed to those other 
Broadcasters. What sorts of messages would these be? 
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Earlier, (in §6.4.4) we found that, for Broadcasters, the key to producing valued benefits is to 
reduce false positive risk for End-Users. (However, we found that this generalization does not 
hold in cases in which the messages that are communicated are such that false positive risk for 
Receivers is inappreciably low.) The total potential harm associated with that risk is multiplied 
as the number of End-Users multiplies. This picture suggests that epistemologists could help 
other Broadcasters by sending messages that help them address this problem of false positive 
risk—which they may do by helping other Broadcasters identify propositions that are unlikely to 
prove false. I suggest that those epistemologists who send such messages are writing First 
History theory; and the general aim of helping other Broadcasters address the problem of false 
positive risk is what makes the First History a coherent research program within epistemology. 
 
I suggest that this last general aim explains the importance in First History literature of the view 
that having sufficient evidence is no less than a responsibility, obligation or duty. Recall W. K. 
Clifford’s extended metaphor about the ship-owner who sent out a ship filled with emigres 
(from §2.2): 
 
he thought that perhaps he ought to have her thoroughly overhauled and refitted, even 
though this should put him at great expense. Before the ship sailed, however, he 
succeeded in overcoming these melancholy reflections . . . [and decided that he] would 
put his trust in Providence, . . . [with the result that the ship] went down in mid-ocean 
and told no tales’ (1876, p.289). 
 
Clifford makes vivid the multiplication of harms that may follow from sending false messages to 
large numbers of End-Users. Recall too (from §2.2) the importance in First History literature of 
the deontological conception of justification, which suggests that the very meaning of the term 
‘epistemic justification’ should be rooted in this responsibility. Alvin Plantinga points out, 
‘[o]riginally and at bottom, epistemic justification is deontological justification’ (1993, p.14). 
Also recall (from §2.2) the suggestion in First History literature that we have a responsibility and 
duty to believe and to withhold belief in a way that accords with the evidence. William Alston 
explains that epistemic ‘principles will forbid beliefs formed in such a way as to be likely to be 
false and either permit or require beliefs formed in such a way as to be likely to be true’ 
(original italicization, 1988, pp.258-259). The primary motivation for such views is explained by 
the importance of reducing false positive risk for large numbers of End-Users. 
 
The second general way in which epistemological messages could be helpful to End-Users is by 
shedding light on a basic aspect of the human condition and of human nature, shedding light on 
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the circumstances under which we take ourselves as knowing or of not knowing that particular 
world conditions obtain under ordinary circumstances. As I suggested earlier (in §1.2.2), this 
would in turn shed light on the ordinary use of ‘know’, the ‘shiftiness’ of ‘know’, as Matthew 
Chrisman puts it (2012, pp.121-122). From a different perspective, epistemologists could 
analyse, describe and explain the appearance of variation in Epistemic Standards. Many 
epistemologists have availed themselves of this opportunity; and I suggest that those who have 
write Second History theory. It is this aim that makes the Second History a coherent research 
program within epistemology. I add that, unlike First History epistemologists, those who write 
Second History theory hold a position in that information economy of which they are a part that 
is on the same level as that of other Broadcasters. 
 
* 
 
Let us now look at these two research programs more carefully. In particular, let us recognize 
that the two research programs are radically different: They call for (1) different conceptions of 
knowledge, (2) different views on the evidential standard required for knowledge, (3) different 
analytical focuses and (4) for knowledge theory that has different criteria for success. Let us 
look at these in turn. 
 
 
1. Different conceptions of knowledge  
 
Achieving the First History aim of helping Broadcasters identify propositions that are unlikely to 
prove false is facilitated by holding the view that knowing does not tolerate the possibility of 
falsity. Epistemologists assume that propositions that are truly known cannot later prove false. 
(I do not mean to suggest that the primary First History aim is necessarily the only reason that 
epistemologists hold this view—though I suggest that it is a significant factor in their holding 
the view.) This conception of knowledge is reflected, for example, in Bertrand Russell’s 
suggestion that ‘what does not go beyond our own personal sensible acquaintance must be for 
us the most certain’ (1914, p.67). Russell suggests that Advanced Propositions are inherently 
susceptible to being proven false; and so, in general, knowledge claims in relation to Advanced 
Proposition should be made with an appropriate degree of caution. This view that knowledge 
does not tolerate falsity is also reflected in D. M. Armstrong’s suggestion that the pursuit of 
knowledge leads to an indefinite regress of reasons (1973, pp.152-154). Knowledge depends on 
having a reason, r, for taking ourselves as knowing that p; having a further reason, s, for taking 
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ourselves as knowing that r has the appropriate relation to that which makes p true; having a 
further reason, t, to ensure that s qualifies as a good reason; and so on, indefinitely.  
 
However, achieving the Second History aim of accounting for the ordinary use of ‘know’ forces 
epistemologists to address the fact that we sometimes take ourselves as knowing propositions 
that turn out to be false. Second History theorists, it would seem, would have to allow that 
propositions that are truly known can later prove false (though if they are, they would no longer 
be known). Indeed, many of these theorists make this allowance: They accommodate 
fallibilism—the view that it is possible to know without entailing evidence—in their theories of 
knowledge. Recall (from §2.3) Austin’s early Second History step toward such an 
accommodation, 
 
If we have made sure [that the bird is] a goldfinch, and a real goldfinch [by ruling out 
the relevant alternatives], and then in the future it does something outrageous 
(explodes, quotes Mrs. Woolf, or what not), we don’t say we were wrong to say it was a 
goldfinch, we don't know what to say. Words literally fail us . . . [However, if we have 
ruled out the relevant alternatives, we cannot] be proved wrong, whatever happens . . . 
(1979, pp.88-89)  
 
Austin’s suggestion that, when we have ruled out all of the relevant alternatives, we cannot be 
proved wrong, seems to constitute a step toward the hypothesis that a knowledge attribution 
that follows from ruling out the relevant alternatives may be deemed to be true—even if it is 
possible that it will later prove to be false (and if it does prove to be false, would cease to be 
deemed to be true). So, knowing is fallible. Even so, it is Steward Cohen who brings fallibilism to 
the fore in the Second History with his paper “How to Be a Fallibilist” (1988) (which I discuss in 
§2.3). Here, he helps other Second History theorists accommodate fallibilism in their knowledge 
theory.  
 
 
2. Different views on the evidential standard required for knowledge  
 
I showed earlier (in §6.4.4) that my developed theory of Knowledge Intuitions predicts that 
Broadcasters in evidence-based disciplines, such as scientists, would tend to hold the view that 
the evidential standard for knowledge is very high and not dependent on the practical 
circumstances of any particular individual (when the cost of a false positive for End-Users is 
appreciable). Epistemologists are able to achieve the First History aim of helping these 
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Broadcasters by sharing this view, i.e., by being Classic Invariantists. However, most Second 
History epistemologists seem to have found that they would not be able to achieve their aim of 
accounting for the ordinary use of ‘know’ by holding this view. Classic Invariantism does not 
describe, analyse or explain the ordinary use of ‘know’. Many Second History epistemologists 
have found that they could go some distance toward achieving their aims by maintaining less 
stringent views on epistemic justification, such as those defended by Contextualists, Subject 
Sensitive Invariantists and Moderate Invariantists. (However, as Broadcasters, Second History 
epistemologists may nonetheless hold the view that the evidential standard for knowledge in 
relation to the epistemology that they and others produce is very high and not dependent on 
the practical circumstances of any particular individuals.)  
 
 
3. Different analytical focuses  
 
Epistemologists are able to achieve the First History aim of helping Broadcasters identify 
propositions that are unlikely to prove false by focusing on the predictive validity of evidence 
and on how such evidence can turn out to be inadequate or faulty. Consider again H. H. Price’s 
suggestion:  
 
When I see a tomato there is much that I can doubt. I can doubt whether it is a tomato 
that I am seeing, and not a cleverly painted piece of wax. I can doubt whether there is 
any material thing there at all. Perhaps what I took to be a tomato was really a 
reflection . . . (1932, p.3) 
 
Or, consider C. I. Lewis’ suggestion that the ‘congruence’ or the ‘coherence’ of different pieces 
of evidence confer a much higher probability upon hypotheses than is generally assumed (1946, 
pp.344-346).  
 
However, investigations into the predictive validity of evidence and on how such evidence can 
turn out to be inadequate or faulty do not shed light on the appearance of variation in our 
Epistemic Standards, or on the ordinary use of ‘know’. Problems of evidence cut across 
contexts. So, Second History theorists do not standardly concern themselves with matters of 
evidence. Instead, they pursue their aims by investigating the practical circumstances that seem 
to influence Epistemic Standards. 
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4. Different criteria for successful knowledge theory  
 
Generally, the principal criterion for successful theory is that it helps one to achieve one’s 
research aims. So, the standard view among First History theorists is that a successful 
knowledge theory is one that may help us identify propositions that are unlikely to prove false; 
while the standard view among Second History theorists is that a successful knowledge theory 
predicts or explains the production of Knowledge Intuitions, or accounts for the use of ‘know’, 
in a wide range of cases.  
 
* 
 
Some of the theory that I included in my brief First History (in §2.2) may not seem to advance 
the First History aim of helping Broadcasters in other fields achieve their aim of identifying 
propositions that are unlikely to prove false. I refer to theory that suggests either that almost 
any proposition could prove false, or that we generally do not know when we have knowledge. 
Such theory may seem to suggest that Broadcasters should give up trying to identify 
propositions that are unlikely to prove false.  
 
Cartesian epistemology which casts doubt on the veracity of sense perception and the existence 
of an outside world is an early example; and Cartesian concerns arise in the substantial 
literature on epistemic scepticism. Externalist theory may also be of concern in this regard. (A 
theory of justification is externalist if it includes, as a necessary condition for knowledge, a state 
of affairs that is beyond the potential knower’s Cognitive perspective, e.g., the view that 
knowledge requires that a belief be the product of a reliable belief formation mechanism.) 
Externalism suggests that knowers may generally not know that they know. (I discuss 
externalism and opposition to it in §3.2). 
 
Even so, this literature may well be helpful to Broadcasters in other fields. For example, as Tim 
Maudlin points out, it may inform scientific investigations:   
 
[p]hilosophical scepticism focuses attention on the conceptual weak points in 
[scientific] theories and in arguments. It encourages exploration of alternative 
explanations and new theoretical approaches. (2015) 
 
So, scientists and other Broadcasters may well find such epistemology helpful, even if they do 
not accept its radical conclusions. Moreover, scepticism, externalism and such suggestions as 
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Bertrand Russell’s that ‘what does not go beyond our own personal sensible acquaintance must 
be for us the most certain’ (1914, p.67) may bear on Broadcasters’ assumptions and attitudes 
about the sufficiency of evidence, and the ways in which evidence can fail (i.e., with any 
inductive inference). In this way, the literature may influence evidence gathering and 
experimental design, and it may support or encourage views such as that scientific conclusions 
are only tentative even if they are extremely reliable, or the Popperian view that we should 
value both the imaginative development and patient falsification of scientific theory. 
 
 
7.2 The Validity of Second History Theory 
 
As I suggested earlier, many First History theorists do not seem to think that Second History 
theory is of particular philosophical importance. If they are right, there would not be much 
point in worrying about the bifurcation in the literature that I have described. We ought to 
concern ourselves only with First History theory. So, let us look at First History criticism of the 
underlying basis for Second History theory to see if there is something there. 
 
In earlier First History theory, the view that Second History theory is not philosophically 
important followed from the assumption that evidential standards for taking oneself as 
knowing, under ordinary circumstances, are not set in accordance with principles that matter. 
C. I. Lewis explains and defends this assumption even before concerted work on Second History 
theory began. It is a pre-emptive attack on Second History theory:  
 
[Epistemological theory] cannot be merely a verbally more precise rendering of 
common-sense, nor a direct generalization from actual practice. Though it rises from 
what is implicit in experience, its procedure must be critical, not descriptive. So far as it 
is to be of use, it must assume the function of sharpening and correcting an 
interpretation which has already entered into the fabric of that experience which is its 
datum. Logical principles aim to replace . . . our naïve morality, and metaphysics, our 
unreflective ontological judgments. (1929, p.19) 
 
Lewis’ general observations either suggest or imply that the principles that govern the use of 
‘know’ and the production of ordinary Knowledge Intuitions are simply not philosophically 
important. Such a view is perfectly understandable if either,  
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(1)  the theorist has not yet identified a principle that matters reflected in the ordinary 
use of ‘know’ or the Epistemic Standards that we seem to set (such as that they 
track the cost of a false positive), or  
 
(2) the theorist has focused exclusively on examples in which everyday Epistemic 
Standards seem to have been set in accordance with principles that do not matter 
much, i.e., that have little predictive or explanatory value.  
 
David Lewis and Peter Unger, in their early writings, express views that are like C. I. Lewis’, and 
do so under condition (1) above. (Both philosophers, in much later writings, adopt very 
different views on this subject.61) Both Lewis and Unger explain the appearance of Epistemic 
Standards that move up and down as merely the consequence of the imprecise use of ‘know’, 
and the cause of this lack of precision is not a matter of epistemological import. Lewis suggests 
that the ordinary use of ‘know’ may be imprecise just as the use of geographical shape 
adjectives, such as ‘hexagonal’, may be imprecise. He uses ‘France is hexagonal’ (1979, p.352) 
as an example. Unger (1975) suggests that ‘know’ belongs to the class of ‘absolute terms’—a 
class that includes ‘flat’, ‘dry’, and ‘empty’—and, like other absolute terms, is often, or 
generally, used imprecisely. We may say that the table is flat. However, if the table was truly 
flat, then no other object could be flatter. I note too that consistent with these suggestions, 
both Lewis and Unger, in those writings, suggest that true knowledge depends on entailing 
evidence.62 So, at the time that these early papers were written, neither Lewis nor Unger seem 
to have yet identified an important principle reflected in the use of ‘know’.  
 
Keith Lehrer expresses views that are like C. I. Lewis’, and does so under condition (2) above. In 
particular, he focuses exclusively on unrepresentative examples that seem to reflect principles 
(in relation to ordinary Epistemic Standards) that have little predictive or explanatory value. In 
particular, he focuses on (a) an example of wishful thinking that invites belief with poor 
evidence, and, oppositely, on (b) an example that features an unusual psychological 
impediment to belief: 
 
                                                          
61 See, for example, Lewis (1996) and Unger (1986). 
62 Both Lewis’ and Unger’s analyses fail, I suggest, because they both depend on the term ‘know’ being 
used in ordinary contexts in a way that would make it a gradable expression. The lack of precision in the 
examples they present is afforded by gradability: there are degrees to which an object may be hexagonal, 
degrees to which an object may be flat, degrees to which an object can be empty. However, Jason 
Stanley, has shown that ‘know’ does not come in ‘varying degrees of strength’ (2005, p.36). 
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One person may find, for example, that he believes that someone is tenderly concerned 
about his welfare, but, looking at the evidence, concludes that this is probably not true. 
He wishes it to be so with such fervour that he cannot help but believe it nonetheless. 
Similarly, there may be something that is so distasteful for a second person to believe 
that he cannot do so, even though the person becomes aware that it is evidently true. 
In the quest for truth, the first person might refuse to assent to what he believes, and 
the second might assent to what he does not believe . . .  
 
. . . we find ourselves with a basket of apples . . . and we face the problem of sorting 
through the collection to decide which ones are good to eat and which are not . . . we 
sort through our beliefs to decide which ones should receive our assent and which ones 
not. (1979, pp.66-67) 
 
In later First History theory, the basis for the view that Second History theory is not 
philosophically important is fundamentally different than it is in early First History theory. This 
change seems to correspond with the growing acceptance in the twentieth century that a 
particular cognitive process, or a particular cognitive trait or mental state, may well have an 
important function, even it is not obvious what that function might be. This point of view 
suggests that if, in fact, everyday standards of evidence move up and down, then that 
movement might well be governed by principles that matter. So, it seems that as the new point 
of view took hold, the basis of the First History dismissal of Second History theory transitioned 
from (a) the view that in those ordinary cases in which evidential standards seem to move up or 
down evidential standards are not set in accordance with principles that matter, to (b) the view 
that standards of evidence do not, in fact, move up and down. Epistemic Standard Variabilism is 
false. Thus, the debate between First History and Second History theorists reduces to whether 
the thesis of Epistemic Standard Variabilism is true. (Except that Moderate Invariantism, which I 
view as Second History theory and which I discuss briefly in §2.3, is immune from attacks from 
First History theorists on the basis of the falsity of Epistemic Standard Variabilism.) 
 
Where are we, very roughly, in relation to this debate? On one hand, the most important 
evidence in support of Epistemic Standard Variabilism to be produced so far comes from the 
low stakes and high stakes cases presented by Contextualists and Subject Sensitive Invariantists 
(such as Stanley’s Low Stakes Case and Stanley’s High Stakes Case63). In these paired cases, it 
seems that a change of context causes a change in Epistemic Standard. Additionally, some 
                                                          
63 See fn. 34 for a listing of other often-discussed paired cases. 
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Contextualists suggest that cases in which sceptical alternatives are presented, such as 
‘sceptical paradoxes’, constitute evidence for Epistemic Standard Variabilism. Consider this 
example: John says, ‘That animal is a zebra’; Mary replies, ‘Perhaps it’s a cleverly painted mule’; 
and John responds, ‘You may be right. I guess I don’t know that it’s a zebra’. Contextualists 
explain that the appearance of a higher Epistemic Standard in John’s last response is a 
consequence of a shift in the context of utterance, which shift was caused by Mary’s 
introduction of a sceptical alternative. On the other hand, First History theorists have presented 
a number of varied arguments against Epistemic Standard Variabilism.64 Even so, it seems that 
there are a relatively small number of core arguments amongst these. In the pages that follow, I 
look at what appear to be these core arguments, and argue that they fail.  
 
 
7.2.1 Reflective Access to the Process that Modulates Epistemic Standards 
 
First History theorists have argued that if Epistemic Standards are context-dependent, then 
their being so should be apparent, and it is not. Earl Conee writes, 
 
[h]ow can it be that fluent English speakers are well enough attuned to [the contextual 
factors that contextualists claim determine the meaning of ‘know’] while none noticed 
that ‘knows’ is context-sensitive until recently, and some are unable to recognize this by 
semantic reflection . . . ? (2005, p.55) 
 
Conee suggests that there exists an intrinsic link between (a) the ability to move Epistemic 
Standards up and down in accordance with the practical circumstances, and (b) having 
reflective access to those processes. (Perhaps he believes that reflective access is needed to 
move Epistemic Standards up and down in accordance with the practical circumstances.) Such 
an inference seems to have no basis. Much of our Cognitive processing is unconscious. Moving 
Epistemic Standards up and down on the basis of practical circumstances may well also be an 
unconscious process. Therefore, contra Conee, being ‘attuned’ to contextual factors does not 
indicate that we should have ‘noticed’ Epistemic Standard Variabilism, i.e., we may well be 
attuned via unconscious processes. Moreover, we often fail to have a clear understanding of 
                                                          
64 I set aside here explanations that later First History theorists and Moderate Invariantists have offered 
for the appearance of Epistemic Standard Variabilism; which explanations do not depend on Epistemic 
Standards moving up and down. These explanations are not arguments against Epistemic Standard 
Variabilism per se, but rather constitute competing accounts of the data.  
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why we doubt or fail to doubt some given proposition given the evidence. Such a phenomenon 
suggests the workings of an unconscious process that governs whether we take ourselves as 
knowing. 
 
 
7.2.2 Interpretations of Acontextual Knowledge Attributions 
 
Epistemologists often present knowledge attribution examples without enough information 
about the practical circumstances for us to get a sense of the Risk/Reward Quotient or whether 
the Adding Evidence Thesis is applicable. I describe such examples as being ‘acontextual’. One 
might think that if Epistemic Standard Variabilism is true (particularly if our Epistemic Standards 
depend on the practical circumstances), then we should simply not be able to adjudicate these 
acontextual knowledge attributions: If we do not know anything about the practical 
circumstances, we should not be able to set an Epistemic Standard, and therefore not have a 
basis upon which to adjudicate those attributions. However, we do in fact somehow make 
sense of these attributions. Even so, a closer look suggests that while we may well not need 
context to make sense of acontextual knowledge attributions, our ability to do so does not 
disprove Epistemic Standard Variabilism. To see this, consider these statements which are 
uncontroversially context-dependent and that are presented without any context: 
 
(1) Simon only drinks local wines. 
(2) Simon is short. 
(3) Simon lives in an old house. 
 
One may make sense of (1) by assuming that Simon only drinks wines that are produced in the 
country in which he lives—even though, in some contexts, it means that he only drinks wine 
from the particular region in which he lives. One may make sense of (2) by assuming that Simon 
is short relative to his demographic—even though, in some contexts, it means that Simon is 
short relative to professional American basketball players. People who live on the Canadian 
West Coast may make sense of (3) by assuming that the house that Simon lives in is somewhere 
between 40 and 70 years old—even though Europeans may make sense of the statement by 
assuming that Simon’s house is much older. 
 
These last suggested interpretations were all based on a best bet about the nature of the 
context. For example, one may interpret (2) on the basis of a best bet that the sentence would 
have been presented is a discussion about Simon’s height relative to his demographic. The fact 
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that we are able to interpret these statements when they are presented outside of a context 
does not disprove that they are context-dependent. 
 
So too, it seems like many acontextual knowledge attributions are interpreted on the basis of a 
best bet about the nature of the context. For example, I interpret the acontextual knowledge 
attribution, ‘I know that the animal is a zebra’, on the basis of a best bet that the attribution is 
uttered by an individual visiting a zoo with a friend or family member in the course of a casual 
conversation. As a result, I assume that the Risk/Reward Quotient and Epistemic Standard that 
applies to the example are not particularly high. 
 
However, it seems that some of us interpret some acontextual knowledge examples, not on the 
basis of a best bet about the nature of the context; but, rather, on the basis of an internalized 
theory of justification. These attributions are interpreted in a way that is consistent with such 
an internalized theory; and we see this frequently in the examples that are presented in First 
History literature.  
 
We find, in particular, that First History epistemologists interpret acontextual knowledge 
attributions in a way that is consistent with the justification theories they defend. For example, 
early and mid-twentieth century First History theorists—such as Bertrand Russell, H. H. Price, C. 
I. Lewis and D. M. Armstrong65– standardly defend the view that we know very little if any of 
what we think we know; and, consistent with this view, they find that acontextual knowledge 
attributions reflect an extremely high evidential standard. For example, H. H. Price suggests that 
the statement ‘I know that that is a tomato’ reflects an extremely high standard; and that, as a 
result, the statement is probably false. In contrast, Earl Conee, who holds the more moderate 
view that the ‘most plausible unvarying standard for truth is very high, but not unreachably 
high’ (2005, p.52) finds that acontextual knowledge attributions reflect a more moderate 
evidential standard. However, regardless of the particular theory of justification one has 
internalized, if one consistently interprets acontextual knowledge attributions in a way that is 
consistent with that theory, then it will seem as if Epistemic Standard Variabilism is false—even 
though one needs only a proper context to reveal it.  
 
* 
 
                                                          
65 I discuss their theories in §2.2.  
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Herman Cappelen and Ernie Lepore (2003) present what may be the most elaborate attack on 
Epistemic Standard Variabilism in the literature, which they do via an attack on Contextualism. 
That attack is based on three purported tests for context sensitivity of the truth conditions of 
knowledge attributions. In their ‘test (i)’ and ‘test (ii)’, they look to see whether the truth 
conditions of a given knowledge attribution change when it is made under different 
circumstances. However, Cappelen & Lepore do not say a word about the practical features of 
those circumstances, i.e., features that are needed to get a sense of the Risk/Reward Quotient. 
In the end, they make the mistake of endeavouring to test for context sensitivity using 
acontextual attributions; and as a result, they get negative findings for context sensitivity which 
findings are false. 
 
Let us look carefully at one of these two tests, test (ii). (We do not need to look at both because 
they share the same shortcoming.) Here is a schematic version of it: 
 
Test (ii): Initially, agent A, under unknown practical circumstances C1, attributes 
knowledge to agent B. Agent A says ‘B knows when the train leaves’. Then, an 
observer, agent D, under unknown practical circumstances C2, reports that A 
has endorsed B as a good informant with respect to when the train leaves. D 
says, ‘A said that B knows when the train leaves’.  
 
Thus, the attribution, ‘B knows when the train leaves’ has been transplanted from A’s unknown 
practical circumstances, C1, to D’s unknown practical circumstances, C2. Cappelen & Lepore 
suggest that if such an operation is unproblematic, then ‘know’ must not be context-
dependent; and indeed the operation is not problematic. So, this test produced negative 
findings for context sensitivity (2003, pp.34-35). The theorists further suggest that the 
evidential standard connoted by the knowledge attribution is the same in both C1 and C2.  
 
Even so, as I suggested, the test is simply not sensitive to context sensitivity. The reader may set 
an Epistemic Standard for the attribution, ‘B knows when the train leaves’, in both C1 and C2, in 
a way that is either consistent with a best bet about the practical circumstances in C1 and C2, or 
consistent with internalized justification theory. In either case and as a result, the reader’s 
sense of the Risk/Reward Quotient and Epistemic Standard in both C1 and C2 is likely to be the 
same. In order to effectively test for context sensitivity, we would need to know a little more 
about agent D’s and agent A’s practical circumstances, and those circumstances would need to 
be significantly different (in the right way), similar to what is presented in the paired cases used 
to support Contextualism or SSI (see §2.3).  
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(Cappelen & Lepore’s investigation includes a third test, ‘test (iii)’. In that test, Cappelen & 
Lepore do present knowledge attributions in practical contexts, and one may indeed have a 
sense of the Risk/Reward Quotient in those contexts. So there is no call to discuss it in this 
particular section. Even so, Cappelen & Lepore’s report negative findings for Epistemic Standard 
Variabilism in the test, and so I discuss it elsewhere, in Appendix 4. I conclude that while the 
test is valid, Cappelen & Lepore have not conducted it properly. If conducted properly, it is 
positive for Epistemic Standard Variabilism.) 
 
 
7.2.3 An Observer Effect 
 
Another line of attack against Epistemic Standard Variabilism is based on the effect of critically 
examining Knowledge Intuitions in the moment that they arise. Such critical examination often 
produces doubt. It is argued that this doubt is a reflection of the doubter’s true invariant 
evidential standard for knowledge. So, critical examination reveals our true conception of 
knowledge. Earl Conee explains,  
 
In ordinary contexts, when nothing much turns on it, people will claim knowledge, and 
attribute knowledge to themselves and others, in belief and in speech . . . [However,] if 
asked whether some proposition to which knowledge is ascribed on some such basis is 
really known, or truly known, or really and truly known, fluent speakers have a strong 
inclination to doubt or deny that it is. Only the most conspicuous facts of current 
perception, the clearest memories, triple-checked calculations, and the like will often 
pass some such ‘really and truly’ test. The present view has it that the answer to this 
‘really and truly’ question reveals what a speaker judges to be knowledge when she is 
trying her best to apply her best thought as to what is the actual standard for the truth 
of a ‘knowledge’ attribution. (2005, p.52) 
 
The questioning that Conee references, whether the proposition is really and truly known, is an 
example of the critical examination to which I refer. This seems to produce doubt. However, 
there is reason to believe that this effect of critical examination is not revelatory in the way that 
Conee and others suggest. Critical examination produces an ‘observer effect’ (a notion often 
used in the physical and social sciences) in which the examination alters the examined object. 
When we check tire pressure, we release air and thereby lower the pressure. So too, when we 
critically examine Knowledge Intuitions, we may produce doubt. David Lewis makes a similar 
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point—suggesting that examinations make knowledge elusive: ‘Examine it, and straightaway it 
vanishes’ (1996, p.560). So, I maintain, critical examinations of knowledge intuitions produce 
tainted data—data that has no value to researchers who are trying to understand the 
production of Knowledge Intuitions. 
 
I can suggest two causes of such an observer effect. First, the effect is the result of the 
knowledge attributor inferring that the critical examiner has a reason for scrutinizing her 
attribution, and that reason weighs against knowing. Such an inference would be consistent 
with the Gricean hypothesis that proper conversational contributions are relevant to the 
purpose of the conversation (Grice, 1989). The attributor takes it that her attribution is being 
critically examined because the examiner has assessed the likelihood of the questioned 
proposition being true as being lower than has the attributor. The examiner may (a) possess 
contrary Present Evidence, (b) assess the Prior Probability that the proposition is true as being 
lower than she does, or (c) assess the predictive validity of the Present Evidence as being lower 
than she does. So, the question of whether one really and truly knows may suggest that there 
exists reason to doubt. J. L. Austin rightly challenges the conversational appropriateness of such 
critical examinations,  
 
The doubt or question ‘But is it a real one?’ has always (must have) a special basis, 
there must be some ‘reason for suggesting’ that it isn’t real, in the sense of some 
specific way, or limited number of specific ways, in which it is suggested that this 
experience or item may be phony. (1979, p.87) 
 
A second cause of an observer effect may be that critical examination suggests to the knower 
that the examiner is aware of potential costs of a false positive of which the knower is unaware. 
For example, I might worry that an examiner is asking me if I really and truly know because he is 
worried about a grave consequence of a false positive for me. If so, I may raise my assessment 
of the Risk/Reward Quotient in the situation, and associate with it a higher Epistemic 
Standard—which standard my evidence fails to meet. 
  
Under either of these causes, the knower in these cases treats the critical examination itself as 
new Present Evidence that weighs against the proposition in question. Further, the knower’s 
assessment of the strength of this new evidence may depend on either (a) how good an 
adjudicator of the questioned proposition the knower believes the examiner would be, or (b) 
whether the knower believes that the examiner has information about the consequences of a 
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false positive that she does not. Nonetheless, this new contrary evidence, the critical 
examination, may well be strong enough to produce doubt.  
 
The notion that critical examination constitutes new contradictory Present Evidence may be 
used to explain a certain often-made observation that informs some versions of Relevant 
Alternative Theory. It is observed that the mere act of advancing an alternative hypothesis 
makes the hypothesis relevant in the context. According to RA Theory, once an alternative is 
relevant, knowledge depends on ruling it out.66 I am suggesting that when an agent who takes 
herself as knowing that p is presented with the alternative hypothesis q, she may infer that q 
would not have been presented unless the presenter had good reason for doing so—
particularly, she may infer either that the presenter has evidence which she does not that 
supports q, or that the presenter’s evidence for q is stronger than her own. Thus, the 
presentation of alternative hypotheses introduces an observer effect—though it is a different 
kind of situation than that produced by critical examinations of knowledge attributions. So, 
from the knower’s point of view, the mere presentation of alternative q constitutes evidence 
that weighs against p, and changes the nature of the case so that additional Present Evidence is 
needed to rule out q. (Notice again that it is plausible that the presentation of an alternative 
does not have the effect of revealing an otherwise hidden conception of knowledge.) 
 
 
7.2.4 Basic Assumptions About Knowledge 
 
In each of the last three sections I alluded to an incorrect basic assumption that seems to be 
held by many First History theorists:  
 
(1)  If our Epistemic Standard accords with Epistemic Standard Variabilism, then this 
should be evident, i.e., Epistemic Standard Variabilism depends on our having 
reflective access to the process that modulates Epistemic Standards (in §7.2.1). 
 
(2)  The meaning of ‘know’ is reflected in our interpretation of acontextual examples 
(in §7.2.2). 
 
(3)  We should be able to critically examine Knowledge Intuitions or suggest alternative 
hypotheses without producing an observer effect (in §7.2.3).  
                                                          
66 See, for example, Steward Cohen (1988, p.106) 
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Different combinations of these basic assumptions are reflected in the First History literature 
that argues against Epistemic Standard Variabilism. In an interesting attack on Epistemic 
Standard Variabilism, Timothy Williamson makes assumptions (1) and (2), at the same time that 
he explicitly identifies assumption (3) as one that he will avoid making, just in case it is false. 
Williamson writes, 
 
John: I know that this is a zebra. 
Mary: How do you know that it isn’t a mule cleverly painted to look like a zebra? 
John: Hmm, for all I know it is a painted mule. So I was wrong. I don’t know that it is a 
zebra after all. 
 
. . . a contextualist can reconcile [John’s] first and last remarks by postulating that 
Mary’s question causes the word ‘know’ to shift its reference [consistent with Epistemic 
Standard Variabilism]. But [this] move [doesn’t make] sense of John’s admission ‘So I 
was wrong’, for [the move involves] explaining how John was not wrong in his first 
speech. More subtly, in context his final words ‘after all’ imply an admission of error. 
(2005, pp.220-221) 
 
Williamson acknowledges the possibility that assumption (3) may be incorrect by allowing the 
possibility that Mary’s question changes the context of attribution, and in the process alters the 
truth conditions of John’s initial knowledge attribution. Even so, Williamson suggests that when 
John implies that his initial knowledge attribution was made in error—call this ‘John’s mea 
culpa’—John reveals what he judges to be knowledge, contradicts a contextualist account of 
the case, and contradicts Epistemic Standard Variabilism. I suggest that this conclusion is 
incorrect and depends on basic assumptions (1) and (2). 
 
First, notice that assumption (2) is reflected in Williamson not saying a word about the practical 
circumstances under which John initially takes himself as knowing that the animal is a zebra. I 
suggested earlier that we interpret such attributions in a way that accords either with (a) our 
best bet about the nature of the practical circumstances, or (b) internalized justification theory. 
It seems plausible that most of us would interpret John’s first comment in accordance with a 
best bet about the circumstances. Perhaps, John was engaged in casual conversation while 
visiting the zoo, in a context in which the Risk/Reward Quotient is not extremely high.  
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Second, assumption (1) (that Epistemic Standard Variabilism requires reflective access to the 
process by which we set Epistemic Standards) seems to be reflected in Williamson taking John’s 
mea culpa seriously, suggesting that the mea culpa reflects the meaning of ‘know’. To be clear, 
it certainly seems plausible that, following Mary’s question, John may think and say that he 
made an error in suggesting that he knows that the animal is a zebra. However, I suggest that 
John’s mea culpa may be used as evidence against Epistemic Standard Variabilism only if 
assumption (1) is true, only if John has reflective access. Consider that if John does not have 
reflective access, then Epistemic Standard Variabilism could be true and John’s mea culpa could 
be the result of his not having reflective access. We may test the plausibility of this suggestion 
with the help of a thought experiment. We may see how the conversation between John and 
Mary would plausibly have gone in a nearby world in which Epistemic Standard Variabilism is 
true and in which he has reflective access. If John would plausibly not have admitted error, 
then, on our world, John’s mea culpa could well have been the result of his not having reflective 
access—and not the result of Epistemic Standard Variabilism being false as Williamson suggests. 
 
To be clear, in the world in which the following experiment takes place, everyone has full 
reflective access to the process by which they modulate Epistemic Standards. Also, everyone 
expresses what is foremost on their mind, and they do so in a straightforward manner, without 
irony or deceit. Further, let us assume that John and Mary are engaged in ordinary 
conversation, they are not epistemologists, and that the exchange between them takes place 
while they are casually strolling through a zoo.  
 
John: I know that this is a zebra. 
Mary: How do you know that it isn’t a mule cleverly painted to look like a zebra? 
John: Are you feeling alright? Here we are together at the zoo, clearly in a context in 
which the Risk/Reward Quotient is just moderate. We should both associate my 
last knowledge attribution with an Epistemic Standard that would be met by 
evidence that has just moderately high predictive validity—which allows errors 
somewhere perhaps on the order of one in every one hundred trials. However, 
the frequency with which we might observe an animal that looks exactly like a 
zebra but that is in fact a painted mule would seem to be a very small fraction 
of this last frequency—perhaps only one in many millions. So, my evidence 
meets my properly modulated Epistemic Standard, and that is how I know that 
it isn’t a painted mule. Additionally, not only does your question suggest that 
you have detached yourself from the present practical circumstances; but the 
Epistemic Standard implied in your question is higher than any I have 
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encountered in my life, one that is even higher than a scientific standard. I think 
you must be making a joke. 
 
It seems plausible that on this nearby world John would not have assessed his initial knowledge 
attribution as having been made in error. So, John’s mea culpa in our world may well have been 
the result of reflective access being false, and not, as Williamson suggests, the result of 
Epistemic Standard Variabilism being false. I suggest that we recognize that when John makes 
his mea culpa on our world, he does not know better, and it should not be taken seriously. 
 
 
7.2.5 Three Experimental Philosophy Studies 
 
Three X-phi studies seem to present experimental evidence that contradicts Epistemic Standard 
Variabilism: Buckwalter (2010), May et al. (2010), and Feltz and Zarpentine (2010). However, all 
three studies are based on experiments (each study includes multiple experiments) that all 
somehow have the same design flaw—with the exception of one of the experiments in one of 
the studies, which I say a few words about further on. This design flaw invalidates all the 
experiments that have them. 
 
The design flaw to which I refer produces an observer effect—though a different kind of 
observer effect than the others I described earlier. The effect is produced by subjects in 
knowledge cases seeming to set an Epistemic Standard that is lower than what the reader 
would otherwise expect.  
 
All three X-phi studies test for the extent to which experiment participants, the ‘respondents’, 
agree or disagree with the subjects of low stakes and high stakes knowledge cases. The low 
stakes cases that are presented to respondents are just like the low stakes cases that 
Contextualists and Subject Sensitive Invariantists present. In fact, the low stakes cases that are 
used in some of the experiments are taken verbatim from the literature. However, in all three 
studies, the structure of the high stakes cases presented to respondents is markedly different 
than those used in the high stakes cases standardly presented in the literature. High stakes 
cases in the literature present high stakes contexts that seem to elevate Epistemic Standards—
which the subjects’ evidence fails to meet. So, these subjects deny that they know. (See, for 
example, Stanley’s High Stakes Case.) In contrast, the high stakes cases in the three studies 
present high stakes contexts that do not cause the subjects described in those cases to have 
higher Epistemic Standards than they might otherwise; and the subjects’ evidence, in those 
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cases, meets their Epistemic Standard. So, the subjects, in both the low stakes and high stakes 
cases, in all the experiments, in all three studies (again, except one that I say a few words about 
further on) take themselves as knowing to be true the propositions in question. All these 
experiments then test for the extent to which respondents agree or disagree with those 
subjects. 
 
So, respondents read cases in which the subjects, in both the low stakes and high stakes cases, 
claim to know. The researchers suggest that if Epistemic Standard Variabilism is true, then 
significantly more respondents should agree or strongly agree with the subjects in the low 
stakes cases than with the subjects in the high stakes cases; or, alternatively, more respondents 
should disagree or strongly disagree with the subjects in the high stakes cases, than with the 
subjects in the low stakes cases. However, the principal finding in all three studies is that there 
is a strong tendency among respondents to agree with the subjects in both the low stakes and 
high stakes cases. This is supposed to indicate that Epistemic Standard Variabilism is false.  
 
However, let us consider the effect on respondents that might be produced by the subjects in 
the high stakes cases taking themselves as knowing. To get a sense of this, consider that the 
respondents would likely assume that the subjects in these cases base their Epistemic 
Standards on information that the respondents do not have. The subjects in the cases are like 
strangers to the respondents, and the communities in which they live are like communities they 
do not know. As a result, the respondents’ sense of the Risk/Reward Quotient in the cases 
would seem to depend heavily on best bets. Consider, for example, Stanley’s High Stakes Case. 
The only information that we get about the extent to which Hannah would disvalue failing to 
deposit the cheque by Saturday is that she has an impending bill coming due, and that it is ‘very 
important’ that the cheque be deposited. So, our sense of the cost of a false positive for 
Hannah is based on a best bet on exactly how important it is to her to deposit the cheque. 
Moreover, we do not get any information about the frequency with which, in Hannah’s 
community, (a) banks are closed on Saturdays, (b) branches are being permanently shut down, 
and (c) banks alter their operating hours. So, our sense of the Prior Probability of Hannah’s bank 
being open on Saturday is also a best bet.  
 
As a result, respondents should have the sense that the subjects in the cases have a far better 
sense of the Risk/Reward Quotient than they do. The subjects have a precise sense of the 
extent of the cost of a false positive; and, they have a sense of the Prior Probability of the 
questioned proposition being true that is based on accumulated experiences in their own 
communities. The respondents may feel that they do not have the epistemic right to disagree or 
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to strongly disagree when the subjects in the high stakes cases attribute knowledge. From a 
different perspective, subjects taking themselves as knowing, in these high stakes cases, 
constitutes, for respondents, evidence that weighs against the appropriateness of elevated 
Epistemic Standards. 
 
However, even if we should not expect respondents to disagree or strongly disagree with the 
subjects in these high stakes cases (for the reasons I describe); we may well expect that they 
would not agree as strongly with the subjects in the high stakes cases, as they would with the 
subjects in the low stakes cases. This is precisely what all three studies reveal. It is, in fact, one 
of the principal findings in the studies. May et al. conclude that while their ‘data indicate that . . 
. raising stakes [does not move] most people from attributing knowledge to denying it’ (2010, 
p.265). However, ‘practical interests did . . . affect the . . . level of [respondents’] confidence in 
the truth of [the subject’s knowledge attributions]’ (p.270). For example, many respondents 
may indicate that they ‘strongly agree’ with the subjects in the low stakes cases, and indicate 
only that they ‘agree’ with the subjects in the high stakes cases.  
 
There is one experiment, in one of the studies, that is not described by any of foregoing. The 
Feltz and Zarpentine (2010) investigation includes four separate experiments. The second 
through the fourth all include modified high stakes cases of the kind I describe. However, the 
first experiment does not do so. In fact, the first experiment uses Stanley’s Low Stakes Case and 
Stanley’s High Stakes Case verbatim; and they find that in this experiment, but only in this one, 
that their test results ‘offer support for the thesis that practical facts do have some effect on 
ordinary ascriptions of knowledge’ (p.689).  
 
We find in these studies that when an observer effect is included in the analysis of the data, all 
three studies seem to favour Epistemic Standard Variabilism instead of going against it.  
 
 
7.2.6 Conclusion 
 
I suggested that the debate between First History and Second History theorists about the 
validity of Second History theory reduced to whether Epistemic Standard Variabilism is true; 
and I have found here that core arguments against Epistemic Standard Variabilism fail. So, in my 
view, the validity of Second History theory remains plausible.  
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Chapter 8: Gettier-Style Cases 
 
 
In Gettier-Style Cases, such as Russell’s Stopped Clock, the subject has a true belief supported 
by ordinary justification (see §2.2). However, the evidence that constitutes the justification is 
faulty, e.g., in Russell’s Stopped Clock, the clock is stopped. Further, we do not have the 
intuition that the subjects in these cases have knowledge—even though they have justified true 
belief. Some First History theorists find that because these cases feature ordinary justification 
the failure to intuit that the subject has knowledge is appropriate and unsurprising. Recall D.M. 
Armstrong’s observation, 
 
But because possession of such [justification] could not constitute possession of 
knowledge I should have thought it obvious that they are too weak to serve as suitable 
grounds. It is not surprising, therefore, that Gettier is able to construct examples where 
a true belief is justified in an ordinary sense of ‘justified’, but the true belief is clearly 
not a case of knowledge. (1973, pp.152-153) 
 
My theory suggests that such a response from First History theorists is perfectly appropriate: 
Their principal aim is to help Broadcasters, i.e., help Altruistic Senders who intend or envisage 
communicating consequential messages to a large number of Receivers (discussed in §7.1). So, 
ordinary justification may well not meet their Epistemic Standard.   
 
Even so, under ordinary circumstances (i.e., when we are not in a First History theorist’s or 
Broadcaster’s frame of mind), we still do not intuit that the subjects in these cases have 
knowledge; and my developed theory may seem to suggest that we would. The subjects’ 
Present Evidence would seem to meet the Epistemic Standard that might be set in the context. 
However, a closer look reveals that my theory does predict that we would ordinarily not intuit 
that the subject in these cases know. Moreover, it explains why this is so. I look at this in this 
short chapter. 
 
Let me start by suggesting that it is plausible that Knowledge Intuitions are produced by our KIP 
both in real-life situations and when we read knowledge cases. It seems that when we read 
knowledge cases, we are able to engage the KIP by either putting ourselves in the knowledge 
attributor’s shoes, or by envisaging ourselves helping the subject (say by sending a helpful 
message). If we engage the KIP using the former method, then Egoistic Knowledge Intuitions 
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may be produced; and if by the latter, then Altruistic Knowledge Intuitions may be produced. 
For example, when we read Stanley’s Low Stakes Case we may put ourselves in Hannah’s shoes 
in order to engage the KIP and to produce Knowledge Intuitions. However, it seems that we 
generally engage the KIP in Gettier-Style Cases by using the latter method, by envisaging 
ourselves helping the subject. We may help by either confirming or disconfirming the subject’s 
belief. Even so, whether we engage the KIP using the former or the latter method, we employ 
the Basic Method and determine whether the Adding Evidence Thesis is relevant (under either 
egoistic or Altruistic assessments) in order to govern the production of Knowledge Intuitions.  
 
Consider the role of the Adding Evidence Thesis in Gettier-Style Cases. For that thesis to be 
relevant to a reading of a Gettier-Style Case, the reader would need to get a sense of whether 
gathering additional evidence is a practical possibility, and whether the benefit of a reduction of 
false positive risk that would follow from gathering that evidence exceeds the cost of gathering 
it. However, Gettier-Style Cases do not standardly tell us enough about the background 
circumstances to do this. So, I will set aside the Adding Evidence Thesis and focus only on the 
Basic Method. 
 
Employing the Basic Method in a reading of a Gettier-Style Case requires the reader to get a 
sense of the Risk/Reward Quotient. However, the questioned propositions in the Gettier-Style 
Cases presented in the literature are standardly presented without enough information about 
the practical circumstances for us to get a sense of the Risk/Reward Quotient. Earlier, I 
described presentations of this kind as being acontextual. (For further discussion of the 
acontextual presentation of propositions see §7.2.2.) For example, in Russell’s Stopped Clock, 
we do not know why the man needs to know what time it is, or how important it is to him to 
know that. So, following our ordinary response to acontextually presented examples, our 
intuitive response to Gettier-Style Cases is based on a best bet about the nature of the context. 
For example, I assume that the man, in Russell’s Stopped Clock, is in an ordinary context, and 
that the stakes for the man are not terribly high. Moreover, I suggest that the best bets we 
make when we read Gettier-Style Cases in general are that the stakes are not terribly high. 
(Earlier, in footnote 7, I explain why the Gettier-Style Cases that are presented in the literature 
do not generally feature high-standard contexts, such as scientific contexts.) So, I suggest that 
we ordinarily get the sense that the Risk/Reward Quotient in these cases is not terribly high. 
Following the Basic Method, the reader associates this sense with an Epistemic Standard that is 
also not terribly high. Finally, under the Basic Method, the reader will assess the strength of the 
Present Evidence; and if it meets her Epistemic Standard, then Knowledge Intuitions will be 
produced.  
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However, as if by divine intervention, the reader of these cases learns that the subject’s Present 
Evidence is faulty. In fact, we learn that the evidence has no predictive validity whatsoever. It 
has no ability at all to predict that which the evidence is purportedly evidence for. (Recall from 
§4.3.2.1 that my theory is based on the notion that it is the predictive validity of evidence that 
determines its strength.) In Russell’s Stopped Clock, the evidence consists in the time told by a 
clock that the reader learns has stopped.67 Accordingly, the reader accepts that the Present 
Evidence has no predictive validity. As a result, the reader assesses that the Present Evidence 
fails to meet her Epistemic Standard, and, following the Basic Method, a Knowledge Intuition is 
not produced. 
 
In summary, in these cases, we envisage helping the subject; we employ the Basic Method in 
order to determine whether we would confirm or disconfirm the subject’s belief; we make a 
best bet that the Risk/Reward Quotient is not terribly high; we set an Epistemic Standard that is 
also not terribly high; we learn that the Present Evidence has no predictive validity and fails to 
meet our standard; our KIP fails to produce Knowledge Intuitions; and we conclude that we 
would not confirm the subject’s belief.  
 
However, even if the Basic Method explains our response to Gettier-Style Cases, one may worry 
that the Basic Method is, in fact, more flexible than what I have suggested. Perhaps, it does not 
need to take the predictive validity of the Present Evidence into account in these cases. After 
all, the reader learns that the questioned proposition is true (e.g., the time the clock tells is 
correct) and understands that, under most ordinary circumstances, the Present Evidence would 
have sufficient predictive validity to meet the Epistemic Standard that is set. Why must we 
                                                          
67 This evidence does not have any predictive validity relative to the time of day—because the time told 
by the stopped clock does not have a causal connection with the actual time of day. Compare this with 
the counterfactual situation in which the man looks at a working clock. Here, working mechanisms cause 
the time told by the working clock to track the actual time of day, i.e., to track the daily axial rotation of 
the earth. So, if the mechanism is, in fact, working reliably, then the axial rotation may be viewed as a 
causal factor of both the time told by the working clock and the actual time of day. However, under 
Russell’s Stopped Clock, such a causal relation is absent. 
 
Generally, evidence E may confer a probability on p in virtue of the fact that either (1) E indicates the 
existence of a cause of the state or event described by p, (2) E indicates the existence of an effect of the 
state or event described by p, or (3) E indicates the existence of an effect of a hypothesized causal state 
or event and p describes a different effect of the same hypothesized causal state or event. I note that 
under possibility (2), when E indicates the existence of an effect of the state or event described by p, the 
inductive relation between E and p may follow from an abductive process, i.e., p may be the best 
explanation of the evidence. For example, smoke may confer a high probability on the truth of the 
proposition that there is a fire. 
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worry that the Present Evidence fails to have any predictive validity in the extraordinary 
circumstances that are presented in these cases?  
 
To answer this last question, let us recognize a basic principle of Signal Detection Theory: 
Systems that respond to equivocal or misleading data in a way that tends to advance their 
operator’s interests will of necessity assess the predictive validity of their evidence. Radar 
systems that failed to take into account the predictive validity of its evidence (i.e., inputted 
radar data) could get the system’s operators into a great deal of trouble. So too, producing 
Knowledge Intuitions without taking into account the predictive validity of evidence could be 
very bad for us. Accordingly, if my story about the evolution by natural selection of the KIP is on 
the right track, then it would be safe to assume that taking the predictive validity of evidence 
into account is an innate trait associated with the KIP. In addition to which, I showed (in 
§4.3.2.1) that it is plausible that we possess just such a trait, i.e., Trait 1, according to which we 
assess evidential strength with a degree of precision and a frequency of being correct that are 
sufficient for the application of SDT principles.68 From a different perspective, it seems plausible 
that there would have been sustained selection pressure for this sort of inflexibility in the 
operation of the KIP.  
 
* 
 
Paul Mosher suggests that ‘our understanding [of] exactly what propositional knowledge is 
essentially involves our having a Gettier-resistant analysis of such knowledge’ (2010, p.397). 
Even so, Gettier-Style Cases do not seem to fit comfortably in any theory of knowledge that has 
a wide base of support. Nonetheless, not only is my theory of Knowledge Intuitions Gettier-
resistant, the theory explains our intuitions in these cases. 
 
Moreover, these cases may be viewed as adding a measure of support to my thesis that the 
ordinary use of ‘know’ in knowledge attributions and denials generally depends on the 
production of Knowledge Intuitions (outlined in §1.2.2)—which thesis contrasts the standard 
assumption that the use of ‘know’ reflects a particular concept, definition, or theory of 
knowledge. Having described a plausible process by which Knowledge Intuitions would be 
produced (i.e., the process that employs the Basic Method and the Adding Evidence Thesis) we 
find that it correctly predicts how we use ‘know’ in Gettier-Style Cases; whereas the theory that 
                                                          
68 Nonetheless, if behaving as if p will tend to produce better consequences than that of not behaving as 
if p even if not-p, then our Epistemic Standard may be so low that Present Evidence that has no predictive 
validity may meet that standard and Knowledge Intuitions may be produced. 
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equates knowledge with true belief plus ordinary justification fails to correctly predict our use 
of ‘know’ in these cases. Further, while externalistic formulations (e.g., knowledge is true belief 
plus reliable belief formation) do predict our use of ‘know’ in these cases, they are otherwise 
not widely accepted, either by First History theorists (see §2.3) or Second History theorists.  
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Chapter 9: Conclusion 
 
  
9.1 Summary 
 
As I suggested at the outset, my aim here was to address the bad state of the epistemological 
enterprise, in which we find a Gordian knot of competing and incompatible positions with 
respect to the basic problems of knowledge. I promised to cut the knot with a general theory of 
the origin, function and triggering-conditions of Knowledge Intuitions. 
 
In Chapter 1, I focused on outlining a conception of Knowledge Intuitions that is suggested by a 
body of prima facie evidence. First, I suggested that Knowledge Intuitions, which are produced 
in the moment and often in quick succession, reflect our adjudications of Advanced 
Propositions about world conditions. They help us to picture the world decisively and 
unambiguously—as being filled with distinct, solid, and weighty objects, filled with people who 
have good or bad intentions, filled with systems and organizations that may work well or badly, 
and filled with events that are causally connected though those connections may be non-
perceptible. Second, I suggested that the word ‘know’ gives voice to these natural Knowledge 
Intuitions. Third, I suggested that these adjudications of Advanced Propositions, and the picture 
of the world that we get from them, constitute a basis for performing deliberate actions and 
forming attitudes.  
 
In Chapters 3 through 6, I developed a naturalized hypothesis of the function of Knowledge 
Intuitions, F1; and then developed, on the basis of that hypothesis, a general theory of 
Knowledge Intuitions that was able to explain why, given the evidence, we have or fail to have 
those intuitions, and to identify their triggering-conditions. My hypothesis and the general 
theory were developed on a foundation of (a) biological theory about the function of Cognition 
(and particularly Godfrey-Smith’s Environmental Complexity Thesis), (b) Signal Detection 
Theory, and (c) biological theory about altruism. This led to the following simple general 
prediction: The Epistemic Standard that we seem to set depends upon (a) the Risk/Reward 
Quotient, assessed either Altruistically (under the AAT) or egoistically, and (b) whether the 
conditions contained in the Adding Evidence Thesis have been met, which assessment may also 
be made either Altruistically or egoistically. Moreover, because ‘know’ gives voice to those 
intuitions, this last general prediction applies to the use of ‘know’; it predicts the use of ‘know’. 
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This last general prediction seemed to hold with all the knowledge cases that I encountered in 
the literature—along with a good number of non-standard examples. In particular, the general 
prediction proved consistent with cases standardly used to support Contextualism, Subject 
Sensitive Invariantism, and Classic Invariantism. Additionally, I found that Gettier-Style Cases 
(Chapter 8), sceptical challenges (and paradoxes) (§7.2.4), and rational acceptance cases 
(§4.3.2.4) are all consistent with my developed theory. In fact, not only are Gettier-Style Cases 
consistent with the theory, the theory explains our intuitions in those cases. 
 
In Chapter 2, I offered two very short histories of epistemology that suggest that the 
epistemological literature has bifurcated over the last century —creating two separate, distinct, 
individually coherent and mutually incompatible histories within epistemology, i.e., the First 
History and Second History. Then, in Chapter 7, I explained the situation on the basis of my 
developed theory. It seems that much epistemological literature belongs to either one or the 
other of two separate and distinct research programs; and the research programs powerfully 
influence the theory that falls under them. They suggest appropriate (a) conceptions of 
knowledge, (particularly whether or not propositions that are truly known can later prove 
false), (b) evidential standards required for knowledge, (c) focuses of analysis (particularly, 
whether to focus on how evidence can turn out to be inadequate or faulty, or focus on the 
practical circumstances that seem to influence Epistemic Standards), and (d) criteria for 
successful knowledge theory. I found that the research program that produced the First History 
influences Classic Invariantist theory and a diverse range of compatible theories; whereas the 
research program that produced the Second History influences Contextualist, Subject Sensitive 
Invariantist and Moderate Invariantist theory, and other theories. 
 
Further, the developed theory suggests that under different circumstances, Knowledge 
Intuitions have different triggering-conditions. I was able to understand the state of the field on 
the basis of this fact. For any one of several basic positions in epistemology that have standardly 
been viewed as being incompatible, there is a set of circumstances under which the position 
works, and other circumstances under which it does not. 
 
Position 1: The meaning of ‘know’ is not revealed in ordinary contexts, but it is in high-standard 
contexts. This position works when we intend or envisage Broadcasting messages that carry 
appreciable false positive risk for Receivers. (Recall that I defined Broadcasters as Altruistic 
individuals who intend or envisage passing messages to large numbers of Receivers.) (See 
§6.4.4 in particular.) 
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Position 2: The meaning of ‘know’ is revealed in ordinary contexts, but not in high-standard 
contexts. This position works in most every circumstance except when we intend or envisage 
Broadcasting messages that carry appreciable false positive risk for Receivers. 
 
Position 3: Epistemic Standards are influenced by the practical interests of knowledge 
attributors, but not the subjects of those attributions. This position works when attributors 
‘egoistically’ assess the Risk/Reward Quotient and whether the conditions contained in the 
Adding Evidence Thesis have been met. (See Chapter 5 in particular.) 
 
Position 4: Epistemic Standards are influenced by the practical interests of the subjects of 
knowledge attributions, but not the attributors’. This position very often works when 
attributors, in non-Broadcast situations, Altruistically assess the Risk/Reward Quotient and 
whether the conditions contained in the Adding Evidence Thesis have been met; and also works 
in cases that feature first-person attributions or denials, and in which attributors ‘egoistically’ 
assess the Risk/Reward Quotient and whether the conditions contained in the Adding Evidence 
Thesis have been met. (See Chapter 6, except §6.4.4.) 
 
Position 5: The Epistemic Standard is not influenced by the practical interests of any particular 
individual at all. This position works when we intend or envisage Broadcasting messages that 
carry appreciable false positive risk for Receivers. (See §6.4.4.) 
 
The picture that emerges from my developed theory suggests that epistemology seems to be in 
a bad state mainly because its practitioners overgeneralize as a matter of course. They claim 
universal applicability of theory that in fact applies to only a subset (though usually an 
important subset) of knowledge cases.  
 
 
9.2 A Brief Comparison with Moderate Invariantism 
 
I pointed out earlier (at the end of §2.3) that Moderate Invariantism is an approach that 
succeeds in accounting for our use of ‘know’ in cases that are used to support Contextualism, 
and also cases that are used to support Subject Sensitive Invariantism. Moreover, it is Second 
History theory, as is my theory of Knowledge Intuitions. The theories share the basic 
characteristics of Second History theory (which I described in §7.1), e.g., instead of focusing on 
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problems of evidence, they focus on the appearance of variation in evidential standards. So, the 
approach competes with my theory. 
 
I am not able to offer decisive arguments against Moderate Invariantism. However, I can point 
to two states of affairs that weigh in favour of my theory. The first is that my theory seems to 
have greater explanatory and predictive adequacy than does Moderate Invariantism. First, it 
seems to better both predict and explain the evidential standards that we seem to set: (a) it 
identifies contextual factors that seem to have a role in determining evidential standards that 
are not identified by Moderate Invariantism (e.g., the benefit of a true positive, and whether 
reducing false positive risk by gathering additional evidence is a practical possibility), and (b) it 
explains that we take these contextual factors into account in an effort to identify when 
behaving as if p will tend to have more highly valued consequences than would not behaving as 
if p. Second, it explains the impasse between Contextualists and Subject Sensitive Invariantists. I 
will not review the account of the impasse given in §6.2.1 here, save to point out that while the 
latter aims to accommodate cases that feature Altruistic Knowledge Intuitions, the former are 
more focused on cases that feature Egoistic Knowledge Intuitions. Third, it explains why we 
have two independent and strikingly different histories in epistemology, each of which reflects 
a different basic aim, conception of knowledge, focus of analysis, and criterion for success (see 
Chapter 7). Fourth, it explains our responses to Gettier-Style Cases, which are (surprisingly) not 
consistent with the view that knowledge is justified, true belief (see Chapter 8). Fifth, it explains 
the calculated deliberate performance of actions and formation of attitudes—as either 
following from knowing the principal questioned proposition or from knowing certain 
secondary propositions (see §4.3.2.4).  
 
The second state of affairs that I would point to is that Moderate Invariantism depends on a 
move that contradicts an entrenched principle in epistemology, and which my theory does not. 
(The principle could of course be wrong. However, an awful lot of theory has been based on it, 
and it seems at least somewhat unlikely that it is wrong.) Moderate Invariantism seems to 
either set aside or reject the notion that Knowledge Intuitions are a good indicator of 
knowledge, or of the meaning of ‘know’. In DeRose’s high stakes bank case (which is presented 
and discussed in §2.3), when DeRose asserts 'Ok, I don't know that the bank is open on 
Saturday', it would seem that, in the moment, he would not have intuited knowing that the 
bank is open, i.e., he would have had some doubt about the matter. However, Moderate 
Invariantists tell us that DeRose nonetheless knows; and that a claim, by DeRose, to know in 
this instance, though it may constitute a conversational impropriety, would nonetheless be 
literally correct. So, it seems that DeRose would not intuit knowing; yet he does know and, if he 
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made the claim to know, that claim would be correct. In contrast, my theory supports the view 
that Knowledge Intuitions are a good indicator of knowledge, or of the meaning of ‘know’. Thus, 
I accept that it is legitimate for Contextualists, Subject Sensitive Invariantists and Classic 
Invariantists to allow their Knowledge Intuitions to inform the development of their theories 
(except that I suggest that they should not claim universal applicability of theory that in fact 
applies to only a subset of knowledge cases). 
 
 
9.3 Cutting the Knot 
 
The general theory of Knowledge Intuitions I have laid out presents a framework of sorts for 
epistemological investigation. The framework is described by the different circumstances under 
which Knowledge Intuitions are triggered by different conditions—such circumstances as 
whether one is focused on one’s own practical interests or focused on helping others, and 
whether one is envisaging communicating to a large audience. The Gordian knot of competing 
and incompatible positions in epistemology may be cut by viewing those positions through the 
lens of this framework (as I have in my comments on Positions 1 through 5 above). Doing so, 
eliminates much of the incompatibility of such positions by limiting their scope in accordance 
with the framework.  
 
Viewing the field of epistemology through the lens of this framework has additional significant 
advantages. Doing so allows us to see and appreciate a far greater richness in the field of 
epistemology than we do otherwise. If one assumes that all but one of a group of competing 
theories is incorrect, when in fact several of those theories shed light on a range of cases, one 
will have failed to appreciate the insight offered by those theories that one has dismissed, and 
one may well also dismiss valuable observations and findings on which those theories are 
based. Additionally, viewing the field of epistemology through the lens of this framework adds 
depth because it connects the literature to a picture of the role of knowing in life, and also to a 
picture of the dissemination of important messages in communities through information 
economies.  
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Appendix 1: The Extent to Which the 
Environmental Complexity Thesis 
Overgeneralizes 
  
 
In Chapter 3, I suggested that the primary Teleonomic Function of the KIP depends on the 
primary Teleonomic Function of Cognition—just as the function of depth perception depends 
on the general function of physical responses to physical circumstances. I then based my 
hypothesis of the function of the KIP, F1, on Godfrey-Smith’s hypothesis of the function of 
Cognition, the ECT, and also my corollary of the ECT, ECT’, which applies in the human case:  
 
ECT: ‘[t]he function of cognition is to enable the individual to deal with environmental 
complexity’ (Godfrey-Smith, 1998, p.3).  
 
ECT’: The function of Cognition is to create or select specialized behaviours that tend 
to be more efficacious and efficient in the different world conditions that the 
individual encounters than would general-purpose behaviours. 
 
However, some theorists worry that the ECT overgeneralizes—largely because human Cognition 
takes in a wide range of Cognitive traits that are assumed to have different evolutionary 
histories; and the validity of the inferences I made from the ECT to F1 is undermined to the 
extent that the ECT overgeneralizes. So, let us see whether it is plausible that the ECT holds 
over, at least, a very large part of Cognition—so that my inferences may be viewed as being 
worthy of further investigation.  
 
The task at hand may be reduced to seeing whether it is plausible that nearly all of our 
Cognitive traits ultimately help us to deal with Environmental Complexity. This may be further 
reduced to seeing whether nearly all of our Cognitive traits ultimately facilitate behavioural 
flexibility. However, as I pointed out earlier, we may assume that Cognitive traits that have only 
an instrumental function (i.e., a function that pertains strictly to how the trait is actually 
utilized) are by-products of traits that have a Teleonomic Function, that evolved by natural 
selection. So, we may even further reduce the task to seeing whether it is plausible that nearly 
all of those Cognitive traits that have a Teleonomic Function facilitate behavioural flexibility. 
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* 
 
Karen Neander finds that the ECT does not overgeneralize. On my reading, she argues that the 
ECT points to something like a necessary ingredient, which becomes a common denominator, in 
the creation of adaptive pressure for Cognitive traits:  
 
The ECT concerns the primary teleonomic function of cognition: as Godfrey-Smith 
otherwise expresses it, it purports to sketch an explanation of why we have cognition at 
all. This is to be contrasted with an explanation of why, given that we have cognition, 
we have cognition with this or that particular feature. So—and it is important to note 
this—the ECT is therefore consistent with many features of cognition being otherwise 
explained; perhaps . . . serving some subsidiary teleonomic function. (1997, p.569) 
 
And on the matter of these subsidiary functions, she writes, 
 
[T]he ECT seems to exclude very little in the way of an adaptational explanation of 
cognition: just about anything would qualify. If cognition was selected in one case for 
foraging for food, and in another case for choosing a mate, and in another case for 
evading predators, these could all be seen as enabling the agent to deal with 
environmental complexity. If all the world was food we wouldn’t need to tell food from 
non-food; if all potential mates were the same, there would be nothing to choose 
between them; and if predators were all entirely predictable, one wouldn’t need to be 
so alert. (p.574) 
 
This seems correct. Nonetheless, it is not obvious that this necessary ingredient, i.e., enabling 
behaviour flexibility, had a role in the creation of adaptive pressure for nearly all of our 
Cognitive traits. Godfrey-Smith is the first to express the very worry: 
 
[Cognition] might be a conglomerate of traits, located in a tangled nexus of 
evolutionary forces, different in every case . . . [Even so, this book will treat] a basic 
cognitive tool-kit as a unit for adaptationist analysis. This assumption about the 
teleonomic unity of the tool-kit is not regarded as obvious or necessarily true, but as an 
assumption which opens up a field of possibilities worthy of philosophical exploration. 
(1998, pp.23-24) 
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Godfrey-Smith then allows that the ECT does not explain Cognition associated with (1) the 
production of conscious qualitative experiences or qualia, and it does not explain (2) dreams 
(pp.22-23); and there are other Cognitive traits that have been suggested as not being covered 
by the ECT. D. M. Walsh finds that ‘[m]any thoroughly advantageous features of cognition, like 
the innate knowledge of grammatical structure, may be beneficial precisely because they 
facilitate inflexibility’ (1997, p.616) which contradicts ECT (and particularly ECT’). Also, Kim 
Sterelny suggests that some traits should be excluded from the ECT. He points out that 
cognition is an extremely broadly defined trait; and, he argues, the more broadly defined the 
trait, the less likely we are to being able to construct a plausible history of it, or ‘phylogeny’. He 
writes, ‘The more broadly we define swimming, the less likely it has an adaptive explanation, 
and the harder it will be to use phylogeny to test our adaptive hypothesis’ (1997, p.560). 
 
However, Godfrey-Smith’s, Walsh’s and Sterelny’s reservations seem misplaced. Look at 
Sterelny’s first. Sterelny’s worry may well be based on a valid general concern: Adaptationist 
accounts may well tend to get into trouble when the investigated object is a very broadly 
defined trait. However, under my reading (and, it seems, Neander’s), Godfrey-Smith’s project is 
a special case. His aim is not to develop a proper phylogeny of Cognition per se. Instead, he is 
focused on identifying a necessary ingredient, or a common denominator, in the selection 
pressure for a wide range of cognitive traits. This is a far more limited project than that which 
Sterelny envisions.  
 
Godfrey-Smith’s and Walsh’s reservations also seem misplaced. They seem not to have 
considered that many Cognitive traits are well understood as component traits of an 
overarching composite trait; and that while some of these component traits may not facilitate 
behavioural flexibility, the composite trait under which they fall may well do so. I explain. 
 
Certain traits are composite traits, constituted by component traits. For example, many birds 
have the composite trait of an orangey, or carotenoid-based, plumage coloration, which has at 
least four distinct component traits: pigment elaboration, patch area, pigment symmetry, and 
patch area symmetry. Human Cognition itself is a composite trait that includes, as component 
traits, attention, memory, knowledge, problem-solving, beliefs, appraisals, interpretations, 
representations and expectations (Gruszka et al., 2010). However, these component traits may 
themselves be composite traits and have their own component traits. For example, the 
component trait, problem-solving, is itself a composite trait that includes component traits of 
abstraction, analogy, brainstorming and lateral thinking. Similarly, a component trait of the 
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composite trait, depth perception, is the ability to determine the extent to which the eyes 
converge when they focus on objects. 
 
Critically, component traits do not need to facilitate behavioural flexibility in order to come 
under the ECT provided that the composite traits under which they fall do so. The Teleonomic 
Function of the composite trait produces adaptive pressure for its component traits in virtue of 
the latter supporting the former. For example, it is plausible that the composite trait, depth 
perception, produced adaptive pressure for the component trait, the ability to determine the 
extent to which the eyes converge when they focus, in virtue of the latter supporting the 
former. Accordingly, if depth perception can be explained by the ECT, as a trait that facilitates 
behavioural flexibility, then the ability to determine the extent to which the eyes converge 
when they focus, can also be explained by the ECT.  
 
Consider again Walsh’s suggestion that ‘innate knowledge of grammatical structure may be 
beneficial precisely because [it facilitates] inflexibility’ (1997, p.616). However, innate 
knowledge of grammatical structure would seem to be a component trait of the composite 
trait, the ability to communicate propositions about world conditions. Moreover, this 
composite trait facilitates behavioural flexibility, and so falls under the ECT. Accordingly, the 
component trait too, innate knowledge of grammatical structure, falls under the ECT. 
 
Consider Godfrey-Smith’s suggestion that the production of qualia and the production of 
dreams is not covered by the ECT. These also are plausibly component traits. They seem to 
facilitate the composite trait of problem-solving, which in turn facilitates behavioural flexibility. 
Accordingly, these component traits too, fall under the ECT. 
 
These various considerations suggest that the ECT does not greatly overgeneralize; and it is 
plausible that nearly all of our Cognitive traits that have a Teleonomic Function can be 
explained as facilitating behavioural flexibility, and fall under the ECT.  
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Appendix 2: Jason Stanley’s Bank Cases 
 
Two cases presented by Jason Stanley (Stanley, 2005, p.4) follow: 
 
Low Stakes 
Hannah and her wife Sarah are driving home on a Friday afternoon. They plan to stop at the 
bank on the way home to deposit their paycheques. It is not important that they do so, as they 
have no impending bills. But as they drive past the bank, they notice that the lines inside are 
very long, as they often are on Friday afternoons. Realizing that it isn’t very important that their 
paycheques are deposited right away, Hannah says, ‘I know the bank will be open tomorrow, 
since I was there just two weeks ago on Saturday morning. So we can deposit our paycheques 
tomorrow morning’. 
 
High Stakes 
Hannah and her wife Sarah are driving home on a Friday afternoon. They plan to stop at the 
bank on the way home to deposit their paycheques. Since they have an impending bill coming 
due, and very little in their account, it is very important that they deposit their paycheques by 
Saturday. Hannah notes that she was at the bank two weeks before on Saturday morning, and it 
was open. But, as Sarah points out, banks do change their hours. Hannah says, ‘I guess you’re 
right. I don’t know that the bank will be open tomorrow’. 
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Appendix 3: Biological Altruism 
 
I suggested that we adjudicate Advanced Propositions using the Basic Method under the Adding 
Evidence Thesis; and the Basic Method and Adding Evidence Thesis call for assessments of the 
benefit of true positives and the cost of false positives. These assessments are often made in 
relation to our own direct practical interests. Even so, the biological research supports the 
thesis that under certain circumstances these assessments may be made in relation to the 
practical interests of others—which thesis I call the Altruistic Assessment Thesis (§6.2). The 
research (a) predicts circumstances under which Altruistic behaviour is evolutionarily stable 
(i.e., it supports Inclusive Fitness under the varying environmental and social conditions 
individuals encounter), (b) finds a correspondence between these predicted circumstances and 
the circumstances under which Altruistic behaviour is observed, and (c) hypothesizes that this 
Altruistic behaviour is regulated by a Cognitive mechanism that evolved by natural selection. 
Each of the following four sections discusses an area in which such a correspondence between 
predicted and observed Altruistic behaviour has been identified. So, each of these sections 
predicts particular circumstances under which Altruistic behaviour may arise; and thus indicates 
the circumstances under which it is plausible that the Altruistic Assessment Thesis is applicable. 
 
 
A.3.1 Helping Kin 
 
According to kin-selection theory, adaptive pressure is produced for traits that cause individuals 
to help closely-related kin to survive and reproduce. The genes that produce these traits would 
tend to spread within the community. This suggests that the Altruistic Assessment Thesis may 
well be applicable when individuals are communicating with closely-related kin.  
 
However, kin-selection theory postulates that the maximum biological cost c that a donor is 
willing to incur, in order to produce a biological benefit b for a recipient, is directly proportional 
to the genetic relatedness between donor and recipient. So, genetic relatedness determines the 
predicted maximum c/b ratio reflected in Altruistic interactions; and the maximum c/b ratio 
reflected in Altruistic interactions between distantly related individuals is predicted to be very 
low.  
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Further, the relatedness between individuals may be precisely quantified, e.g., the coefficient of 
relatedness r between brothers is .5, and that between cousins is .125. So, the maximum cost C 
that an individual is willing to incur to produce benefit b for someone else may be precisely 
quantified: rb > c. Individuals would incur one unit of cost to help his brother only if that 
brother gets two or more units of benefit. This inequality was proposed by W. D. Hamilton 
(1964) and is generally called ‘Hamilton’s principle’. J. B. S. Haldane famously demonstrated the 
principle in a verbal response to a question about whether he would sacrifice his life to save a 
drowning brother. He would not, though he ‘would save two brothers or eight cousins’ (cited in 
McElreath and Boyd, 2007, p.82). 
 
However, it seems that a very large proportion of human interactions is with strangers 
(Seabright, 2004). So, kin-selection theory may seem to predict that Altruistic human 
communication would be highly limited, and produced mainly between close-related kin. Even 
so, Mary Jane West-Aberhard identifies an important range of cases in which kin-selection 
theory predicts Altruistic behaviour would be directed toward non-closely-related beneficiaries: 
 
The probability of altruism is increased if the beneficiary stands to gain a great deal 
(e.g., in emergencies), if the cost is low (e.g., if the altruist is . . . in control of an 
abundant resource), or both; and if the donor is particularly efficient at giving aid or if 
the beneficiary is particularly efficient at using it, as in the case of the specialized 
workers and queens of social insects, or if both situations obtain. (1975, p.1) 
 
Many communication cases feature these elements that increase the probability of Altruism. 
Communicated messages have the potential of being highly beneficial to Receivers, whereas 
the cost incurred sending those messages may be very low. So this suggests that kin selection 
theory may apply to wider range of human communication cases than what one might 
otherwise surmise. 
 
 
A.3.2 Direct Reciprocation 
 
Direct reciprocation theory relates to donor-recipient interactions in which, as a result of those 
interactions, (1) the loss in Inclusive Fitness for the donor is less than the gain in Inclusive 
Fitness for the recipient, (2) there is a good likelihood that the recipient will later reciprocate in 
an interaction in which, again, the loss for the helper is less than the gain for the one being 
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helped. Under these circumstances, when a donor helps and the recipient later reciprocates, 
both parties come out ahead in a ‘non-zero-sum game’. Donors seem to adopt the motto, ‘I 
scratch your back, you scratch mine’. To be clear, under direct reciprocation theory, individuals 
will tend not to help or to become a donor, unless they assess that their prospective recipient 
(a) would likely reciprocate if the opportunity arose, and (b) has the resources or the prospect 
of obtaining the resources that are necessary in order to reciprocate.  
 
The question arises: How do donors assess whether their potential recipients would indeed 
reciprocate if the opportunity arose? Biologists find that donors of several different species 
depend on the recipient’s history of reciprocating. The term ‘co-operator’ is used to refer to an 
individual who has a good history (and also to refer to an individual who has a good history of 
being a donor). Those who have a bad history in relation to either reciprocating or being a 
donor are referred to as ‘defectors’ or ‘free-riders’. So, potential donors adopt a simple rule: 
help if the individual is a co-operator, and do not help if she is a defector.  
 
A reciprocation strategy based on this last rule is referred to as ‘Tit-for-tat’; and such a strategy 
appears to be employed by a number of species—including vampire bats, African vervet 
monkeys, and more than forty-five species of fish who offer cleaning services to larger fish 
species in coral reefs.69 Moreover, it seems that humans employ Tit-for-tat: 
 
a broad array of experimental and neuroscientific evidence has accumulated over the 
last two decades supporting the hypothesis that our species' decision-making 
architecture includes both cognitive and motivational specializations whose design 
features are specifically tailored to enable gains through direct reciprocity (e.g., 
detection of defectors and punitive sentiment toward defectors). (Delton et al., 2011, p. 
13335) 
 
Even so, we are far from being infallible in our identifications of co-operators and defectors. 
Fortunately, the risk of error may be significantly reduced by forming twosomes whose 
members may receive ongoing benefits from ongoing reciprocal interactions. Members of these 
twosomes seem to adopt the motto, ‘I will scratch your back from time to time, and expect that 
you will scratch mine from time to time’. The research indicates that the behavioural traits that 
regulate such dyadic relations are evolutionarily stable. Moreover, by the lights of some 
                                                          
69 Matt Ridley offers an overview of the interesting history of discovery and investigation in relation to 
Tit-for-tat (1997, pp.60-78). 
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researchers, ‘[t]he most important condition necessary for the evolution of direct reciprocity is 
that interactions between pairs of agents be sufficiently repeated’ (Delton et al., 2011, 
p.13335). This finding suggests that the Altruistic Assessment Thesis may well be applicable 
when Senders and their intended or envisaged Receivers have an ongoing relationship that 
involves reciprocal interactions e.g., one is an employee, and the other her employer (assuming 
that the employee’s work in fact benefits the employer and the employer regularly reciprocates 
by paying the employee’s wages).  
 
 
A.3.3 Reputation-based Reciprocity 
 
According to the direct reciprocation theory discussed in the previous section, community 
members tend to prefer helping co-operators to helping defectors. As a result, all other being 
equal, co-operators should tend to be more successful at eliciting help than defectors. Such a 
state of affairs suggests that (a) community members keep track of who the co-operators and 
defectors are, (b) an individual’s reputation as either a co-operator or a defector may be a 
significant factor in their Inclusive Fitness, and, most important to the present discussion, (c) 
selection pressure is produced for Cognitive traits that mediate reputation-building behaviour.  
 
The reputation-building behaviour that biologists standardly suggest evolves primarily consists 
in the individual bringing it to pass that others in the community learn that she behaves like a 
co-operator, and do not learn that she behaves like a free-rider. This state of affairs suggests a 
modification to the direct reciprocation rule that I referred to in the last section, viz., help if the 
individual is a co-operator, and not if she is a defector. The modification is as follows: 
 
Reputation-Building Rule: Help if the individual is a co-operator and others in the 
community will find out.70 
 
Reputation-Building Rule is predicted to be an evolutionarily stable strategy; and this situation 
suggests that the Altruistic Assessment Thesis may well be applicable when the Sender’s 
intended or envisaged Receiver is a co-operator, and others in the community will learn about 
the communication. 
 
                                                          
70 The research in relation to this strategy is reviewed in Nowak and Sigmund (2005). 
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The extent of the selection pressure for Cognitive traits that mediate reputation-building 
behaviour depends on the benefits of having a good reputation. Richard Alexander argues that 
these benefits may extend beyond those that are produced by being a preferred partner for 
reciprocal interactions. He suggests that, 
 
the beneficent individual may [also] be rewarded with direct compensation from all or 
part of the group (such as with money or a medal or social elevation as a hero) which, in 
turn, increases his likelihood of (and that of his relatives) receiving additional 
perquisites; [and] the beneficent individual may be rewarded by simply having the 
success of the group within which he behaved beneficently contribute to the success of 
his own descendants and collateral relatives. (1987, p.94) 
 
Moreover, the benefit of helping co-operators when others in the community will find out 
extends to being able to avoid punishment. It seems that some community members are willing 
to incur a cost to directly punish those who fail to help co-operators. Ernest Fehr and Simon 
Gächter find that,  
 
there is indeed a widespread willingness of the co-operators to punish [those who fail 
to help co-operators]. Our results indicate that this holds true even if punishment is 
costly and does not provide any material benefit for the punisher. In addition, we 
provide evidence that [those who fail to help co-operators] are punished the more 
heavily the more they deviate from the cooperation levels of the co-operators. [Those 
who potentially fail to help co-operators], therefore, can avoid or at least reduce 
punishment by increasing their cooperation levels. (2000, p.980) 
 
The effect of this willingness on the part of co-operators to punish those who fail to help co-
operators is to further increase selection pressure for Cognitive traits that mediate reputation-
building behaviour—that mediate, in particular, following the Reputation-Building Rule.  
 
 
A.3.4 Commitment Theory 
 
The recognition of the possibility that co-operators could change their stripes, i.e., become 
defectors, has the potential of undermining (a) direct reciprocity, including that exhibited in 
ongoing dyadic relationships (described in A.3.2), and (b) the benefit of having a reputation as a 
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co-operator (described in A.3.3). Under both situations, potential co-operators may come to 
doubt whether their help will be reciprocated; and they may, as a result, refuse to help others. 
Under such circumstances, the non-zero-sum benefits that are produced by reciprocation may 
be lost.  
 
Commitment theory postulates that individuals have a means by which they may reduce such 
doubt, and may in the process mitigate the potential loss of benefits caused by that doubt: They 
may reduce the doubt that others may have about them by (a) allowing themselves to be 
forced in some way to co-operate in the future, and (b) ensuring that others find about this.  
 
We may commit ourselves by employing a ‘commitment device’ that effectively forces certain 
future co-operative behaviour. Ulysses, for example, in Homer’s Odyssey used a commitment 
device in the form of a pact that he made with the crew of his ship. The Sirens’ beautiful voices 
lured sailors in passing ships to crash on their island reefs. As Ulysses’ ship approached the 
Sirens’ island, Ulysses wanted to hear the Sirens' song without endangering himself or his men. 
So, as their ship approached the island, he ordered his sailors to tie him to the ship’s mast and 
to put wax in their ears so that they would not hear the Sirens’ song. Ulysses’ future behaviour 
would thus be controlled.  
 
Commitment theory postulates that an individual’s personality or character functions as a 
commitment device inasmuch as it may effectively compel future behaviour. An individual who 
has a helpful character may feel that they must be helpful. So, the inferences we make about 
the future co-operative behaviour of community members depends both on their reputation as 
a co-operator (which is based on their history of co-operation and defection), and on their 
demonstrations of personality or character.  
 
In paradigm cases, displays of character are made by behaving in a way that is consistent with 
one’s character precisely when doing so is costly. (According to Robert Frank, this principle 
applies not only to positive reputational characters, such as honesty or trustworthiness, but 
also to negative ones, such as the character of retaliating against hostile actions. If one is to 
demonstrate that one is a retaliator by character, it is not enough to retaliate when doing so 
would prove immediately advantageous. One must retaliate when it is costly to do so (1988, 
pp.71-95).) So, we reduce the potential for others to doubt our future co-operation by 
184 
 
demonstrating that we are a co-operator by character, which we do by co-operating when it is 
costly to do so.71 
 
The foregoing suggests that selection pressure would be produced for a Cognitive device that 
would mediate a co-operative character. Moreover, according to Mary West-Aberhard, such 
selection pressure may be especially strong. She postulates the existence of potent ‘social 
selection’ that emerges out of competitions between conspecifics. This is a ‘competition in 
which an individual must win in contests or comparisons with conspecific rivals in order to gain 
access to some resource, including (under sexual selection) mates’ (1983, p.155). Social 
selection leads to the evolution of character traits: ‘Characters used in social competition can 
undergo particularly rapid and divergent evolution’ (155).  
 
It is plausible that our ancestors competed to attract partners with whom they could have 
reciprocal interactions, friends, allies, and other kinds of partners. These competitions would 
have been based on having a co-operative character. Thus, strong selection pressure for having 
a co-operative character may have been exerted.72 These findings suggest that the Altruistic 
Assessment Thesis may well be applicable when individuals’ co-operative character is strong 
enough to compel them to provide the level of co-operation called for in the circumstances.  
 
 
 
 
  
                                                          
71 Even so, it seems we sometimes fail to distinguish (a) individuals who co-operate in order to create a 
good reputation, but who may well defect if they believed that the defection would go undiscovered, 
from (b) those who have a co-operative character, and who, as a result, may well not defect even if they 
believed that the defection would go undiscovered. 
72 Robert Frank suggests that learning plays an important role in having a co-operative character: 
‘indoctrination and practice are required for [a range of character traits] to emerge’ (1988, p.18). He 
argues further that such practice sometimes results in Altruistic behaviour with non-kin, in one-shot 
interactions, even if it is unlikely to enhance one’s reputation, e.g., tipping a restaurant server while on 
holidays. 
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Appendix 4: Cappelen & Lepore’s ‘Test (iii)’  
 
 
Herman Cappelen and Ernie Lepore (2003) perform three tests for the context sensitivity of the 
truth conditions of knowledge attributions; and report negative findings in all three. However, I 
showed earlier (in §7.2.2) that the first two are based on interpretations of acontextual 
examples, which invalidates them. The third test, ‘test (iii)’, in my view, is valid. However, 
Cappelen & Lepore do not conduct it properly. The problem follows from using 
unrepresentative examples (i.e., they make an inductive sampling error). If conducted properly, 
the test is positive for context sensitivity. 
 
As I suggest, test (iii) is based on a valid principle, which Cappelen & Lepore demonstrate using 
the following example: 
 
Suppose we know there are two contexts in which 'Yesterday John left' and 'Yesterday 
Bill left' are true respectively (though we don't know the time of these contexts). It 
doesn't follow that there is a context in which ‘Yesterday John and Bill left' is true. 
(p.35) 
 
For example, it may be that yesterday the statement 'Yesterday John left' was true; it may be 
that today the statement 'Yesterday Bill left' is true; and it does not follow from this that there 
is a context in which the collective description, ‘Yesterday John and Bill left' is true. The failure 
of the collective description to follow indicates that the two initial statements are context 
sensitive. This ‘is because the semantic value of [the collective description] is determined in one 
context, and we have no guarantee that that semantic value . . . “captures” . . . the semantic 
values of [the initial two statements] in those contexts of utterance’ (p.35).  
 
Cappelen & Lepore then propose a test for context sensitivity of knowledge attributions based 
on this principle. I paraphrase a formulation of the test as follows:  
 
Test for C-D: Suppose we know that there are two practical contexts in which ‘S1 
knows that p’ and ‘S2 knows that p’ are true respectively. If it follows 
from this that there exists a context in which the collective description ‘S1 
and S2 know that p’ is true, then we may infer that the two initial 
knowledge attributions are not context sensitivity.  
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They find that it does follow that the collective description is true, and conclude that knowledge 
attributions are not context sensitive. Even so, I find this conclusion to be false. 
 
It is possible to demonstrate that their test is in principle able to report positive findings for 
context sensitivity of the truth conditions of knowledge attributions. To see this notice first that 
there may, in general, be only one context in which a given context sensitive expression is true. 
For example, it may well be that ‘Yesterday John left’ is true in only one context. Say, that John 
had spent his entire life up until yesterday in a prison. Yesterday he left; and died the moment 
he left. Here, it may well emerge that there is only one context under which the expression is 
true. Now, say that that there is only one practical context in which ‘S1 knows that p’ is true and 
only one practical context in which ‘S2 knows that p’ is true; and these two contexts are 
different. Call them contexts C1 and C2 respectively. Further, the Epistemic Standard that S1 sets 
in C1 is lower than that which she sets in any other context; and the Epistemic Standard that S2 
sets in C2 is lower than that which she sets in any other context. Moreover, say that S1’s 
evidence just meets the extremely low Epistemic Standard in C1, and S2’s evidence just meets 
the extremely low Epistemic Standard in C2; and neither S1’s evidence nor S2’s evidence meets 
the Epistemic Standard that they set respectively in any other context. (Also, S1’s evidence does 
not meet the Epistemic Standard that she would set in C2, and S2’s evidence does not meet the 
Epistemic Standard that she would set in C1.) Under these circumstances, C1 is the only practical 
context in which ‘S1 knows that p’ is true, and C2 is the only practical context in which ‘S2 knows 
that p’ is true. It is evident that it does not follow from this that there exists a context in which 
the collective description ‘S1 and S2 know that p’ is true. This seems to suggest that test (iii) may 
in principle report positive findings for context sensitivity.  
 
As I suggested, Cappelen & Lepore’s false negative finding is the result of their using 
unrepresentative examples. They present two such examples. Each example consists of (a) two 
or more cases in which a subject attributes knowledge in relation to a particular proposition, 
and (b) a collective description. Here is one of their examples—which includes three cases and a 
collective description:  
 
A knows that penguins eat fish. 
B knows that penguins eat fish. 
C knows that penguins eat fish. 
A, B and C know that penguins eat fish. 
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Cappelen & Lepore flesh out the various cases presented in their two examples by providing a 
practical context for each subject. One may indeed have a sense of the Risk/Reward Quotient in 
all the cases included in the two examples. Also, they describe all their subjects’ evidence. 
 
They then ask us to assess the truth of the collective description in the two examples, and in the 
process revise their criterion for context sensitivity: ‘If . . . you . . . think it follows that [the 
collective description is true], then you have evidence ‘know’ isn’t context sensitive’ (p.36). This 
is not quite the same as the question that the test calls for—which is something like, ‘Does it 
follow that there is a context in which the collective description is true?’ Also, notice that they 
ask us to adjudicate the collective description acontextually (see §7.2.2). I suggest that the 
epistemologists who read their journal article and adjudicate the acontextual collective 
descriptions in their examples will do so using an Epistemic Standard that is based on an 
internalized theory of justification.73 Let us say that the Epistemic Standard that they set will be 
based on internalized theory that is consistent with Earl Conee’s suggestion that the ‘unvarying 
standard for truth is very high, but not unreachably high’ (2005, p.52).  
 
I do not suggest that Cappelen & Lepore’s revised criterion for context sensitivity that I just 
described in itself violates the integrity of the test. However, I do suggest that they have failed 
to conduct the test properly insofar as their examples include knowledge cases that are not 
representative of the kinds of cases that Second History theorists focus on. In particular, they 
give their subjects in these cases evidence that is arguably the best evidence humans are 
capable of possessing. As a result, it seems to the reader that the subjects would know in pretty 
much any context. So, it is highly likely that we will be inclined to answer in the affirmative the 
question that reflects the revised criterion, ‘If . . . you . . . think it follows that [the collective 
description is true], then you have evidence ‘know’ isn’t context sensitive’ (p.36). 
 
In one of their examples, the knowledge cases involve attributions that have the form ‘Subject 
A knows that object X is red’. The collective description has the form ‘Subjects A, B, etc. all see a 
red object’. The evidence held by all of the subjects consists of seeing, presumably under good 
light, that the object is red (p.36). This evidence is about as good as it gets. So, when the reader 
assesses whether it follows that the collective description is true, she is bound to find that all 
                                                          
73 I discuss such a possibility in §7.2.2. I add that I do not believe that the assessments I refer to here in 
test (iii) are made on the basis of a best bet, primarily because the initial knowledge attributions that 
Cappelen & Lepore use in each of their examples are presented in very different practical contexts, 
suggesting very different Risk/Reward Quotients. As a result, there does not seem to be any one 
particular best bet suggested.   
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the subjects have evidence that meet her Conee-like Epistemic Standard. The collective 
description seems to the reader to be true.  
 
Their other example, the one that involves penguins above, is more complicated. The example 
includes three cases, one involves the subject A, another B, and the third C. Look at the case 
involving B first. Cappelen & Lepore tell us that the knowledge attribution, ‘B knows that 
penguins eat fish’, is made by B’s biology professor. So, the reader would likely assume that B’s 
evidence meets the biology professor’s Epistemic Standard. We are told further that Subject C 
possesses evidence that is so good that it succeeds ‘in responding to scepticism’ (p.36). So, both 
B’s and C’s evidence should easily meet the reader’s Conee-like Epistemic Standard; and it 
should seem to the reader that these two subjects know in pretty much any context.  
 
Before turning to Subject A, notice that if the reader did not already take herself as knowing the 
proposition p that penguins eat fish, then, after learning that both B and C have either 
extremely good or ideal evidence in favour of p, she too would take herself as knowing that p in 
pretty much any context. 
 
Turn to Subject A. About A’s situation, we are told only that ‘A is a five-year-old, and . . . his 
(non-philosophical mother) . . . truly attributes knowledge to him’ (p.35). It would seem to be a 
good bet that A’s mother is a responsible educator for A. So, Cappelen & Lepore have created a 
situation in which (i) the reader takes herself as knowing that p, (ii) the reader understands that 
A’s mother finds that A knows that p, and (iii) A’s mother is likely to be a responsible educator 
for A. It would seem that under these circumstances, the reader is likely to take it that A’s 
evidence would meet their own Conee-like Epistemic Standard.  
 
So, the reader it likely to take it that all the subjects have evidence that meets their own Conee-
like Epistemic Standard; and, so, take it that the collective description is true. 
 
Thus, while ‘know’ seems to have failed Cappelen & Lepore’s revised criterion for context 
sensitivity in both of their examples (i.e., the reader is likely to think that it follows that the 
collective description is true in both examples); ‘know’ fails only because the authors have used 
unrepresentative examples. Cappelen & Lepore give their subjects evidence that meet an 
Epistemic Standard that the reader is likely to set given the way in which the examples are 
presented. For example, the reader would not find that ‘know’ fails their test if they had 
presented some cases in which their subjects’ evidence only just met a relatively low Epistemic 
Standard; and if, following a reading of these cases, the reader was likely to have set an 
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Epistemic Standard when adjudicating the collective descriptions that would not be met by 
those subjects’ evidence. The reader would not have found that the collective description is 
true, and ‘know’ would not have failed Cappelen & Lepore’s revised criterion. Also, under these 
circumstances, the reader would not have found that Cappelen & Lepore’s initial criterion for 
context sensitivity was met, i.e., that it follows that there is a context in which the collective 
description is true. Moreover, I demonstrated earlier that their test is in principle able to report 
positive findings for context sensitivity of the truth conditions of knowledge attributions (which 
demonstration used knowledge attributions that are true in only one context). 
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Appendix 5: Defined Terms 
 
Title case terms and capitalized acronyms have the meanings indicated here.  
 
 
Adding Evidence Thesis   Introduced in §5.2   The thesis that one’s Knowledge Intuitions are 
suspended in the moment (even if one’s Present Evidence meets the Epistemic Standard 
predicted by the Basic Method) if one believes that (a) reducing false positive risk by gathering 
additional evidence is a practical possibility, and (b) the benefit of this reduction in false positive 
risk exceeds the cost of gathering the additional evidence. 
 
Advanced Proposition   Introduced in §3.1   Distinguished from Elementary Propositions, 
Advanced Propositions (a) identify ambiguous or non-perceptible objects, states or events, (b) 
locate those objects, states or events in space or time, (c) attribute ambiguous or non-
perceptible properties to objects, states or events, (d) attribute causes to states and events, or 
(e) make predictions about future states and events. (This is not intended to be a 
comprehensive list.) For example, the following statements express Advanced Propositions: (1) 
the sun will rise in the East tomorrow, (2) my bank will be open this Saturday, (3) she is a loyal 
employee, (4) my car (which I cannot see at the moment) is parked outside on the street, (5) 
that car over there is heavy, (6) he has the public’s best interests at heart, (7) the bridge is safe, 
(8) the bird is a gadwall, (9) anthropogenic global warming is real, (10) the politician’s policies 
directly led to the problems to which you referred, (11) the accused is guilty, (12) the watch 
works fine, (13) that is Jonah’s sweater, and (14) Paris is the capital of France. 
 
Altruism (and cognate adjectives and adverbs)   Explained in §6.1    An individual’s behaviour or 
thought (including an adjudication of an Advanced Proposition) is ‘Altruistic’ if and only if she 
values neutrally or negatively its direct consequences in relation to her own practical and self-
oriented interests, and values positively its consequences in relation to the practical interests of 
those she intends or envisages helping.  
 
Altruistic Assessment Thesis (AAT)   Introduced at the beginning of Chapter 6   The thesis that 
we are sometimes focused on helping others; and when we are, our adjudications of relevant 
Advanced Propositions are based on our assessments of the benefit of true positives and the 
cost of false positives in relation to the practical interests of those others. 
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Altruistic Knowledge Intuitions, Egoistic Knowledge Intuitions   Introduced in §3.3. See also 
§6.2   All Knowledge Intuitions emerge from our valuations of the consequences of performing 
actions or forming attitudes. Egoistic Knowledge Intuitions emerge from those valuations that 
are oriented toward our own practical interests; Altruistic Knowledge Intuitions emerge from 
valuations that are oriented toward the practical interests of individuals who in the moment we 
intend to help or envisage helping. 
 
Basic Assumption   Introduced in §5.3   A belief that is a constituent of our Worldview and 
which facilitates the adjudication of Advanced Propositions by giving Present Evidence a basis 
upon which it may secure predictive validity. 
 
Basic Method   Introduced in §5.1   A procedure by which Advanced Propositions may be 
adjudicated, leading to the production of either Egoistic Knowledge Intuitions or Altruistic 
Knowledge Intuitions. 
(1)  We notice and keep track of the frequency of the appearance or occurrence of different 
general kinds of objects, relations, states or events. These frequencies are the basis for the 
sense we get of the Prior Pr(p=TRUE) in particular instances. We may then get a sense of 
the Risk/Reward Quotient by modulating our sense of the cost of a false positive and the 
benefit of a true positive accordingly, and weigh the numerator of the Risk/Reward 
Quotient against its denominator.  
(2) We associate by positive correlation the Risk/Reward Quotient with an Epistemic Standard. 
(3) We notice and keep track of the frequency with which different general kinds of objects, 
relations, states or events correctly predict other different general kinds of objects, 
relations, states or events. These frequencies are the basis for the sense we get of the 
strength of the Present Evidence in particular instances. 
(4) We produce Knowledge Intuitions in relation to the questioned proposition if and only if 
the assessed strength of the Present Evidence meets our Epistemic Standard. 
 
Basic Proposition   Introduced in §5.3   Propositions that are identified as candidates for the 
content of new Basic Assumptions. 
 
Broadcaster   Introduced in §6.4.4   Senders who intend or envisage passing messages to 
hundreds, thousands or millions of Receivers. Their messages may be passed orally or by the 
written word across communities or down from one generation to the next.  
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Classic Invariantism   The view that the evidential standard for knowledge is very high and not 
dependent on context—though the standard is not so high that knowledge is not a practical 
possibility.  
 
Cognition, Cognitive   Introduced in §3.2.2   ‘[T]hose higher mental processes in humans and 
animals, such as the formation of associations, concept formation and insight, whose existence 
can only be inferred and not directly observed’ (Henderson’s Dictionary of Biology, 14th edn, 
2008, p.131). 
 
Contextualism   Discussed in §2.3   The view that the truth conditions for knowledge 
attributions vary across contexts in accordance with the attributor’s practical interests.  
 
ECT, ECT’   See ENVIRONMENTAL COMPLEXITY THESIS 
 
Egoistic Knowledge Intuitions   See ALTRUISTIC KNOWLEDGE INTUITIONS. 
 
Elementary Propositions   Introduced in §3.1   Propositions that (a) identify unambiguous and 
perceptible objects, states, events or conjunctions of states or events, (b) locate those objects 
or events in space and time, or that (c) attribute unambiguous and perceptible properties to 
objects, states or events. (I do not suggest that this is a comprehensive list.) For example, the 
following statements (made under good observational conditions) express Elementary 
Propositions: (1) the object is a bird, (2) the cat is on the mat, (3) the tomato is red, and (4) the 
red billiard ball hit the black one. 
 
End-User   Introduced in §6.4.4   The notion of the End-User arises out of a suggested division of 
labour with respect to distributions of helpful information. Broadcasters may send messages to 
a number of Senders at a local level who use those message to fashion derivative messages that 
are helpful, pertinent, and understandable to local Receivers, who I call ‘End-Users’. The latter 
are thus able to directly benefit from Broadcasters’ messages.  
 
Environmental Complexity   Introduced in §3.2   Environmental Complexity is an environmental 
parameter that is relative to a particular organism. It has to do with whether an organism’s 
Inclusive Fitness is affected differently when it performs particular behaviours or adopts 
particular Phenotypes under either different environmental conditions that it encounters (i.e., 
under a type of environmental complexity called ‘environmental diversity’), or at different times 
(i.e., under a type of environmental complexity called ‘environmental variability’). If an 
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organism’s behaviour or adopted Phenotype positively affects its Inclusive Fitness under some 
of environmental conditions it encounters, but not others, or at some times, but not others, its 
environment is viewed as being complex. For example, the environment for the plant Hieracium 
umbellatum is viewed as complex insofar as the plant benefits significantly by (i) adopting its 
bushy, broad leaf Phenotype when it grows on rocky, sea-side cliffs, and (ii) adopting its narrow 
leaf Phenotype when it grows on sand dunes.  
 
Environmental Complexity Thesis (ECT)   Introduced in §3.2.3   Godfrey Smith’s hypothesis of 
the function of Cognition: ‘[t]he function of cognition is to enable the individual to deal with 
environmental complexity’ (1998, p.3). In §3.2.3, I propose a corollary of the ECT that is more 
informative and particularly applicable in the human case: 
 
ECT’: The function of Cognition is to create or select specialized behaviours that tend 
to be more efficacious and efficient in the different world conditions that the 
individual encounters than would general-purpose behaviours. 
 
Epistemic Standard   Introduced in §1.2.3   The standard that one’s Present Evidence must meet 
in relation to a proposition p in order to produce a Knowledge Intuition in relation to p. In 
§4.3.2.3 I show that Epistemic Standards correlate (positively) with the SDT Index. Further, 
because I adopt the working hypothesis that the word ‘know’ gives voice to our Knowledge 
Intuitions (in §1.2.3), ‘Epistemic Standard’ also refers to the evidential standard that we seem to 
apply when we use the word ‘know’.  
 
Epistemic Standard Variabilism   Discussed in §7.2   The thesis that the Epistemic Standard 
reflected in knowledge attributions vary across contexts in accordance with practical 
circumstances. The thesis is maintained in theories that suggest that it is the practical 
circumstances of the speaker that determines the Epistemic Standard, e.g., Contextualism; 
theories that suggest that it is the practical circumstances of the subject that determines the 
Epistemic Standard, e.g., Subject Sensitive Invariantism; and the theory presented in this thesis 
that it is the practical circumstances of either the attributor (when Egoistic Knowledge 
Intuitions are produced) or those of the individual(s) who the attributor intends to help or 
envisages helping (when Altruistic Knowledge Intuitions are produced) that determines the 
Epistemic Standard.  
 
F1   Introduced in §3.2   My primary hypothesis of the function of the intuition of having 
propositional knowledge in particular cases: In a situation S, the function of intuiting that one 
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knows that a proposition p is true is to indicate to oneself that, on the total evidence, behaving 
as if p in S will tend to produce better consequences than that of not behaving as if p in S. 
 
F2   Introduced in §3.2   My discussion of communication cases is facilitated by identifying a 
special case of F1 that is specific to the Altruistic Knowledge Intuitions produced in these cases:  
The function of a Sender’s Altruistic Knowledge Intuition in relation to p is to indicate to herself 
that communicating that p will tend to help her Receiver(s) more than would not 
communicating that p. 
 
First History, Second History   See §2.2 and Chapter 7   Two separate, distinct and individually 
coherent histories within epistemology. Epistemological theory builds largely on earlier 
theoretical developments within the history of which it forms a part. The theory that makes up 
the First History may be directly or indirectly associated with the aim of helping those who 
broadcast messages widely identify propositions that are unlikely to prove false. The theory 
that makes up the Second History may be directly or indirectly associated with the aim of 
shedding light on the circumstances under which we take ourselves as knowing or not knowing 
that particular world conditions obtain, and also to shed light on the ordinary use of ‘know’. 
 
Gambling Case, Insurance Case   Introduced in §4.3.2.4   In both Gambling Cases and Insurance 
Cases, agents perform an action or form an attitude even though they do not have enough 
evidence to take themselves as knowing the main questioned proposition. 
In Gambling Cases, agents assume or conclude that the performance of a particular action 
or forming a particular attitude could produce some benefit, and they are not able to rule out 
the possibility that the action would not produce this benefit. So, they perform that action or 
form that attitude with the hope that the benefit would be produced, even though they do not 
know whether it will. For example, I assume that buying a lottery ticket could lead to a win, and 
I am not able to rule out the possibility that it would not. So, I buy a lottery ticket even though I 
do not intuit knowing that I will win.  
In Insurance Cases, agents assume or conclude that they would be harmed by the 
occurrence of an event. They question whether the harmful event will occur, and find that they 
cannot rule out the possibility that it will. So, they take an appropriate precaution, performing a 
particular action or forming a particular attitude. They act though they do not intuit knowing 
that the event will occur. For example, I assume that it would be bad for me if my house was 
damaged or destroyed by fire, and I cannot rule out the possibility that it will. So, I buy fire 
insurance even though I do not intuit knowing that my house will catch fire. 
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Gettier-Style Case   See RUSSELL’S STOPPED CLOCK 
 
Inclusive Fitness   An organism’s ability to pass its genes on to subsequent generations, which 
correlates with its ability and that of its closest relatives to survive and reproduce. 
 
Insurance Case   See GAMBLING CASE 
 
Knowledge Intuitions   Introduced in §1.1   When we have the intuition of knowing that a world 
condition exists, in that moment we believe without any doubt that it exists and are certain that 
we would do well to act or form an attitude as if it exists. I argue in §1.2.2 that the ordinary use 
of ‘know’ in statements having the form ‘I know that p’ give voice to Knowledge Intuitions. 
These mental states are produced by the Knowledge Intuition Producer or KIP. 
 
Knowledge Intuition Producer (KIP)   Introduced in §3.1   The mechanism that adjudicates 
Advanced Propositions and produces Knowledge Intuitions in relation to the propositions it 
adjudicates. It determines whether the strength of the Present Evidence meets an Epistemic 
Standard, and does so in a way that allows it to fulfil its function, whatever that function may 
be. 
 
Moderate Invariantism   Discussed in §2.3   The view that the evidential standard for 
knowledge is invariant across contexts and low enough that we know most of what we think we 
know. 
 
Multiple Receivers Prediction   Introduced in §6.4.3   Senders’ Epistemic Standards correlate 
positively with Receiver numbers—except when there is no appreciable false positive risk for 
Receivers. 
 
Operator’s Question   Introduced in §4.2.1   SDT suggests that, in principle, the optimal 
detection threshold (e.g., in relation to the strength of the data required to flag a target object), 
evidentiary threshold or Epistemic Standard may be set on the basis of how the system 
operator answers the following question: What is the higher priority for me at this time, 
increasing the probability that detections are in fact target objects (by raising the system’s 
detection threshold), or decreasing the probability of failing to detect target objects (by 
lowering the system’s detection threshold)? 
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Phenotype   Introduced in §4.3.1   The physical characteristics of an organism which is 
determined by the interaction of its genotype and its environment.   
 
Present Evidence   Introduced in §4.3.2.3   A type of evidence that is distinguished from the 
evidence that gives us a sense of Prior Pr(p=TRUE). Present Evidence is directly connected to 
the specific proposition and recently gathered, whereas the latter type of evidence is broadly-
based or historical in nature; and while Present Evidence is always prominent in the context, we 
may not be consciously aware that our adjudications are partly based on the latter type of 
evidence. For example, in Stanley’s Low Stakes Case and Stanley’s High Stakes Case, Hannah’s 
having seen that the bank was open on Saturday two weeks before constitutes her Present 
Evidence, whereas the evidence that gives her a sense of the Prior Probability that the bank is 
open on Saturday is not mentioned. (I do not view these evidence categories as being hard and 
fast, but rather as family resemblance descriptions of evidence types.) Knowledge Intuitions are 
produced when one’s Present Evidence meets one’s Epistemic Standard.  
 
Principal Challenge of the KIP Introduced in §4.1   In order to infer the operating principles of 
the KIP, I hypothesize its principle biological challenge as follows: (1) in response to equivocal or 
deceptive evidence, (2) the KIP produces Knowledge Intuitions, (3) that guide our responses to 
world conditions in a way that (4) has a tendency to produce consequences that we value. This 
challenge may be represented as follows: 
 
   
 
 
 
 
Prior Pr(p=TRUE), Prior Pr(p=FALSE)   Introduced in §4.3.2.3   These constituent variables of the 
Risk/Reward Quotient are analytical constructs that are analogous to the notions used in SDT of 
prior probability of signal and of prior probability of noise respectively. Prior Pr(p=TRUE) refers 
to the ‘natural frequency’ (i.e., the experienced or envisioned frequency) with which 
propositions of the kind that are in question are true; and Prior Pr(p=FALSE) is the former’s 
probability complement, i.e., the two probabilities add to unity.  
 
Prior Probability   Introduced in §4.3.2.3   Prior Probability refers to the subjective sense of the 
probability conferred on a questioned proposition by all of one’s evidence except one’s Present 
Equivocal or 
misleading 
evidence 
KIP 
Knowledge Intuitions 
allow responses to 
world conditions 
Tendency to 
produce 
consequences 
we value 
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Evidence. It seems that much of our ordinary sense of Prior Probabilities is derived from our 
sense of the frequency of world states or events based on accumulated experience.  
 
Relevant Alternative Theory (RA Theory)   Introduced in §2.3   Relevant alternative theory holds 
that ruling out all the relevant alternatives to a questioned hypothesis h is a sufficient condition 
for knowing that h. One need not rule out irrelevant alternatives, particularly sceptical 
alternatives. RA Theory thus allows the possibility that there is much that we know. 
 
Receiver   Introduced in §3.3   Individuals to whom intended or envisaged communications of 
Senders are directed. 
 
Risk/Reward Quotient   Introduced in §4.2.2   An alternative conceptualization of the SDT 
Index. One may view the two numerators in the SDT Index as being associated; and, separately, 
view its two denominators as being associated. The product of the two numerators may be 
viewed as something like the expected cost that will be incurred due to false positives (based 
solely on Prior Pr(FALSE)). Similarly, the product of the two denominators may be viewed as 
something like the expected benefit that will be produced due to true positives (based solely on 
Prior Pr(TRUE)). So, the SDT Index as a whole may be thought of as the expected cost of a false 
positive relative to the expected benefit of a true positive (based solely on the Prior Pr(FALSE) 
and Prior Pr(TRUE)). Such a conception of the SDT Index has a well-known counterpart in the 
academic and professional business world, in the concept of the ‘risk/reward environment’—
which refers to something like the expected cost of a bad investment decision relative to the 
expected benefit of a good investment decision. 
 
Risk/Reward Quotient = 
cost of a false positive  x Prior Pr(p=FALSE) 
benefit of a true positive x Prior Pr(p=TRUE) 
 
Russell’s Stopped Clock   Introduced in §2.2   Bertrand Russell (2009) presents a 
counterexample to the thesis that knowledge is true belief supported by ordinary justification: 
‘There is the man who looks at a clock which is not going, though he thinks it is, and who 
happens to look at it the moment when it is right; this man acquires a true belief as to the time 
of day, but cannot be said to have knowledge’ (2009, p.140). The man’s belief is based on 
seeing a clock clearly, which is ordinarily viewed as sufficient justification for knowing the time; 
and his belief is true. Still, he does not have knowledge. Russell thus identifies a class of 
ordinary cases in which the evidence fails to have the right kind of relation with that which 
makes the belief true—so that the belief is true only by accident. Cases of this kind are 
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standardly associated with cases presented by Edmund Gettier (1963). So, I refer to them as 
Gettier-Style Cases. 
 
SDT Index   Introduced in §4.2.2   The SDT Index is a value that positively correlates with THE 
optimal detection threshold in a given context:  
 
SDT Index = 
cost of a false positive 
X 
Prior Pr(noise) 
benefit of a true positive Prior Pr(signal) 
 
The optimal balance between the risk of being overly sceptical and the risk of being overly 
trusting is achieved by setting detection thresholds that correlate with the SDT Index. 
The SDT Index may be applied to the operation of the KIP. We substitute the notion of an 
optimal detection threshold with the notion of an optimal Epistemic Standard. We may in 
principle establish an optimal balance between the risk of being overly sceptical and the risk of 
being overly trusting by adjusting our Epistemic Standards in a way that correlates with the SDT 
Index. A version of the SDT Index that is appropriate in relation to the KIP is as follows. 
 
SDT Index = 
cost of a false positive 
X 
Prior Pr(FALSE) 
benefit of a true positive Prior Pr(TRUE) 
 
See also RISK/REWARD QUOTIENT. 
 
Second History   See FIRST HISTORY. 
 
Sender   Introduced in §6.2   An individual who intends or envisages communicating with the 
aim of helping others. They intend or envisage their communication to be Altruistic.  
 
Signal Detection Theory (SDT)   Introduced in §4.1   Certain man-made systems (such as radar 
systems) and many organisms have the challenge of determining how to respond to evidence 
about world conditions that is very often equivocal or deceptive, and have the challenge of 
doing so in such a way as to tend to best advance the system operator’s or organism’s interests. 
Signal Detection Theory suggests a general approach to addressing this challenge: strategically 
adjust the detection threshold or standard of evidence. The threshold or standard may move up 
and down under different circumstances. Further, SDT predicts the level of the detection 
threshold or standard of evidence that optimally advances the operator’s or organism’s 
interests. In principle, an optimal detection threshold is one that best balances the risk of being 
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overly sceptical against the risk of being overly trusting under the circumstances. See also SDT 
Index. (For a full discussion see §4.2.)  
 
Stanley’s Low Stakes Case, Stanley’s High Stakes Case   See Appendix 2.  
 
Subject Sensitive Invariantism (SSI)  Discussed in §2.3   The view that the truth conditions for 
knowledge attributions vary across contexts in accordance with the practical interests of the 
subjects of those attributions.  
 
Teleonomic Function   Introduced in §3.2   A function of a trait exhibited by an organism which 
explains why that trait evolved and persisted over the course of the organism’s subsequent 
evolutionary history. 
 
Trait 1, Trait 2, Trait 3, Trait 4   Introduced in §4.3   The plausibility that we possess these four 
traits constitutes (relatively) direct evidence that the production of ordinary Knowledge 
Intuitions reflects SDT principles and that we do not possess a cognitive device that can trump 
the KIP in relation to the control of calculated deliberate behaviour. 
Trait 1: We assess evidential strength with a degree of precision and a frequency of being 
correct that are sufficient for the application of SDT principles. 
Trait 2: We assess whether our evidence meets our Epistemic Standard in a way that depends 
on the context. 
Trait 3: We seem to set Epistemic Standards that correlate (positively) with the SDT Index. 
Trait 4: We do not possess a cognitive device that can trump the KIP in relation to the control of 
calculated deliberate behaviour. 
 
Worldview   Introduced in §5.3   An individual’s Worldview consists of all her Basic 
Assumptions. This constitutes a basis for ongoing adjudications of Advanced Propositions, and 
so a basis for performing deliberate actions and forming attitudes. 
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